The U.S. doesn’t have ability to defend Ukraine and Taiwan

Today, as Russia masses upwards of 125,000 troops on Ukraine’s border, and China sends hundreds of warplanes into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, the United States is faced with a harsh new reality; balance of power politics has returned with a vengeance.

U.S. foreign policy needs to adapt and reflect the world as it is, not how we wish it was. Doing otherwise will at best invite folly, at worst tragedy.

It is no secret that the liberal “rules-based” international order that defined U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War is being acutely challenged by Russia and China. That order, however, was always anchored in the reality that the United States found itself as the world’s sole superpower following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

With no other power capable of checking its behavior, the United States could shape the rules of the road, acting where it wanted, when it wanted, and how it wanted, without fearing major consequences.

The fact that this is no longer true is a tough pill to swallow for many officials in Washington, D.C., who spent the last 30 years enjoying influential careers while getting every major foreign policy decision wrong.

The current administration, which is full of such establishment figures, is now facing a reality check after rhetorically backing itself into a corner on two fronts.

President Biden has repeatedly stated his intention to defend the “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Ukraine, and in October 2021, claimed the United States had a commitment to defend Taiwan. Neither statement is true, however. Biden already declared that he will not send U.S. troops to Ukraine, and the White House quickly clarified the President’s statement regarding Taiwan, claiming he misspoke.

While the United States does not want to see Russia or China invade their neighbors, the reality is that neither Ukraine nor Taiwan warrant sacrificing the lives of American service members or risking a nuclear war.

Rhetoric to the contrary does little but diminish U.S. credibility to defend its real core strategic interests, including actual treaty allies in Europe and Asia.

A clear imbalance of political will and military capability is evident in both the Ukraine and Taiwan crises. When deciding to enter a war, a nation must have the resolve to kill other people and the understanding that their own citizens will be killed. After 20 years of “low-intensity” conflict in the Middle East, the U.S. public has little appetite for a conventional — let alone nuclear — war with another great power.

The United States has no obligation to defend Ukraine or Taiwan as it does not maintain defense treaties with either. In fact, the United States does not even formally recognize Taiwan as an independent country — which alone should make the prospect of risking World War III over it an absurd proposition.

The military situation is not favorable either.

While the United States continues to possess the world’s most powerful military, Russia and China have both focused on defense modernization in the past few decades.

Both countries have made significant investments in antiaccess/area denial capabilities that aim to deny adversarial forces the freedom to enter and operate within certain geographical limits.

With Ukraine bordering Russia and Taiwan being some 100 miles off the coast of China, the odds that the United States could successfully surge forces into either region and win a conventional war without enduring unacceptable costs are not realistic.

Indeed, war games conducted by the Pentagon regarding a war with China over Taiwan point to a decisive U.S. defeat.

In both Ukraine and Taiwan, the United States must accept reality and prioritize diplomacy and economic statecraft over a military strategy.

Whether we like it or not, the United States is no longer the sole great power in the world.

A prudent U.S. foreign policy that serves the best interest of the American people must recognize and reflect this new reality.

Sascha Glaeser is a research associate at Defense Priorities. He focuses on U.S. grand strategy, international security and transatlantic relations. He holds a master’s in international public affairs and a bachelor’s in international studies from the University of Wisconsin at Madison.