The Standard (Zimbabwe)

Zim hurtling towards constituti­onal crisis

- By ALEX MAGAISA l This is an abridged version of Alex Magaisa’s latest Big Saturday Read blog

Zimbabwe is hurtling into a constituti­onal crisis with the two recent amendments to the national constituti­on.

Constituti­onal Amendment No 2 Bill has been hurried through at great speed: it was passed by the Senate on May 4, and just three days later, President Emmerson Mnangagwa assented to it, a circumstan­ce that marked the commenceme­nt of the amendment’s life as a law.

The unseemly rush, it appears, is linked to the imminent retirement of the current Chief Justice, Luke Malaba, whose biological clock strikes 70 years old this month.

Seventy is the mandatory age of retirement for judges in Zimbabwe.

The amendment extends the retirement age of judges to 75 years, which the government hopes will provide the kiss of life to a long judicial career that had become comatose by operation of law.

However, not even this legal kiss of life is enough to save the chief justice.

Using this chance to extend his term of service beyond 70 years would not only be unlawful, but a gross abuse of the constituti­on.

The reason is deceptivel­y simple: existing or former officehold­ers cannot benefit from extensions to term limit provisions.

This subject is discussed in more detail in this article, in which I argue that the rushed and illegal amendments are plunging the country into a complex web of constituti­onal crises.

While the definition of a constituti­onal crisis is at best fluid and ill-defined, it generally refers to a situation where the existing constituti­onal mechanism is unable to resolve a fundamenta­l political problem or where the constituti­onal mechanism has become so broken that it leads to a stand-off or a never-ending chain of illegaliti­es.

It undermines the legitimacy of the system of government, making it extremely difficult to govern with consent so that the government becomes ever more reliant on force and extra-legal mechanisms.

The constituti­on is the supreme law of a country and it is supposed to have mechanisms to resolve political disputes and other problems.

If it becomes fundamenta­lly broken leaving it incapable of resolving a standoff or other major political problem, then commentato­rs start describing it as a crisis of the constituti­on.

There are different sets of circumstan­ces that result in a constituti­onal crisis and some crises might be bigger than others.

Some constituti­onal crises might be resolved in a short space of time, usually by one side of an impasse standing down.

But some crises might linger for years, affecting the legitimacy of the government.

Oft-times, norms that have been developed over time help to avert or to resolve a constituti­onal crisis.

Norms can loosely be defined as unwritten rules that are developed by and mediate relationsh­ips between political actors within a country.

One of the norms that I have often referred to drawing from the work of Levitsky and Ziblatt is “forbearanc­e”, which describes an unwritten understand­ing where someone who has power deliberate­ly withholds it and avoids using it in favour of another more cordial approach.

Older democracie­s that have long-standing political practices and traditions have the advantage of having developed these unwritten understand­ings that operate silently to avert crises.

In countries like Zimbabwe, a show of power by the ruling elites is considered more appropriat­e.

There is no room for forbearanc­e and ruling elites like to demonstrat­e the full might of the state whenever an opportunit­y presents itself.

Due to this rigid and inflexible approach, there are greater risks of constituti­onal crises and Zimbabwe has had its fair share.

A typical constituti­onal crisis is where there is a fundamenta­l rupture of the constituti­onal order, usually because of a coup.

Before November 2017, the most infamous rupture of the constituti­onal order occurred on November 11, 1965, when the regime of Ian Douglas Smith unilateral­ly declared independen­ce from Great Britain, the colonial power.

The Unilateral Declaratio­n of Independen­ce was a fundamenta­l disruption of the existing constituti­onal order, which resulted in a potential stand-off between the Executive and the Judiciary and the Executive and the governor who represente­d the Queen in Rhodesia.

Eventually, the Judiciary gave in, recognisin­g the illegal Smith regime as the de facto government of the day.

Two judges, Fieldsend and Dendy Young resigned in protest at the constituti­onal illegaliti­es.

The governor also seemed to give in when the stand-off intensifie­d. However, the crisis of illegitima­cy never went away.

It led to the intensific­ation of the war of liberation in the 1970s.

An attempt to patch up a solution via the internal settlement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1978 had a miserable lifespan.

It was not until the Lancaster House Constituti­on Agreement in 1979 and the elections in 1980 that the path to constituti­onal legality and legitimacy was finally restored.

A constituti­onal crisis might arise where there is a deadlock between the key arms of the state.

This may happen where a court issues an order, which the Executive refuses to obey.

Courts make decisions, but they have no power to enforce those decisions.

Enforcers fall under the Executive’s structures and a refusal to enforce court decisions is a manifestat­ion of a constituti­onal crisis.

It would mean the system is no longer functionin­g, according to constituti­onal rules.

There was such a constituti­onal crisis in 2000 when the courts issued orders for people, who had occupied the then white-owned commercial farms, to vacate, but the government withheld enforcemen­t of those orders.

The stand-off led to the escalation of tensions between the Executive and the Judiciary, a deadlock that could only be resolved by one of them backing down.

After an unpreceden­ted invasion of the Supreme Court building by rogue war veterans, Patrick Chinamasa, who was the Justice, Legal and Parliament­ary Affairs minister, told the Chief Justice that his safety could no longer be guaranteed.

Thereafter, the Judiciary backed down. The then Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay was forced to take early retirement before a mass exodus of judges followed soon afterward.

The constituti­onal crisis ended with the fundamenta­l complete reconstitu­ting of the Judiciary, which resulted in a more Executivef­riendly bench.

But that apparent “capture” of the Judiciary might also be regarded as a manifestat­ion of a constituti­onal crisis.

The November 2017 coup is another example of a constituti­onal crisis arising from a major breakdown of the constituti­onal order.

The military command structure was subverted when the military commanders deployed soldiers in the streets of Harare without the authority of and against the orders of their commander-in-chief, contrary to requiremen­ts of the constituti­on.

There were attempts to cover up these constituti­onal violations by roping the Judiciary to issue orders that the deployment was lawful.

For nearly a week, there was an impasse between the Executive and the military.

The deadlock was only loosened when then-president Robert Mugabe resigned.

He later confirmed what was apparent at the time, that he had resigned under duress.

Parliament had been roped in to impeach him, which left him without a choice.

This veneer of legality provided by the courts and the resignatio­n did nothing to cure the legitimacy deficit caused by the constituti­onal crisis.

A third situation in which a constituti­onal crisis might arise is where individual­s and institutio­ns entrusted with upholding and defending the constituti­on cause its violation or fail to protect it.

No matter how well-crafted it is, a constituti­on cannot enforce itself.

Ultimately, it depends on individual­s and institutio­ns who have the power to carry out and implement its requiremen­ts.

The constituti­on is at their mercy.

If they decide to ignore it or if they actively breach it, there is not much that the constituti­on can do to protect itself.

This would be a major constituti­onal crisis in which a cocktail of illegaliti­es predominat­es.

All arms of the state, that is, the Executive, Legislatur­e, and Judiciary must uphold and defend the constituti­on.

They pledge fidelity to the constituti­on. By ignoring and violating the constituti­on, they would be committing constituti­onal infidelity.

Constituti­onal infidelity is the major problem with both constituti­onal amendments that have recently been passed by the legislatur­e, creating conditions of a constituti­onal crisis.

In the flowing part, I explain the phenomenon of constituti­onal infidelity in respect of the two amendments.

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