Michael Tomasky

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The Midterms: So Close, So Far Apart

Po­lit­i­cal op­po­nents of Pres­i­dent Trump found much to cheer in this year’s elec­tions: the Demo­cratic takeover of the House of Rep­re­sen­ta­tives, most ob­vi­ously; the el­e­va­tion to Congress of so many women of di­verse back­grounds (an ex-CIA of­fi­cer, a Na­tive Amer­i­can for­mer mixed mar­tial arts fighter); the cap­ture by Democrats of seven gov­er­nor­ships, in­clud­ing the cru­cial states of Michi­gan and Wis­con­sin; the gain by the party of at least 315 state leg­isla­tive seats; the ap­par­ent shift of Ge­or­gia (with its six­teen elec­toral votes) from red to pur­ple.

But there are two ma­jor les­sons to take away from the vot­ing that will have a pro­found im­pact on elec­tions in the near fu­ture. The first is that we have fully en­tered an era when they will be close and very hard-fought slogs, the two sides bat­tling for small gains like play­ers in a rugby scrum. The second is that the ur­ban–ru­ral di­vide is now gap­ing. The first de­vel­op­ment is, or has the po­ten­tial to be, on bal­ance good for Democrats; the second is rather less so and re­quires that they take some ac­tion be­fore 2020.

An es­ti­mated 116 mil­lion people voted on Novem­ber 6, mak­ing these the first midterms in US his­tory to ex­ceed the 100 mil­lion mark. Forty­nine per­cent of reg­is­tered vot­ers cast votes—the high­est per­cent­age since 1966, when that 49 per­cent level was equaled, ac­cord­ing to Univer­sity of Florida pro­fes­sor Michael Mc­Don­ald.1 By com­par­i­son, 83 mil­lion people voted in 2014 (37 per­cent), and 90 mil­lion voted in 2010 (42 per­cent). Democrats have long fret­ted about the dif­fi­culty in get­ting their core vot­ers—young people and people of color, chiefly—to par­tic­i­pate in non­pres­i­den­tial elec­tions. This is a prob­lem that Don­ald Trump’s pres­ence in our po­lit­i­cal life seems to have helped them solve. Young vot­ers made up the same 13 per­cent of the elec­torate this year as they did in 2014, ac­cord­ing to CNN exit polls, but the higher over­all num­ber of vot­ers meant that roughly four mil­lion more people aged eigh­teen to twen­ty­nine voted. In some states where can­di­dates with un­usu­ally great ap­peal to young vot­ers were on the bal­lot, such as Beto O’Rourke in Texas, youth turnout swelled dra­mat­i­cally, es­pe­cially in early vot­ing. In ad­di­tion, ac­cord­ing to CNN, Lati­nos voted in higher num­bers this time, mak­ing up 11 per­cent of the elec­torate, com­pared to 8 per­cent in 2014. The African-Amer­i­can vote stayed about the same. Con­comi­tantly, the white share of the over­all vote dropped a bit, from 75 to 72 per­cent. Still, the num­ber of white vot­ers in­creased by just short of 20 mil­lion. White vot­ers aged sixty-five and up—a group that skews heav­ily Repub­li­can— made up 19 per­cent of the 2014 vote, ac­cord­ing to CNN, and 22 per­cent of this year’s vote. They in­creased their over­all num­ber, that is, by nine mil­lion. In sum: more Democrats voted. But Repub­li­cans, per­haps see­ing for

1See Grace Segers, “Record Voter Turnout in 2018 Midterm Elec­tions,” CBSnews.com, Novem­ber 7, 2018. months that this po­ten­tial wave was taking shape, voted in larger num­bers, too. Hence, our new elec­toral re­al­ity: the prospect of hard-fought and close elec­tions in which our na­tion’s two tribes at­tempt to vote each other into sub­mis­sion.

The num­ber of close races this Novem­ber—races in which hun­dreds of thou­sands or even mil­lions of Amer­i­cans cast votes in elec­tions that ended up be­ing de­cided by a few thou­sand— was note­wor­thy. The high­est-pro­file cases re­ceived a great deal of me­dia at­ten­tion—the gu­ber­na­to­rial and Se­nate races in Florida, the gover­nor’s race in Ge­or­gia, and the Se­nate race in Ari­zona, most no­tably. But many con­tests were close. In the con­gres­sional races that were most hotly con­tested, the to­tal vote was on av­er­age some­where be­tween 250,000 and 300,000. Demo­cratic can­di­dates won a num­ber of them by just a few thou­sand. In South Carolina’s 1st Con­gres­sional Dis­trict, Joe Cunningham beat Katie Ar­ring­ton by about 4,000 votes, and will be the first Demo­crat to rep­re­sent that Charleston–low coun­try dis­trict since 1980. In cen­tral Vir­ginia’s 7th, Abi­gail Span­berger beat David Brat by around 5,500 votes. In Ok­la­homa’s 5th, cen­tered around Ok­la­homa City, Ken­dra Horn beat Steve Russell by about 3,300 votes. In Maine’s 2nd, Jared Golden up­set Bruce Poliquin by 2,900 votes in the state’s first use of ranked-choice vot­ing. And there was a flip side to this: a few Democrats were de­feated by very nar­row mar­gins: by fewer than 2,600 votes in New York’s 27th, by fewer than 1,900 in North Carolina’s 9th, by about 1,100 in Texas’s 23rd, and by fewer than 1,000 in Ge­or­gia’s 7th. Of course, there was the usual large num­ber of dis­tricts in which the heav­ily fa­vored in­cum­bent won by a land­slide. That’s al­ways the case. But the point is that con­trol of the House of Rep­re­sen­ta­tives, as well as sev­eral other very im­por­tant races, was de­ter­mined by a com­par­a­tive hand­ful of votes. There have al­ways been close elec­tions. But one senses, over these last few elec­tion cy­cles, that we have en­tered a new era de­fined by an ide­o­log­i­cal dig­ging of trenches that started with the Bush– Gore bat­tle in Florida and has been in­ten­si­fy­ing ever since.

What are the con­se­quences of this? More po­lar­iza­tion, to be sure. The Repub­li­can Party’s main strate­gic im­per­a­tive has been to max­i­mize base turnout since Karl Rove made it a pri­or­ity in 2000 and es­pe­cially in 2004. The Democrats have been slower to em­brace this strat­egy, largely be­cause their base is less ide­o­log­i­cally ho­moge­nous. But the strong per­for­mances of Stacey Abrams and An­drew Gil­lum will, I think, nudge the Democrats in the base-max­i­miz­ing di­rec­tion. Af­ter all, if two openly lib­eral African-Amer­i­cans could very nearly win the gov­er­nor­ships of Ge­or­gia and Florida by run­ning cam­paigns that were largely aimed at max­i­miz­ing turnout among the base, then maybe that’s the Democrats’ best path for­ward. Those kinds of cam­paigns, in which both par­ties do all they can to iden­tify and get to the polls ev­ery voter in their re­spec­tive bases (rather than per­suade swing vot­ers), will be even more di­vi­sive than re­cent ones.

But that isn’t even the main point, which is that fu­ture elec­tions are likely to see much higher turnout. Go­ing back to 1916, ac­cord­ing to the or­ga­ni­za­tion FairVote,2 turnout in pres­i­den­tial elec­tions has ebbed and flowed. The low­est­turnout years were 1920 and 1924, both un­der 50 per­cent of the vot­ing-age pop­u­la­tion. The high­est turnout years were in the 1960s, all above 62 per­cent, which hasn’t been equaled since (though al­most: 61.6 per­cent voted in 2008, when Barack Obama in­spired such en­thu­si­asm).

In raw num­bers: 131.3 mil­lion people voted for pres­i­dent in 2008, 129.1 in 2012, and 138.8 in 2016. If we can

2See “Voter Turnout Rates, 1916 –2016,” at www.fairvote.org/voter_­turnout#voter _turnout_101. ex­trap­o­late from 2018’s 36 per­cent in­crease in turnout over 2014, we can es­ti­mate that turnout in 2020 could reach up to 190 mil­lion people.

That seems im­pos­si­ble—the votin­gage pop­u­la­tion is around 235 mil­lion, which would make for a turnout rate of 80 per­cent. Pre­sum­ably, there is some sort of ceil­ing above which there are cit­i­zens who care only about soap op­eras or sports and don’t know one party from the other. But I would ven­ture that a 2020 turnout per­haps as high as 160 mil­lion, which would be 68 per­cent, is far from im­pos­si­ble. That would be 22 mil­lion more vot­ers than par­tic­i­pated in the 2016 elec­tion. We should as­sume that Trump’s loy­al­ists will vote in huge num­bers, much larger than 2018 and even 2016, to pro­tect their leader, who as far as they’re con­cerned is all that stands be­tween Amer­ica and eter­nal damna­tion. Are the Democrats pre­pared to counter that wave?

Do­ing so will re­quire com­mit­ments of many mil­lions of dol­lars not just from the na­tional and state par­ties but from all the out­side sources that typ­i­cally in­vest in voter turnout. And cru­cially, it will re­quire that wher­ever they can, Democrats find ways to fight Repub­li­can voter sup­pres­sion, which shows no signs of abat­ing and will surely in­ten­sify. This will need to be done pri­mar­ily at the state level. House Democrats say they want to pass voter­pro­tec­tion leg­is­la­tion, but it will not be signed into law. States can do more in the­ory, although there are no states with strict voter ID laws that flipped to the Democrats suf­fi­ciently for the party to pass new laws. Wis­con­sin, for ex­am­ple, voted out GOP gover­nor Scott Walker and elected Demo­crat Tony Evers, but the state leg­is­la­ture re­mains in Repub­li­can con­trol.

Some crit­i­cal 2020 states did elect Demo­cratic sec­re­taries of state, no­tably Michi­gan and Colorado. In Ge­or­gia, the sec­re­tary of state elec­tion is ap­par­ently headed for a De­cem­ber runoff, as nei­ther Demo­crat John Barrow nor Repub­li­can Brad Raf­fensperger got 50 per­cent of the vote as re­quired un­der state law. In other im­por­tant states, Repub­li­cans will still con­trol the elec­tion ma­chin­ery. In Ohio, dis­ap­point­ingly, the Demo­crat lost. And in Florida, the gover­nor ap­points the sec­re­tary of state, so that of­fice will re­main in GOP hands—although the state’s vot­ers did over­whelm­ingly pass an ex-felon reen­fran­chise­ment ref­er­en­dum that will re­store vot­ing rights to more than one mil­lion Florid­i­ans, dis­pro­por­tion­ately African-Amer­i­cans.

It will be up to out­side groups and their donors to fight re­stric­tive voter ID laws in court or sim­ply to help tar­geted vot­ers pro­cure the nec­es­sary IDs. This will be one of the sig­nif­i­cant bat­tles of 2020, as Repub­li­cans seek to max­i­mize their vote and find ways to pre­vent Democrats from vot­ing.

Now to the second les­son, about the ur­ban–ru­ral split. It should be said that a num­ber of Democrats did quite well in dis­tricts and coun­ties that Trump car­ried in 2016—those Ok­la­homa and South Carolina dis­tricts men­tioned

above, dis­tricts in Iowa and Michi­gan and upstate New York that usu­ally have Repub­li­can rep­re­sen­ta­tion, and a few oth­ers. Democrats’ suc­cess in these cases can be chalked up to find­ing good can­di­dates who ran races tai­lored to the dis­trict, and to the gen­eral dis­sat­is­fac­tion in these ar­eas with Trump.

It is also the case that the Demo­cratic elec­torate is be­com­ing more up­per-in­come (at least among whites) and more con­cen­trated in cities and the kinds of close-in sub­urbs that are home to racially di­verse pop­u­la­tions, along with univer­sity towns, which now vote blue even in the red­dest states. Thomas B. Ed­sall wrote in The New York Times two days af­ter the elec­tion:

There is no clearer sign of the chang­ing shape of the Demo­cratic coali­tion than the fact that go­ing into the 2018 midterm elec­tions, six of the 20 rich­est con­gres­sional dis­tricts were rep­re­sented by Repub­li­cans but that when the new Congress is sworn in, all 20 will be rep­re­sented by Democrats.3

This is good news to the ex­tent that these are of­ten bell­wether con­stituen­cies. But by 2020, the Democrats will have to find ways to im­prove their per­for­mance in ex­ur­ban and ru­ral ar­eas. This is not only for the sake of de­feat­ing Trump, but also to have any chance of re­cap­tur­ing the Se­nate.

3Thomas B. Ed­sall, “The Po­lar­izer in Chief Meets the Midterms,” The New York Times, Novem­ber 8, 2016. A look at the Texas Se­nate race is in­struc­tive here. Repub­li­can Ted Cruz sur­vived a strong and im­pres­sive chal­lenge from Beto O’Rourke, the charis­matic young El Paso na­tive. Cruz won by 50.9 per­cent to 48.3 per­cent, or around 220,000 votes out of 8.33 mil­lion cast. O’Rouke car­ried just thirty-two of the state’s 254 coun­ties. They’re the largest coun­ties by pop­u­la­tion, so one—Har­ris County (Hous­ton), for ex­am­ple—is worth per­haps forty or fifty coun­ties up in the pan­han­dle and the north-cen­tral part of the state. But in those coun­ties, O’Rourke got walloped. For ex­am­ple, he nar­rowly car­ried Tar­rant County, home of Fort Worth, by less than a per­cent­age point—a re­sult that, briefly on elec­tion night, had MSNBC’s Chris Hayes buzzing that an up­set was pos­si­ble. But in six of the seven coun­ties that sur­round Tar­rant, Cruz won 54, 68, 76, 80, 81, and 82 per­cent. And he won 70 or 80 per­cent of the vote in dozens of the smaller ru­ral coun­ties.

Con­trast O’Rourke’s per­for­mance in his state’s red coun­ties with Demo­cratic se­na­tor Sher­rod Brown’s in Ohio’s. Brown beat Jim Re­nacci by 6.4 per­cent—even as the Demo­crat Richard Cor­dray lost the gover­nor’s race by 4.3 per­cent­age points. Ohio has eighty-eight coun­ties. Re­nacci topped 70 per­cent in a hand­ful of them in the west­ern part of the state. But else­where, Brown did much bet­ter. In Ap­palachian Ohio—clas­sic “Trump Coun­try” coun­ties near the Ohio River and the West Vir­ginia bor­der—Brown typ­i­cally got around 40 per­cent of the vote, some­times more. He even car­ried one of them, Athens County, which is the home of Ohio Univer­sity, so Brown had an ad­van­tage there; but even in the other ones, he did much bet­ter than O’Rourke did. Of course, he was the in­cum­bent, which helped, and Ohio con­ser­va­tives aren’t Texas con­ser­va­tives, but he has a kind of work­ing-class au­then­tic­ity that few Democrats do. Democrats will never win those ru­ral coun­ties. But they have to do bet­ter than 25 per­cent to win most statewide races. New York­ers know that a Demo­crat can win a statewide elec­tion by car­ry­ing just six or seven of the state’s sixty-two coun­ties. But no other state has a city as big as New York City, so that kind of for­mula can’t be repli­cated widely.

The elec­toral con­se­quences should be clear. Con­sider the Se­nate map of 2020. Thirty-four se­na­tors will face re­elec­tion (ex­cept for those who choose to re­tire). Of those, twenty-three will be Repub­li­cans, and just eleven Democrats. That sounds fa­vor­able to Democrats, but if you look closer, about fourteen of the Repub­li­cans rep­re­sent deep-red states where they should cruise to re­elec­tion. The other seven will not be easy to flip. The fat­test tar­get is prob­a­bly Maine in­cum­bent Su­san Collins. Maine just elected a Demo­cratic gover­nor, who is also the state’s first fe­male gover­nor. But beat­ing an in­cum­bent se­na­tor is al­ways hard (though some be­lieve Collins may re­tire). The other states where Democrats may have a shot in­clude Colorado, Ari­zona, North Carolina, Iowa, Ge­or­gia, and Texas. Don­ald Trump car­ried five of those six.

All have ma­jor cities, but all are states where it’s hard to win by car­ry­ing only the most pop­u­lous coun­ties and do­ing poorly in the ru­ral ones. In Iowa, for ex­am­ple, Demo­cratic gu­ber­na­to­rial can­di­date Fred Hubbell lost to Kim Reynolds by just 3 per­cent­age points. He won only eleven of the state’s ninety-nine coun­ties. Erin Mur­phy, a re­porter in the state, looked back over the re­sults from Iowa’s last six gu­ber­na­to­rial elec­tions and found that the Demo­cratic can­di­dates won forty­nine, sixty-eight, sixty-two, nine, one, and eleven coun­ties, re­spec­tively— they won the first three and lost the last three.4

As for the pres­i­dency, there are a num­ber of states—the Great Lakes states, North Carolina, Florida, and even Ari­zona and Ge­or­gia—where the pro-Trump vote in the ru­ral coun­ties will be so amped up that the Demo­crat, while win­ning the big coun­ties, will have a tough time over­com­ing it. The party’s re­flex will be to max­i­mize the turnout among the ur­ban-sub­ur­ban base and for­get the coun­try­side. But why can’t it think about both?

The

Demo­cratic Party clearly needs a pro­gram for ru­ral Amer­ica. It needs to high­light poli­cies aimed specif­i­cally at small towns, and its pres­i­den­tial can­di­date has to go cam­paign in some of those towns, if only to demon­strate that he or she cares about the people who live there and would like some of their votes.

The ur­ban–ru­ral di­vide is the cen­tral eco­nomic fact of our time, not just in the United States but across the de­vel­oped

4Erin Mur­phy, “Ur­ban-Ru­ral Di­vide: A Tale of Two Vot­ing Iowas,” QuadCity Times, Novem­ber 9, 2018. world, as the Brook­ings In­sti­tu­tion’s Wil­liam Gal­ston ar­gued in his book Anti-Plu­ral­ism: The Pop­ulist Threat to Lib­eral Democ­racy (2018). Con­sider these stun­ning statis­tics. The United States has experienced three re­ces­sions since 1990. An or­ga­ni­za­tion called the Eco­nomic In­no­va­tion Group stud­ied the three post-re­ces­sion re­cov­er­ies. It found that af­ter the early 1990s re­ces­sion, 71 per­cent of the new busi­ness growth oc­curred in coun­ties with fewer than 500,000 people (and within that, 32 per­cent in coun­ties with fewer than 100,000 people). Af­ter the 2002– 2003 re­ces­sion, that 71 per­cent shrank to 51 per­cent. And af­ter the Great Re­ces­sion of 2007–2009, the num­ber was 19 per­cent—and in coun­ties un­der 100,000 growth was lit­er­ally zero.5 That is a cri­sis. It’s at the root of the opi­oid epi­demic, and it’s why so many young people leave these towns. Repub­li­cans aren’t go­ing to ad­dress it ad­e­quately. Congress did re­cently pass, and Trump signed, an opi­oid bill, but it mostly makes “le­gal and reg­u­la­tory tweaks,” in the words of a Vox re­porter, that should help a lit­tle but are far from the well-fi­nanced na­tion­wide treat­ment pro­gram that’s needed.6 Repub­li­cans won’t sup­port such a pro­gram be­cause it will in­volve in­creased do­mes­tic spend­ing and pos­si­bly a tax, and in Repub­li­can world, those are both for­bid­den—people must wait for the magic of the in­vis­i­ble hand to stitch their com­mu­ni­ties back to­gether. For the same rea­sons Repub­li­cans would be un­likely to sup­port a large-scale eco­nomic re­de­vel­op­ment pro­gram with el­e­ments like uni­ver­sal broad­band ac­cess for small­town Amer­ica, even though it would ben­e­fit their vot­ers.

So there’s an open­ing for Democrats. Hil­lary Clin­ton ac­tu­ally ran on some of these things. One of the ironies of the last elec­tion is that it was Clin­ton, not Trump, who pro­posed an am­bi­tious $30 bil­lion re­de­vel­op­ment plan for “coal coun­try” built around ideas like re­pur­pos­ing mining lands and power plant sites, giv­ing more re­search dol­lars to uni­ver­si­ties and col­leges in the re­gion, and spurring pri­vate in­vest­ment by var­i­ous means. But she said in a de­bate that she was go­ing to put coal min­ers out of work. Trump, who prob­a­bly couldn’t have found West Vir­ginia on a map be­fore 2015, sings coal’s praises. Coal mining em­ploy­ment is up marginally since he took of­fice, from about 51,000 to about 53,000, but it’s dropped by about 35,000 over the last two decades due to au­to­ma­tion and lack of de­mand, and most ex­perts agree that those 35,000 jobs are gone for­ever. In ad­di­tion to aid­ing small-town Amer­ica, Democrats need a new agri­cul­tural pol­icy. Last year I asked Tom Vil­sack, Pres­i­dent Obama’s agri­cul­ture sec­re­tary, to write an ar­ti­cle for Democ­racy: A Jour­nal of Ideas, the quar­terly jour­nal I edit, out­lin­ing what such a pro­gram would look like. It’s a deeply de­tailed es­say built around spe­cific ideas like do­ing more to es­tab­lish lo­cal and re­gional mar­kets so that farm­ers aren’t forced to ac­cept

5See Eco­nomic In­no­va­tion Group, “The New Map of Eco­nomic Growth and Re­cov­ery,” May 2016.

6See Ger­man Lopez, “Trump just signed a bi­par­ti­san bill to con­front the opi­oid epi­demic,” Vox, Oc­to­ber 24, 2018.

com­mod­ity prices on crops like corn and soy­beans, and dra­mat­i­cally ex­pand­ing land con­ser­va­tion ef­forts in ways that ben­e­fit farm­ers. Democrats should lis­ten to him; back when the Demo­cratic gu­ber­na­to­rial can­di­date in Iowa was win­ning a ma­jor­ity of the state’s coun­ties, from 1999 to 2007, that can­di­date was Tom Vil­sack.

So these are the Democrats’ two big elec­toral tasks as they head into 2020: to in­vest in max­i­miz­ing turnout among their base vot­ers in cities and di­verse sub­urbs, and to take steps to en­sure that they can be­come more com­pet­i­tive in the ex­urbs and the coun­try­side. These goals may seem as though they con­tra­dict each other, but they need not; both con­stituen­cies would be open to an agenda em­pha­siz­ing pub­lic in­vest­ments that help mid­dle- and work­ing-class people. There will be some ten­sion on cul­tural is­sues, and Democrats shouldn’t go over­board in pan­der­ing for ru­ral votes. Af­ter all, they’re not try­ing win those ar­eas; just to per­form about 10 or 15 points bet­ter—at Sher­rod Brown’s lev­els rather than Beto O’Rourke’s.

Who is the pres­i­den­tial can­di­date ca­pa­ble of weav­ing this ta­pes­try? I say Brown. If we ac­cept that the 2016 elec­tion was lost chiefly be­cause of the Obama-to-Trump vot­ers in the Great Lakes states, then Brown is ob­vi­ously the choice. Try­ing to help those work­ers has been his cen­tral pro­ject for a quar­ter­century. He knows how to talk to them. He had seemed in­tractably un­in­ter­ested in the job, but right af­ter the elec­tion he be­gan say­ing pub­licly that he was think­ing it over. The idea of an O’Rourke can­di­dacy is in­trigu­ing—he just proved that he could put Texas in play, which by it­self is worth a lot. The can­di­dates who have po­si­tioned them­selves to run, in­clud­ing Se­na­tors El­iz­a­beth Warren, Kirsten Gil­li­brand, Ka­mala Har­ris, and Corey Booker, are untested be­yond the bor­ders of their very blue states.

The Demo­cratic pri­mary, which could fea­ture more than twenty can­di­dates, will likely de­volve into an ide­o­log­i­cal pu­rity test, with sev­eral left-lean­ing can­di­dates likely to run. In fact, left-wing can­di­dates did not do well over­all in this elec­tion. The three ma­jor left-wing groups that en­dorsed can­di­dates this year flipped no House seats from red to blue, while the

more cen­trist New Dem PAC flipped twenty-eight seats. What the Democrats will need in 2020, far more than a can­di­date of the left, or for that mat­ter of the avowed cen­ter, is one who can with­stand what will un­doubt­edly be the dirt­i­est and most dis­hon­est cam­paign in the coun­try’s mod­ern his­tory and pro­vide the clear­est moral con­trast to the in­cum­bent.

In the mean­time, at least the party now has the power to hold Trump and his ad­min­is­tra­tion ac­count­able. They shouldn’t over­reach and carry on about im­peach­ment. Re­mov­ing Trump from of­fice would re­quire the as­sent of about twenty Repub­li­can se­na­tors and is there­fore ba­si­cally im­pos­si­ble. They should just ex­pose the cor­rup­tion through hold­ing ag­gres­sive over­sight hear­ings and trust the Amer­i­can people to reach the right con­clu­sion. Trump’s par­ti­sans are fierce, but the elec­tion showed that they are, how­ever nar­rowly, out­num­bered.

—Novem­ber 21, 2018

Newly elected Demo­cratic con­gress­women Alexan­dria Oca­sio-Cortez (New York), Deb­bie Mu­carsel-Powell (Florida), Abby Finke­nauer (Iowa), andSharice Davids (Kansas) at the US Capi­tol, Wash­ing­ton, D.C., Novem­ber 2018

Sher­rod Brown cel­e­brat­ing his elec­tion to a third term in the US Se­nate, Colum­bus, Ohio, Novem­ber 2018

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