Without accord, only al-Qaida wins in Yemen
The Houthi rebels staged a coup in Yemen several weeks ago against President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and a Saudi Arabia-led coalition has been bombarding them with massive air strikes since they seized power.
Hadi had not been in command for long. To terminate the Yemeni Arab spring, Riyadh and Washington had arranged an easy transition of power. Former Vice President Hadi replaced President Ali Abdullah Saleh: a compliant bureaucrat replaced a resilient dictator.
The pro-government and pro-Houthi parties are still fighting. A rushed May 28 peace conference was recently shelved. Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional powers behind these two Yemeni factions, have been adversaries for decades.
This latest phase of a waxing-and-waning conflict in Yemen started in the early spring. On March 25, Saudi Arabia and its allies — nine Arab countries — began a relentless campaign of air attacks on Houthi targets. The Houthis had made rapid progress in occupying the capital Sanaa, and other strategic locations.
But the Houthi rebels lack wide societal support to consolidate their rule. Here is where Iran came to the rescue of “liberators.” Tehran had helped the Houthis in the past, and it continues to supply them with arms, humanitarian aid and diplomatic support.
In response to nonstop air attacks, the Houthis seem willing to negotiate but not to retreat unconditionally. They are fierce fighters and have been struggling for decades to become significant players in the Yemeni power structure.
The Houthis, a third of Yemen’s population, belong to the Zaydi sect, a branch of Shiism which is relatively close to Sunni theology.
There is a third major force in the mix of Yemeni contenders: the al-Qaida fighters. With increased instabilit y in Yemen, this radical Islamist force has been gaining political influence and territorial control in the eastern and central parts of the country.
Timing the Saudi assault on Tehran’s allies in Yemen during the final stage of Iran’s nuclear negotiations is significant. As it desperately seeks sanction relief, Iran looks especially vulnerable to the Saudis.
But in Tehran’s calculus it is the Saudi royal family that is vulnerable. Why? To mention one glaring factor, Saudi Arabia has a sizable oppressed but politically active Shiite communit y in its eastern province. The Arab assault of Sunnite-majorit y states on the Houthis could invigorate an existing solidarity bond between the Shiite communities of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
The existing stalemate of the war in Yemen is tragic: more than 2,000 killed, 6,000 injured and 500,000 displaced, so far.
If fighting continues, all parties are likely to lose, except for one: al-Qaida. From Yemen, al-Qaida could sow instabilit y in the entire Persian Gulf region.
It is ironic that the Saudis are copying the American air power-dominated strategy against terrorists, while Washington itself is reassessing its war on terror. Moreover, it is peculiar that the Saudis consider the Houthis to be sectarian and terrorists, ignoring the fact that these rebels are not fanatic, and that they are the strongest enemies of al-Qaida in Yemen.
It would be wise if Saudi Arabia and Iran were to set aside their sectar- ian and political rivalry in order to effectively address the danger of expanding radical Islamic movements, not only in Yemen but throughout the region.
Washington should exert strong pressure on Saudi Arabia to work with Iran on common regional issues. The resolution of Yemen’s crisis requires international aid and economic empowerment from neighboring Gulf states. But most important, there is the need for equitable power-sharing among the tribal, ethnic and religious communities.