NewsDay (Zimbabwe)

People’s verdict paints a dark picture for Zimbabwe

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THE Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) conducted a national survey on behalf of the Afrobarome­ter Network on “The Quality of Democracy and Governance in Zimbabwe” between April 16 and May 1, 2021. Yesterday, MPOI disseminat­ed the second round of the findings focusing on: People’s developmen­t agenda Leaders’ performanc­e

National dialogue

Freedoms (of speech, of associatio­n and assembly)

Perception­s of social media

I intend to share my immediate reflection­s and wider political implicatio­ns of the findings.

The people’s verdict in the MPOI survey paints a gloomy picture on prospects of economic and political recovery for Zimbabwe. The President is performing dismally, unemployme­nt is a major concern, the elected Members of Parliament (MPs) and councillor­s’ performanc­e rate is way below that of appointed traditiona­l leaders, there is limited freedom of associatio­n and expression and the main sources of news to the majority of citizens living in rural areas remain partisan radio stations and traditiona­l leaders.

Perhaps, the ray of hope is the citizens’ high demand for an all-inclusive national dialogue. However, this can only bear fruit if citizens can converge and actualise their demand through sustained social pressure from below. Otherwise, Zimbabwe is heading towards its fifth lost decade since the end of British colonial rule.

Reflection­s on findings

First, it is striking to note that only 35% of Zimbabwean­s approve or strongly approve President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s performanc­e in the past 12 months. The lowest rating for his predecesso­r, Robert Mugabe, was 20% in 1999 though it later rose to 69% at the time of his ouster in November 2017. There is evidently a continuous erosion of Mnangagwa’s legitimacy since he assumed power in the 2017 military coup. In Afrobarome­ter’s April/May 2018 survey, almost half of citizens, 49%, approved of his job performanc­e.

The most popular narrative is that the President’s legitimacy failed at the input side of the political system through failure to hold a democratic election in 2018. However, this data shows that Mnangagwa has even failed to create legitimacy from the output side of the political system through effective performanc­e. In addition, what is striking is that, the loss of legitimacy is permeating to the ruling Zanu PF’s electoral stronghold­s in the rural areas.

Only 44% approve of the President’s performanc­e and 40% disapprove in the rural hinterland. However, within his Zanu PF party, he has a decent approval of 67%. This possibly means he has been working to increase his grip on the party.

Second, 72% approve or strongly approve the performanc­e of traditiona­l leaders in the past 12 months. They have a higher approval rate than elected MPs at 29% and councillor­s at 48%. Yet one reality is that some traditiona­l leaders are subordinat­ed to a partisan ruling party. On that basis, some liberal democrats delegitimi­se them as “decentrali­sed despots”. However, from the survey, supporters of both the opposition Movement for Democratic Change led by Nelson Chamisa (MDC Chamisa) and Zanu PF believe that traditiona­l leaders are performing well.

So this means Zimbabwe is likely to see the survival of chiefs whichever party is in power. A total of 57% of MDC Chamisa supporters believe that traditiona­l leaders are performing well. This might be surprising for a party whose leadership articulate­s a modernist vision built on democratic­ally elected and accountabl­e institutio­ns. However, the findings are not surprising if we look at the actual functionin­g of chiefs outside the party politics.

They convene and chair the village assemblies where every adult member of the village is a member, the village heads chair village developmen­t committees and headmen sit in ward developmen­t committees which plan and coordinate developmen­t at local levels. The Traditiona­l Leaders Act increased functions of a chief from three to 22; a headman from three to 11 and village heads were allocated 16 functions. The 2013 Constituti­on also bolstered chiefs’ powers by giving them “jurisdicti­on and control over the communal land”. They can allocate residentia­l and agricultur­al land but with the consent of district councils and in line with customary law.

Some rate chiefs in line with their spiritual and cultural functions in societies where people believe in ancestral veneration. If we look at the actual functionin­g of traditiona­l leaders, we can find that they play a more complex role than just being “decentrali­sed despots” and are more than socially embedded in the rural areas.

Third, the survey indicates that the most important problem facing the country that the government must address is unemployme­nt. It was cited by 38% of respondent­s as one of their three priorities. Why would this be so in a country that is said to have a low unemployme­nt rate of 5,7% as of 2020 according to the Internatio­nal Labour Organisati­on (ILO)? This was much lower than South Africa’s unemployme­nt rate which stood at 28,48%.

Most scholars count Zimbabwean­s as employed because they work in the informal sector and are not just sitting at home. This is also in line with the ILO definition. Perhaps, the MPOI findings raise conceptual issues about the definition of unemployme­nt in relation to people’s everyday aspiration­s. In everyday life, some Zimbabwean­s do not consider working in informal family businesses as employment because they are “not paid”. The challenge is to draw a line between the production and reproducti­on sphere in a highly informalis­ed and shadow economy.

In addition, smallholde­r farmers who use unpaid family labour have also been counted as employed in official Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency figures. What I discern from the survey is that the citizens tend to prefer formal employment where they can have social security, better wages and better working conditions. This is also in line with Afrobarome­ter’s pre-election 2018 survey, where most people thought that the election campaign was mainly about job creation.

Fourth, the findings on national dialogue are informativ­e to ongoing national and regional efforts to foster dialogue. Almost three out of four Zimbabwean­s (73%) call for a national dialogue that extends beyond political parties to include other stakeholde­rs such as businesses, churches, and civil society. There has been a binary political discourse on whether there is a crisis or no crisis in Zimbabwe. What this survey inadverten­tly shows is that the country is mired in a crisis that needs a collective resolution. What is striking is that the acknowledg­ement of crisis now transcends the urban and rural divide. In fact, more rural residents (76%) than urbanites (68%) are supportive of an all-inclusive national dialogue. This shows that given a platform even the rural constituen­cies considered to be the support base for Zanu PF have grievances that they want addressed through peaceful dialogue.

The Political Actors Dialogue (Polad) has struggled to gain social legitimacy despite Zanu PF being involved. Only 28% agree or strongly agree that Polad is the only option to bring about national stability and developmen­t in Zimbabwe. What this reveals is that there is no widespread support for Polad even within Zanu PF’s social base. For civil society, churches, South Africa and the Southern African Developmen­t Community (Sadc) region, this should bolster calls for an all-inclusive national dialogue to resolve the multi-faceted crises facing Zimbabwe.

Fifth, Zimbabwean citizens are not free to express their political views and this seems to take a gendered, geographic­al and a surprising demographi­c pattern. Overall, close to eight out of 10 citizens (79%) say they “often” or “always” have to be careful about what they say regarding politics. On gender, the fear is more prevalent amongst women where 85 % are unfree to talk about politics.

Geographic­ally, fear is more prevalent in the Zanu PF rural stronghold­s and in political violence hotspots. These include Manicaland, Mashonalan­d West, Mashonalan­d East and Mashonalan­d West provinces. It shows that Zanu PF rules by coercion.

Phillan Zamchiya is a researcher and academic. He writes here in his personal capacity.

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