The role of international observers in forthcoming elections
ObsERVINg elections has become a standard practice around the world, fostered by the development of standards for the holding of elections.
In Africa, these standards have been codified in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and governance and the sadc Principles and guidelines governing Democratic Elections.
It is, therefore, axiomatic that any country seeking to abide by these codes will need to have the electoral process verified, and this requires an objective to test, which test comes through the process of external observation.
Thus, countries seeking to provide legitimacy for their elections will generally encourage observation of the process, but this can be very tricky as Zimbabwe has found to its cost since 2000.
In the elections in 2000 and 2002, there were an enormous number of observer groups allowed into the country, sparked by the controversy over Zimbabwe’s land reform, but also by the rejection of the proposed constitution, a potential signal that the reign of Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF was under serious threat from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
The 2000 Parliamentary election led to serious criticism from the Commonwealth, the European Union and other observer groups, with the threat from the Commonwealth that Zimbabwe could be suspended from the Councils of the Commonwealth if the presidential poll did not live up to the standards of the Harare Declaration.
The 2002 elections did not meet Commonwealth standards, Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth, and finally left the Commonwealth.
These unacceptable elections led to further consequences with restrictive conditions and sanctions placed on the country by the Us and the EU.
The result was that Zimbabwe then adopted a policy of restricting who could observe elections, but not even this could save the country from having the AU reject the outcome of the presidential poll in 2008, forcing the creation of the inclusive government under the global political agreement, brokered by then south African president, Thabo Mbeki.
Thus, allowing external observers to witness and measure elections is a double-edged sword for Zimbabwe.
On the one-hand, such observation is the key to establishing international credibility – critical for Zimbabwe’s survival currently – but it also comes with the risk that, if the standards are not met — this will maintain international pressure, and even lead to increased pressure.
The hope in 2018 was that allowing in a wide range of observers, and running an election that met best practices would cure the coup, lead to removal of sanctions, and start the complex process of international reengagement and fostering investment.
This did not happen, and the furore over the counting of the presidential ballot and the subsequent violence — and killings — left the legitimacy of the government still challenged.
Zimbabwe is in a considerably worse position in 2023 than it was in 2018, and the forthcoming elections are critical for the survival of the government, and the continuance of Zanu PF in power.
It is obvious that only an election that meets best practice and verified by observer groups will give the incoming government the legitimacy to re-engage internationally.
Thus, the stakes over observation are higher than ever, especially if the government is forced to allow both “approved” and “disapproved” observer groups to observe the elections.
The Elections Policy Dialogue was seized with just the above problem, and the very thorny question about whether to observe when none of the conditions required of an election meeting best practice are evident long before the poll.
One of the most important points about election observation made in the dialogue was about the fate of recommendations made by observer groups.
The idea behind best practice standards is, as pointed out, to improve the quality of elections, and an important role of observer groups is to provide indicators about how these might be improved, a positive role in observation.
In the aftermath of the 2018 elections, more than 200 separate recommendations were made which consolidated into 115 when all similarities and duplications were considered.
The comment was made that very few of these have been taken on board by Zec and the government, and as was also pointed out, observer groups always come back to see the extent to which their recommendations have been acted upon.
by way of example, the following were some of the most important recommendations:
• Ensuring complete independence of Zec from government oversight – removing the role of Zec being responsible to the Justice, and Legal and Parliamentary Affairs minister.
• Complete alignment of the Electoral Act with the Constitution.
• Control of assisted voting, as this was still evident in by-elections in 2022 – between 10% to 15% of voters were “assisted”.
• The role of the state media and press – creating a truly independent public service broadcaster providing equitable treatment to all political parties and candidates.
• Ensuring the non-partisan status of traditional leaders, which now seems to be getting worse not better.
• The reform of the role of state security in civilian affairs.
None of these recommendations have been credibly addressed, and it might be remembered that these are not merely recommendations from 2018 but have been made repeatedly since 2000.
The biggest question left hanging in the Elections Policy Dialogue was what should be done when an election fails the test of best practice?