NewsDay (Zimbabwe)

How ED is plotting takeover of opposition

- Alex Magaisa

“WE are Everything”

“We must be respected. We are the majority. We are the people. We are the government. We are the army. We are the air force. We are the police. We are everything you can think of. We determine who can do mining in Zimbabwe. We determine who can construct a railway line in Zimbabwe. We determine who can build a road in Zimbabwe. No other party can do so!” said President Emmerson Mnangagwa a few years ago.

He was speaking at a political gathering. At that time, he was Vice-President to the late former President Robert Mugabe. In one sense, the words were a descriptio­n of the totality of control that Zanu PF held over the State and its institutio­ns. Since 1980, there has been a conflation of party and State, which has left the latter completely emasculate­d.

In another sense, the words represente­d Mnangagwa’s vision of his kind of State; a typically totalitari­an State in which the ruling party controls virtually everything and the opposition plays a meaningles­s role. For Mnangagwa, the opposition is no more than a nuisance. If it is to be allowed, it is merely for purposes of appearance­s; a gimmick to hoodwink the rest of the world. If it cannot be obliterate­d, it must be controlled.

This is a State in which critique of the government is not permitted. Citizens must toe the line. It is a system where patronage dominates ahead of merit. There is a very small caste of elites which is engaged in a process of grand accumulati­on of personal wealth on the back of public resources. The type of State that Mnangagwa is establishi­ng is called a kleptocrac­y.

The dictators’ playbook

In the three years since he usurped power from Mugabe, Mnangagwa has demonstrat­ed an unrelentin­g willingnes­s and zeal to achieve his vision of a controlled and pliable opposition.

This much is evident in how he has shut down democratic space by using the military to kill protestors in cold blood and detaining political opponents and activists on spurious charges.

The detention of political activists is now commonplac­e. By denying them bail and keeping them in filthy prison cells, the Mnangagwa regime is applying a strategy of detention without trial, commonly found in dictatoria­l regimes. These political activists are literally serving sentences before and without trial. When they are finally released on bail, they are kept on remand for long periods.

During this time, their political freedoms are tightly restricted by severe bail conditions. Eventually the courts let them go because the case would have gone cold. The reality is that the State never had a credible case in the first place. It’s a strategy of lawfare, whereby the law is weaponised against political opponents and critics.

It also includes selective applicatio­n of the law, whereby rules are applied differentl­y depending on the political totem of the individual­s. Those carrying the opposition totem are pursued relentless­ly by the authoritie­s, while members of Zanu PF are spared or treated with kid gloves. In this strategy of lawfare, Mnangagwa has roped in the police, the army, the prosecutio­n and the Judiciary, lending the systematic abuse a false coat of legality.

Basic political rights, such as freedom of expression or the right to demonstrat­e exist only on paper. In practice, they have been severely restricted. Human rights abuses by State agents including torture and abduction are not investigat­ed. Instead, protestors against these abuses are detained. This is why Takudzwa Ngadziore, president of the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union is in remand prison, while the abductors and torturers of Tawanda Muchehiwa, whose cause he was championin­g, are walking free.

In another case, the State is going hard against Joana Mamombe, a victim of abduction and torture who is suffering from anxiety and depression as a result. Yet it has no appetite to investigat­e cases of abduction and torture. When Mnangagwa appointed a commission of inquiry to investigat­e the post-election violence in 2018, and the commission recommende­d the investigat­ion and prosecutio­n of offenders, he simply ignored it. No one has been prosecuted for the cold-blooded murders of six civilians.

Furthermor­e, using the dictators’ playbook, Mnangagwa has embarked on a mission to change the Constituti­on in order to consolidat­e power in his office. This is what the continent’s first generation of dictators did soon after independen­ce. They amended the constituti­ons to centralise power in the office of the president. If successful, the proposed changes will be a major reversal of the gains of the constituti­on-making process that produced the current Constituti­on in 2013.

Annihilati­on

However, Mnangagwa’s dictatoria­l streak has been most evident in his tireless scheming to annihilate and take control of the main opposition political party, the MDC Alliance. Dictators prefer to rule without opposition. If there is any opposition, they would like to control it. For Mnangagwa, the strategic goal is very simple: to weaken the MDC Alliance by taking control of it through his surrogates.

To be sure, he did not create the fault-lines in the opposition. But their existence presented an opportunit­y which he has fully exploited in his strategy to gain control of the opposition. In them, he found an instrument to accentuate the divisions and go after the major threat to power represente­d by the MDC Alliance led by Nelson Chamisa. The endgame is clear: to weaken the MDC Alliance so much that Zanu PF will be left without any serious political competitio­n.

Mnangagwa’s strategic goal is not just a threat to the MDC Alliance as an institutio­n but to the very idea of political pluralism and serious opposition politics in Zimbabwe. It examines how Mnangagwa is using the apparatus of the State and surrogates in the opposition to systematic­ally and methodical­ly destroy the idea of political pluralism in Zimbabwe, leaving him and Zanu PF with untrammell­ed power.

What happened at the elections? To understand Mnangagwa’s strategy to control the opposition, it is useful to present the position after the 2018 general elections. The main opposition contested the election as the MDC Alliance, originally a coalition of seven political parties. When the then leader and presidenti­al candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai died in February 2018, he was succeeded by Chamisa. The succession was not without controvers­y, but Mnangagwa himself duly recognised that Chamisa was his opponent and the MDC Alliance was a political party.

That the MDC Alliance was a political party under the electoral law was never in doubt. Zimbabwe’s electoral law recognises political parties and independen­ts. Political parties might form a coalition, but the law does not recognise coalitions. It only recognises political parties. Therefore, the MDC Alliance presented itself before the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec) as a political party and it was recognised as such. Candidates were nominated as candidates of the MDC Alliance.

The formula for calculatin­g proportion­al representa­tion seats recognised the MDC Alliance as a political party. When Chamisa challenged results of the election, even the Constituti­onal Court recognised the MDC Alliance as a political party.

I make extensive reference to this recognitio­n to highlight the absurdity of the claims in recent months that seek to delegitimi­se the status of the MDC Alliance as a political party. It’s nothing more than political gamesmansh­ip designed to exclude and dismember the main opposition from the political community.

The MDC Alliance came second to Zanu PF, with more than 100 seats in Parliament and 28 out of the 32 urban local authoritie­s. Its presidenti­al candidate Chamisa was adjudged second to Mnangagwa, although this outcome has remained a point of contention. Both Mnangagwa and Chamisa shared the lion’s share of the national vote, each getting more than two million votes.

The nearest candidate Thokozani Khupe of MDC-T was so far behind that her presence barely registered on the electoral scale. Khupe had just 45 000 votes and her party, the MDC-T got only two seats in Parliament, both based on proportion­al representa­tion.

I mention this to highlight the attempt in recent months to exclude Chamisa while attempting a miracle of resurrecti­on of Khupe’s status as the legitimate opposition leader.

Read full article on www.newsday. co.zw

Alex T Magaisa is a prominent Zimbabwean lawyer and constituti­onal expert currently teaching law at the University of Kent Law School in England. He once served as advisor of the then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Morgan Tsvangirai from 20122013. He writes here in his personal capacity.

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