USA TODAY International Edition
Never too soon to consider military options in Syria
As the violence in Syria intensifies, calls are growing for international action.
The estimated death toll of 6,000 since March does not compete with the hundreds of thousands or even millions who have died in some recent wars in places such as Somalia, Congo and Sudan. But right in the heart of the Arab world, the violence threatens the positive momentum of the past year’s various revolutions — and threatens the stability of the crucial Middle East region as well. With President Bashar Assad showing no serious concern for the welfare of his fellow citizens, and no willingness to step down from power, it is quite possible that things will get even worse this year.
In fact, they might have to get worse before they can get better. Tragically, that would seem the reality of the situation. Any promising military mission would be so difficult that its costs and casualties could quickly exceed the lives lost to date; any lesser mission, modeled perhaps after the Libya operation of last year, could easily fail.
But even if it is too soon to act, we can imagine, and begin to debate, at least three types of military options. We should consider them only in the event of strong Arab League and NATO support and participation. Yet if the situation continues to worsen, they should not be ruled out.
One possibility is a naval or air operation to spur a coup against Assad. The goal would be to encourage the Syrian president’s cronies to depose him and create a power- sharing arrangement with the opposition — as a precondition for ending sanctions and the associated punitive military campaign. Our military operations could feature a naval blockade, or a limited air campaign to deprive the regime of assets that it values ( such as mansions and the business interests of close Assad allies).
A second option could be a broader air campaign, similar to what NATO conducted in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. Airstrikes could include targeting of heavy Syrian army weapons being used to shell cities. We could also establish a “no- fly” zone for Syrian military aircraft.
A final option would be to create a safe zone for Syrian civilians, using airpower and some modest number of outside ground troops. This might be established in the north near Turkey. It would be modeled on the protection we afforded Kurds in Iraq throughout the 1990s, even with Saddam Hussein still in power. Alas, it would be more challenging here. There is no natural geographic or demographic basis on which to establish any particular safe zone in Syria. Populations are too interspersed. In addition, the killing is happening largely in central cities, where it would be impractical to create such zones.
This kind of mission would therefore have a limited ability to protect innocents. But it could help some. And it could be built upon to create the nucleus of a stronger resistance that could ultimately challenge Assad’s rule, using the safe area as a staging base. We could threaten Assad with that prospect — including outside arming of resistance forces — if he refused to negotiate with the opposition and refused to stop the killing or let go of power.
None of these ideas looks decisive, and all are risky. But it’s not too early to start debating them— and to start threatening the Syrian regime that unless the violence ceases, the world will reassess its options.