Biological counter-proliferation strategy and action plan: Part One
...in unity lies strength
AS we continue on our monography series of biodefence and strategy, we have scaled the scope to the regional biological strategy and action plan.
The threat of biological weapons has always existed; it has been the biggest enemy of mankind since the beginning of time, space and matter.
SADC faces a wide range of infectious diseases — either naturally occurring, deliberately disseminated or accidentally induced. Proposed SADC biological counter-proliferation monographs aim to strengthen the SADC regional bloc’s health security by preparing it for biological attacks and heightening its awareness to biological threats. These include bioterrorism, protection of civilians and military forces, medical counter-measure stockpiling, risk communication, border closures, and alertness to emerging infectious diseases, among other issues.
The proposed counter-proliferation conceptual mechanism should include conventional public health objectives, such as health surveillance, detection and rapid response to infectious disease threats.
People agree, more than ever, that biological threats are real, thus inter-governmental bureaucracies should come up with measures to curtail this persistent and consistent threat.
Regionally and globally, the COVID-19 crisis exposed serious shortcomings in both national, regional as well as international public health and biodefence efforts.
SADC nations, like Zimbabwe which recently placed a Biowarfare Bill on the legislative agenda, recognised the importance of biodefence and strategy and are investing in the development of biodefence strategies to protect their people from biological threats.
Six AU member-States: Mali, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, The Gambia and Tunisia, for instance, met from March 19-21 2024 at the Sheraton Hotel in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on a Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa.
The programme ran under the theme, ‘Frameworks for Sustainable Surveillance and Health Security Systems for African Union Member States’.
The Signature Initiative was a partnership between Africa CDC and the Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, aimed at building sustainable health security capacities on the African continent.
The need for SADC countries to develop a comprehensive regional biodefence strategy that includes early detection, rapid response, and effective management of biological threats cannot be overemphasised. This all-inclusive strategy includes the establishment of a National Centre for Infectious Diseases, a high-level biocontainment laboratory and a public health emergency operations centre.
Over 230 000 cholera cases and 4 000 deaths have been chronicled in more than 12 cholera-affected countries in Eastern and Southern Africa since the beginning of 2023.
As of March 2024, 11 countries are reporting active outbreaks, with six countries currently categorised by WHO as 'acute crises' for cholera. What is odd in some countries in SADC, for instance Zimbabwe, since 2008 after every major election, cholera outbreaks have become a pattern.
These disease outbreaks have demonstrated the importance for SADC countries to have national biodefence and disease surveillance systems and plans that can quickly respond to public health threats.
The current cholera outbreak should serve as a warning for Africa, in general, and SADC, in particular, to consolidate themselves by developing policies and action plans at the regional or continental levels to outline steps to be taken should a biological outbreak be suspected (whether naturally occurring, accidental or deliberate).
Can cholera be weaponised?
The answer is an emphatic yes! During the Second World War, the Japanese dabbled with infectious agents. An inquiry into the development revealed that they used bubonic, plague, anthrax, typhus, smallpox, yellow fever, tularemia, hepatitis and cholera, among others. An estimated 580 000 Chinese succumbed to the Japanese bio-weapon programmes.
The weaponisation of cholera is not simply a claim that the current scourge is, or was, deliberately released but it is a clarion call to SADC countries to put in place regional and subsequent continental biodefence and strategy mechanisms that counteract an actual outbreak or potential outbreak of any nature (natural, deliberate or accidental).
Experts and the court of public opinion differ on the plausibility of a biological attack in SADC, while history is replete with scenarios of such attacks in the region.
However, comprehensive regional biodefence strategy is proposed to include the following:
● Risk assessment: Coming up with and subsequent execution of risk assessments to identify potential biological threats and susceptibilities;
● Early detection and the will to counter bio threats: Developing modalities to detect outbreaks of infectious diseases at an early stage, including laboratory capacity;
● Laboratory capacity: Developing and maintaining high-quality laboratory infrastructure for identifying and characterising biological agents. Priority should be given to increasing laboratory capacity, including training workers and enhancing equipment and infrastructure. This will ensure that the region's governments are better prepared to recognise and respond to infectious disease outbreaks;
● Medical counter-measures: Making medical counter-measures available, such as vaccines, medications and diagnostics, to prevent and treat biological agent infections;
● Research and development: Encouraging research and development activities to improve our understanding of biological agents and create new medical counter-measures;
● Response planning and preparedness:
A detailed response plan should specify the roles and responsibilities of the many agencies involved in responding to an outbreak. The strategy should also include processes for dealing with suspected cases, locating contacts and providing medical care;
● Internternational co-operation: Working with other countries and international organisations to improve global health security and prevent the transmission of biological dangers across boundaries;
● Offering instruction and skill development programmes to increase understanding of biological hazards and develop abilities to identify, avert and react to biological dangers. Biosafety and biosecurity deal with the safe and secure handling, transportation and storage of biological agents.
The goal is to prevent accidental release or intentional misuse of these agents. Proper biosafety and biosecurity procedures ensure that biological agents are carefully controlled at all times. This involves following protocols for containment, access control, inventory monitoring, transport safety, disposal, training and emergency response.
By implementing robust biosafety and biosecurity measures, the risks of biological agents being mishandled or misused are greatly reduced.
Overall, biosafety focuses on protecting people and the environment from harm, while biosecurity aims to prevent biological agents from being stolen, lost or used for bioterrorism or biowarfare. Strong biosafety and biosecurity are critical for research facilities, hospitals, labs, the biotechnology industry and any entity handling dangerous biological materials.
Public health officials must create and carry out plans to quickly and successfully react to biological dangers. This includes making emergency response blueprints and co-ordinating public health response efforts.
● Communication and information sharing: Making the creation of communication networks between countries in the region a top priority would guarantee that information about infectious disease outbreaks is exchanged quickly and effectively. This would enable a co-ordinated reaction to outbreaks.
Regional counter-proliferation strategy needs to have sufficient funds and resources in place to allow for its implementation and continuation over time.
Securing financing and logistical support is crucial for the successful rollout and ongoing operation of the strategy.
The parties responsible for the regional counter-proliferation strategy must make certain that adequate budgeting and supplies are available to put the plan into action and maintain it going forward.