Reflections on America’s standing as a general retires

When Marine Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie Jr. became head of U.S. Central Command in 2019, his chief worry was Iran. As he ends his tour today, Iran is still the priority. “Iran is not going to go away,” he says.

America’s power waxed and waned in the Middle East during McKenzie’s command of U.S. forces in the region. The United States quit its longest war in Afghanistan, and traditional partners such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates began to hedge their bets. But Iranian power remained a constant.

McKenzie is a hawk on Iran. But he told me that as he hands over military responsibility for the region, he’s convinced that “we need to find an accommodation with Iran going forward.”

McKenzie’s retirement offers a chance to reflect on where America stands in the Middle East after spending so much blood and treasure there for decades as the region’s chief policeman. The honest answer is that the United States has been treading water much of the time, trying to maintain a status quo that was inherently unstable.

McKenzie’s assignment was sometimes a thankless task. Even the countries that benefited most from America’s military umbrella are now flirting with China. But Gulf Arabs are also turning in secret to Israel to coordinate regional air defense against Iran. Facilitating that covert partnership might be the most important achievement on McKenzie’s watch.

I made several trips to the region with McKenzie during his time as Centcom commander. Those conversations mapped the arc of American power.

My first trip was in July 2019. We visited Saudi Arabia as the United States was installing Patriot missile batteries to protect the kingdom. We saw startling modernization of Saudi society. But the repressive face of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman lurked in the background. For example, we shared lunch with Gen. Fahd bin Turki, then the commander of Saudi forces in Yemen. A year later, the crown prince had him arrested.

The following January, with Iranian threats continuing, McKenzie recommended what was probably the most potent display of U.S. power against Iran since the revolution of 1979 — the drone attack that killed Iranian Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani. McKenzie told me that the United States had intelligence that Soleimani was planning new attacks that could have killed Americans in Iraq.

The attack drew a harsh Iranian response: a pinpoint missile attack on Iraq’s al-Asad air base that was meant to kill Americans, and would have if U.S. intelligence hadn’t obtained early warning that allowed U.S. troops to seek shelter. The retaliation demonstrated the precision of Iranian missiles — and the threat they pose to the region. But McKenzie argues that the net effect of the Soleimani tit-for-tat was that it reinforced American deterrence.

Another military success during McKenzie’s tour was the battle against the Islamic State in Syria. We traveled in 2019 to Kobane to meet the United States’ partner in that fight, Syrian Kurdish Gen. Mazloum Abdi. The Kurds provided crucial intelligence that allowed McKenzie’s forces to target and kill Islamic State leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi in February, another key operation during his tour.

America’s chaotic retreat from Afghanistan seemed to mark the eclipse of U.S. power in the Middle East. That’s certainly the way the Saudis and Emiratis perceived it. But as McKenzie leaves his command, U.S. military forces remain in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain and Kuwait — not to mention Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. The Middle East remains a codependent habit that neither the United States nor its fickle friends seem able to quit.