The Mnangagwa squad

PROPELLED into prime position by the military coup that overthrew the late former President Robert Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa holds the reins of power in Harare. The Africa Report examines how tightly he is holding on and how his current and former allies and opponents are protecting their interests.

Armoured cars and tanks had been trundling across the capital all day on November 14, 2017. It was not until the early hours of the next day that Zimbabweans heard a hesitant General Sibusiso Moyo explain that Mugabe, president for 37 years, was under house arrest.

The Zimbabwe Defence Forces would be dealing with the “criminals” around the President who were responsible for the country’s “socioeconomic problems”. Of course, this was not a coup d’état, added Moyo, who was later appointed Foreign Affairs minister.

Mnangagwa arrives on the scene

On this point, Moyo contrived to convince South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma and Guinea’s sceptical President Alpha Condé, who chaired the African Union at the time. In Zimbabwe, people were more interested in the coming man — Mnangagwa, who had fled into exile a week earlier. Tales of derring-do circulated about how Mnangagwa and sons sneaked into Mozambique via bush paths, dodging would-be assassins, before winding up in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg.

Back in Harare, the generals and the image-makers co-ordinated demonstrations bringing tens of thousands onto the streets to celebrate the toppling of Mugabe. Days later, Mnangagwa flew in to a rockstar’s reception, promising “jobs, jobs, jobs” to the people and “Zimbabwe is open for business” to foreign investors. From his days as personal secretary to Mugabe, Mnangagwa had cannily positioned himself as the heir apparent by sidelining his rivals until only one serious contender was left — Mugabe’s wife, Grace.

The November 2017 coup took out both Mugabe and his wife, leaving Mnangagwa space to launch his project: fixing the Zimbabwe economy and reuniting the ruling party for another decade in power. Within a year it had failed. The economy weakened further due to corruption and patronage as well as a regional drought. Political fights within the ruling Zanu PF party became even more bitter and the all-important military lost confidence in Mnangagwa.

Some citizens believed the promises of free elections; diplomats mulled lifting sanctions, and companies started signing deals. Three years later, the new order is cracking open. Clean water and power are sporadic, inflation is more than 750% and the relaunched local dollar has crashed against its US counterpart. The team that brought Mnangagwa to power now speaks of buyer’s remorse.

Plots and putsches are in the air. In response, Mnangagwa and the first family are circling the wagons. Loyalty, if not blood ties, is the defining test in the inner circle. Higher Education

former deputy minister Godfrey Gandawa warns about the direction the country is going: “The Zanu PF has turned the security forces into a militia which they use as a coercive tool.

“The Minister of State Security has been implicated as a key cog in the abuses of the rights of citizens since January 2019.”

Who runs this town?

Mnangagwa has brought the levers of security under direct control of the presidency, although saboteurs can still cause damage. Gandawa says the presidency has gone further still: “Zimbabwe’s courts, including the chief justice and the Constitutional Court, are captured by the Executive. People [are] being arrested for insulting the President even though the law setting out this crime is patently unconstitutional.”

As Mnangagwa has centralised power around his office and its immediate satellites, opponents have taken cover elsewhere. The circle around Vice-President Constantino Chiwenga has become a staging post for regime sceptics. Zimbabwe has two heads who often disagree. Mnangagwa has doubled down on personal security but Chiwenga, as former army commander, is closer to the ranks of the military. No one knows how these formations will hold up under the country’s worst economic crisis in decades. Chiwenga has clashed with Mnangagwa behind closed doors and is accused of plotting against him.

The original accord under which Mnangagwa was to serve a single term before handing over to Chiwenga, 10 years his junior, has been torn up. Mnangagwa’s allies thwarted a plan by Chiwenga’s acolytes to oust the President in January.

Officers say these rumblings explain Mnangagwa’s enthusiasm for a lengthy and comprehensive lockdown in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Senior officers are increasingly critical of the shenanigans of Zanu PF politicians, often allies of Mnangagwa.

Those divisions surfaced more publicly at a meeting of the Zanu PF politburo in July, when intelligence chief Isaac Moyo tabled a report claiming that two members of the committee had been storing posters and placards calling for the overthrow of Mnangagwa and praising Chiwenga. According to Moyo, the plotters had planned to use a national demonstration by opposition parties on July 31 as cover for the operation.

A few weeks earlier, senior State officials held a bizarre Press conference denying that they had uncovered coup plots against Mnangagwa. Some say a cohort of younger officers and politicians is preparing to take over.

But most of the names mooted have an air of surrealism about them. Two things have become clear from the chatter.

For now, Mnangagwa has a wrestler’s grip on the army and State security, and he wants to run for a second term in 2023. Any attempt to oust him by capitalising on dissent within the regime is likely to seek some sort of endorsement from Chiwenga and Sibusiso Moyo.

Zimbabwe is open for business. Really?

The lobbying, in the wake of the November 2017 coup, run by the Foreign Affairs minister and business ally Edwin Manikai, yielded dividends quickly.

Rory Stewart, Britain’s Africa minister at the time, jumped on a plane to Zimbabwe within hours, talking of a new era in Harare-London relations. Within a year, ministers were claiming some $15bn of new investment had been pledged. Two big foreign operators in Zimbabwe — Londonbased Gemcorp and Cairo-based Afreximbank — provided lines of credit, said to be secured by mineral exports. But the government struggled to widen its pool of backers.

Despite a stream of high-profile deals, little moved on the ground. Most of these multibillion-dollar deals with opaque outfits, such as Cyprus-based Karo group, Russia’s Vi Holding and Great Dyke Investments (GDI), were premised on State access to mineral assets such as platinum or gold, and they stumbled on raising finance.

The Vi Holdings and GDI platinum mine will require $2bn in investment but bankers say that Zimbabwe will not be able to raise the money as long as the US representatives on the World Bank and IMF boards insists on opposing any finance or guarantees for the Mnangagwa government or entities close to it. Much of the talk about opening doors to foreign companies and governments was aimed at impressing voters before the presidential elections in July 2018.

When the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission announced a narrow victory for Mnangagwa against a background of claims of fraud by the opposition and the shooting dead of at least six civilians in a Harare demonstration, the goodwill dissipated. Mnangagwa appointed Mthuli Ncube, formerly a vice-president with the African Development Bank, as finance minister, to reopen negotiations with the World Bank.