How the crisis evolved,
Analysts say U.S., Western leaders should’ve planned for Russian moves
Now that Russia has annexed Ukraine’s Crimea region, the question arises whether the U.S. and its European allies could have kept the region out of Moscow’s hands. Ukraine had seen unrest for years, but it only attracted the West’s focus when demonstrations that began in November blew up into violence. Protesters demanded stronger economic ties to Europe, while Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovych wanted an alliance with Russia.
European capitals, Washington and Moscow were drawn into a drama that unfolded rapidly. The steps taken by all sides may provide clues into what lay ahead for the potentially explosive region:
Feb. 7: Yanukovych visits Putin, Russians visit Crimea
As demonstrators took over government buildings to demand change, Yanukovych visited Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Olympic opening ceremonies in Sochi, Russia. That week, a Russian lawmaker visiting the Crimean capital, Simferopol, announced that Russia would use force if needed to “protect” Crimea’s ethnic Russian residents.
Damon Wilson, White House director of European affairs under President George W. Bush, said he believes Putin sent emissaries to Crimea to prepare the ground for a takeover using local militiamen and Russian troops.
Putin had a “playbook,” he said, and the visit was the first overt sign that the playbook was being executed.
President Obama’s response was silence. Wilson suggested Obama could have issued warnings at this point about protecting “the territorial integrity” of Ukraine, which later became White House code for warning Russia not to invade Crimea.
Janusz Bugajski, an independent Russia analyst based in Washington, said at that point, U.S. and Western officials should have begun planning for a Russian invasion.
Feb. 18-20: More than 80 killed in Ukraine’s capital
Obama did not issue a public comment on the turmoil until after new fighting erupted between protesters and police in Kiev. More than 80 people, mostly protesters, were killed. When he did speak on Feb. 19, Obama called for restraint on both sides and threatened “there will be consequences if people step over the line.”
Critics, such as Sen. John McCain-R, Ariz., criticized the response as weak. They said the consequences needed to be harsh and spelled out.
Feb. 21-22: Yanukovych is deposed after striking a deal with the opposition.
The Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, ousted Yanukovych and then implemented a series of measures including the annulment of a law that gave official status to the Russian language in regions where 10% of the population speak it. The response was negative in Crimea, where most people speak Russian.
Western diplomats might have pushed harder to temper the “revolutionary zeal” of Ukraine’s new leaders by warning them that Russia would use such inflammatory measures as a pretext for invasion, Wilson said.
U.S. and European diplomats also should have pushed the Rada to reach out to Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and leaders in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, where Yanukovych’s support was greatest, to show their desire to include them in Ukraine’s future, Wilson said.
The annulment was vetoed under Western pressure, but Russian troops were already heading to the border and flooding a leased Russian naval base at Crimea’s Black Sea port. Russian officials said it was their duty to to protect ethnic Russians from “radicals” who had seized Kiev.
The Ukrainian military should have acted faster, but “part of it is our fault for not alerting the Ukrainians what was going to happen, because presumably we had good intelligence on what was going on,” Bugajski said.
Feb. 25: Pro-Russian protests begin in Crimea’s capital, Simferopol
Bugajski said Western officials should have issued a stern warning as soon as Russian troops appeared in Crimea: “If you try to topple the elected government in the Crimea we will impose sanctions.” Faced with only threats, Moscow pressed ahead.
Wilson said Ukraine could have done more militarily, sending troops to stop the Russian advance rather than let themselves be blocked in their bases by pro-Russian “volunteers.”
The U.S. could have deployed military force, but that might have backfired, Wilson said. Thousands of U.S. troops to secure an independent Ukraine is “not what the Ukrainians wanted,” he said.
Feb. 26: Soldiers without national insignias seize two Crimean airports
It was clear to many observers these were Russian troops. Obama spent hours on the phone with Putin, warning of “costs for any military intervention in Ukraine.” But still no sanctions.
“American officials could have called a spade a spade immediately, when the first few hundred special forces appeared at the Crimean airports,” Wilson said.
Ukraine should have sent its ships out to sea rather than let them become trapped at port by Russian vessels, he said. Then again, a more confrontational approach by Ukraine’s military could have led to open fighting, which Russia would have used as a justification to send even more troops and armaments, he said.
Feb. 27: Armed troops invade Crimean parliament
Under the eye of uniformed Russian gunmen, Crimean lawmakers voted to appoint a new prime minister, Sergei Aksyonov, an unknown who had received 3.5% of the vote in the most recent elections. He had created a “self defense” youth group several thousand strong, and they were out pressuring elected officials to resign. Aksyonov then announced Crimea would hold a referendum on independence.
That should have been Obama’s moment to impose broad sanctions against many people in the Russian government, and against Russia’s banking and financial sectors, said Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation.
The U.S. could also have moved an aircraft carrier battle group into the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to send Russia a signal to back off, Cohen said. No such moves were taken.
Obama said Feb. 28 that he was “deeply concerned” about Russian troop movements in Crimea and repeated that “there will be costs” for military intervention. It was not until March 6 that he authorized sanctions on Russian officials barring them from travel and freezing any assets they may have in the U.S.
Heather Conley, who heads the Europe program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that stronger sanctions would have sent a message but that European politicians were wary of launching an economic war with Russia “at a time they are economically vulnerable.”
And no amount of diplomatic pressure, she said, would have altered the outcome. “Absent of a military response,” Russia’s Crimean takeover was not to be prevented she said.
March 16: Crimea votes to join Russia
Crimeans streamed into the street to celebrate a vote considered by the West to be illegal and rigged in Russia’s favor. The next day, the White House imposed sanctions on seven Russian officials and four Ukrainians.
Wilson said Western powers should have known Putin would try to make a move for Crimea, which he referred to years ago as a crucial asset of the Russian Federation. Putin also has referred to the breakup of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century. “It was no surprise to us the Russians have been thinking about, planning for, imagining scenarios for Crimea,” he said.
The White House defended its foreign policy toward Russia, insisting that the administration had been “clear-eyed” in its relations with Moscow.
“Our approach to our relations with Russia has been extremely clear-eyed,” said White House press secretary Jay Carney. “It has not been driven by hope or romanticism about what Russia might do but very specifically driven by what we can get done cooperatively.”