NewsDay (Zimbabwe)

AU’s peace and security architectu­re: Filling the gaps

- Dominique Mystris  Dominique Mystris is a senior researcher at SA SDG Hub, University of Pretoria, South Africa

SINCE its inception in 2002 the African Union has been under pressure to resolve the extensive peace and security challenges being faced by the continent. In particular, it tried to address the limitation­s faced by its predecesso­r, the Organisati­on of African Unity (OAU) in this area.

The biggest change has been the shift from the OAU’s socalled non-interferen­ce stance to the AU’s more interventi­onist approach. This is most explicitly found in Article 4 of the AU Constituti­ve Act.

The AU’s African Peace and Security Architectu­re was establishe­d when the organisati­on adopted the Protocol on the Establishm­ent of the Peace and Security Council in July 2002. It is guided by the AU’s mandate and its interventi­onist approach.

The architectu­re, which has five pillars composed of AU organs and bodies, drives the AU’s peace and security work. Its aim is to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts by working collaborat­ively with the regional economic communitie­s and mechanisms.

Therefore, the peace and security architectu­re has a role to play from the early warning and conflict prevention stages to post-conflict developmen­t.

The five pillars are: the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise; the Continenta­l Early Warning System; the Standby Force and the Peace Fund.

While not all pillars function as intended, there have neverthele­ss been a number of success stories in which the architectu­re was instrument­al.

Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council is the main decision-making body of the peace and security architectu­re and can take decisions on a number of fronts. These include:

implementi­ng the AU’s common defence policy,

performing peace-making and building functions,

authorisin­g and overseeing peace support missions,

recommendi­ng Article 4(h) interventi­ons for situations of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, and

impose sanctions for unconstitu­tional changes of government, to name a few.

As such, it has issued a plethora of resolution­s since its inception with varying degrees of success. Most recently, it suspended Mali from the African Union after the coup that ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.

Yet, the Council does not always respond, or is sometimes slow to respond, to developing situations and conflicts. Cameroon, has proved to be one such situation where the Council has remained largely quiet on over the years.

There are a number of reasons for these shortcomin­gs.

First, despite only requiring a majority vote, it is subject to political constraint­s that hamper its decisions. This is despite the provision that disallows countries that are being discussed from participat­ing in Council meetings concerning them. Such countries are only allowed to make a statement.

There are also financial and personnel constraint­s. For example, mustering enough troops to fulfil a mandate can be a challenge. And then there’s the question of financing, training and equipping them. This is a common problem for the AU mission in Somalia.

In addition, there has been external influence and underminin­g of the Council’s attempts at conflict resolution. A case in point was NATO’s interventi­on in Libya, which was parallel to the AU’s mediation efforts.

Panel of the Wise

The Panel of the Wise acts as the advisory body to the Peace and Security Council. It has mediation and preventati­ve diplomacy roles.

The panel’s five elders are chosen based on their contributi­ons to peace, security and developmen­t. They work either at the request of the Peace and Security Council, or on the panel’s own initiative.

The panel has successful­ly undertaken various roles, including when there has been need for a neutral, respected diplomatic interventi­on.

Examples of their work includes interventi­ons in Kenya’s post-election violence in 2008, and their reports regarding the Arab spring.

Continenta­l early warning system

The mandate of the continenta­l early warning system is conflict prevention and anticipati­ng events.

Both are notoriousl­y difficult. Prevention and anticipati­on rely on accurate data and political will to act, yet the Peace and Security Council tends to react more to conflicts rather than preempt them.

Reports from the early warning system inform the Council and remain one of the ways it is prompted to meet. To be more effective, the early warning system needs to work more collaborat­ively with non-government­al and internatio­nal organisati­ons, academic institutio­ns and research centres.

While this system continues to suffer from staff and funding shortages, building capacity is ongoing.

African Standby Force

Composed of contingent­s from the five regions, the African Standby Force’s job is to implement decisions made by the Peace and Security Council. This includes authorised interventi­ons, conflict and dispute prevention, observatio­n, monitoring and any type of peace support mission, humanitari­an assistance and peace-building.

But there were delays in getting it off the ground. Mobilising a standby force from across the 55 States was never going to be easy because the appetite for involvemen­t in peace support operations differs. Second is the diverse states of readiness and capabiliti­es of the military, police and civilians across countries and regions.

Despite the 2003 decision to establish the force, it was only in 2016 that the force was officially considered to have obtained full operationa­l capacity. Since then, it has yet be deployed.

Peace Fund

The Peace Fund is tasked with the mammoth role of ensuring availabili­ty of funds.

The vast majority of AU members struggle to meet their membership dues, and self-financing of the AU is yet to prove possible. This means that the fund struggles to secure support from African States.

The fund is financed from the AU’s budget, fundraisin­g and voluntary contributi­ons from AU members, individual­s, civil society, internatio­nal partners, and the private sector.

While US$164 million has been raised to date, it is well below the target of US$400 million.

Overall, the success of the African Peace and Security Architectu­re is paramount for Africa’s developmen­t and human security. Its value on the continent’s peace and security agenda should not be underestim­ated.

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