Afghanistan debacle damages U.S. trustworthiness globally
Having participated in the planning of the responsible drawdown of Iraq 12 years ago, it is heart-wrenching to witness today’s chaos in Afghanistan. One moment of film captured the desperation, as thousands flooded the airport in vain attempt to escape as the Taliban was taking it over. So many have risked their lives assisting the United States in the past two decades. The sudden evacuation evokes the images of Saigon, of U.S. abandonment and the ultimate betrayal.
It took almost two years after President Obama’s Iraqi drawdown announcement in February 2009 at Camp Lejeune to turn over all the bases and finally drawdown all the troops in December 2011. Without prior notice to us boots-on-theground, we immediately regrouped as the logistics drawdown cell to execute this new order from the commander in chief. We held dozens of meetings, made detailed plans or tabletop “war games” on gigantic carpets to figure out a carefully detailed sequence of closing more than 400 Forward Operating Bases, starting with the smaller bases, and regrouping the troops and consolidating materiel to the larger bases, while the largest enduring base would close last.
Besides conducting ceremony to transfer a FOB from the American commander to the Iraqi counterpart — every base closure required drawdown transfer authority paperwork, including taking meticulous inventory, and to ensure that every item being turned over to the Iraqis was in good working order. If something was not functional, we had to get it repaired to working condition first (e.g., generators would be repaired to provide electricity). I especially remember one instance when we discovered that the A/C units were stolen at one base; and we had to install new A/C units before the turnover would take place. The basic premise was that to conduct a responsible drawdown, we would never abandon “trash” to the Iraqi government. The timeline was tentative because we knew the enemy would always have a vote, and the drawdown schedule must be adjusted based on safety, security and the actual conditions on the ground.
By the end of 2011, most of those who needed to leave Iraq had departed the country safely.
By contrast, the hasty departure of the last 2,500 U.S. soldiers and the thousands of contractors seemed to lack much of the detailed planning necessary for a responsible drawdown.
Even though on paper the Afghanistan government had more than 300,000 trained soldiers, the small number of U.S. troops, along with the logistical, intelligence and air support provided by the U.S. contractors, proved to have bolstered confidence needed to keep the country from falling into Taliban control. During the last five years, the majority of the fighting against the Taliban was primarily conducted by the Afghan Security Forces, as evidenced by the relatively low number of American casualties.
The U.S.’ abrupt departure from the large Bagram Air Base came as a surprise to the Afghan counterparts. This lack of coordination is astounding. Without Americans’ support and logistical reinforcement, Taliban’s control of Afghanistan became imminent. So why would the Afghan Security Forces be willing to risk their lives to fight the inevitable?
The Taliban quickly entered every provincial capital with little to no resistance. This reminded me of the instance in 2014 when 1,500 al-Qaida insurgents were able to capture Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, with little resistance. Al-Qaida’s ruthless reputation was sufficient to frighten the 15-fold larger Iraqi Security Forces with superior weaponry to flee.
In 2019, the U.S. abandoned the Kurds in Syria, then America’s most trusted allies fighting ISIS and Saddam Hussein for decades; with this latest debacle in Afghanistan, it is doubtful any future ally would be so trusting.