Elections in 2023: Has Zim passed audit on pre-election process
Every election has led to electoral dispute in the courts and to negative reporting by reputable election observer groups. However, the political context within each of the previous elections took place were all very different: some — 2000, 2005, and 2013 — took place after long periods where civil strife was absent, whilst others took place in a climate of economic turmoil or serious political violence (2002, 2008 and 2018).
In each of these elections, the pre-election periods were very different as were the polls. However, apart from 2008, in every election Zanu PF was elected into government.
The election in 2023, however, takes place in a wholly different context to any of the previous polls.
Firstly, the country has not been in such dire circumstances before, with inflation rising rapidly, the economy sagging to unprecedented depths, food insecurity at world-beating levels, and most of the population living below the poverty line.
Scarcely the conditions in which a government is likely to be re-elected.
Secondly, all the political forces in the country are in disarray.
Despite the rhetoric, both Zanu PF and the Citizens Coalition for Change are fragmented, fractious and deeply distrusted by the general population.
For example, the Afrobarometer survey in 2022 indicates that only 27% support Zanu PF, 26% the CCC, and 46% are “reticent” (would not vote, refused to answer, or don’t know).
With so much at stake, it is obvious that the quality of this election, and the effect that this can have in moving the country from international disfavour and re-engagement, matters enormously.
It cannot be business as usual.
In order to determine whether these elections can meet the standards of best practice, the Sapes Trust and RAU have undertaken an audit of the pre-election conditions, and the probability that Zimbabwe will pass the test.
Over nine policy dialogues, 26 local, regional, and international election experts have discussed every aspect of the electoral process leading up to the poll later this year.
The discussions have ranged over the technical issues, such as the independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec), delimitation, and the voters’ roll, through the more citizen critical issues like political violence, press and media freedom, and the role of the courts in elections.
A major point in the discussion was over the publication of results and the final authority of the Zec in publishing results.
The point was made that once the count has taken place, the returning officer and the party representatives have agreed on the result, and the V11 form is posted outside the polling station, should the general public, the press, and observers not be entitled to collect and collate results as they come in?
This is common practice in many countries, and, as pointed out in one dialogue, occurred in Kenya.
There was disagreement over the desirability of independent collating and reporting on results.
One view was that this is desirable and leads to greater confidence in the electoral process, whilst the contrary view was that this will lead to dispute and should be left only to Zec.
An additional point raised was the lack of a transitional mechanism in finalising the election and the establishing the government, as is increasingly the case in many countries.
This describes a set of legal procedures to be followed after the final count, and not merely declaring the winner and swearing in the president.
The objective behind this Election Policy Dialogue series was to arrive at a clear understanding about whether the country was ready to meet national, regional, and international best practices on the holding of elections.
The standards to meeting the criteria of best practice are laid down in the Zimbabwe constitution and the Electoral Act but should also conform to the Sadc Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of the African Union.
There are also the recommendations given repeatedly by international observer groups, by one count 114 of these after the 2018 elections.
The short answer is that this audit suggests that there cannot be any confidence in the forthcoming elections.
The conclusions for each of the pillars is that there are severe deficits for each and every one of these, and the examination of how each pillar reinforces each other amplified this. In many ways, the pre-election process looks worse than it did in 2018, and many forms of bad electoral practices not seen in the past two elections — in 2013 and 2018 — have returned with memories of the very bad elections in 2000, 2002, and 2008.
This pre-election audit indicates that the conditions for a free and fair election are absent, and there is little possibility that the multiple reforms necessary can be achieved in the little time remaining.
Thus, the kinds of recommendations that can be made must focus on what must be done to deal with a flawed election.
There seems little doubt now, with the decision by the Constitutional Court dismissing the application to set aside the delimitation, that elections will take place, underlining the concerns raised in the elections policy dialogue about all the secrecy around setting the date for the elections this year.
If the hopes that an election can cure the coup and restore the country to legitimacy and international re-engagement cannot be met, then the focus must shift to a more political process, and one in which the international community — regional, continental, and international — must play a significant part.
The consequences for Zimbabwe and the region are too serious for it to be business as usual following another failed Zimbabwean election: as pointed out elsewhere, Zimbabwe has reached its “Lancaster” moment.
The desperate citizens deserve better than more form without content, and a serious intervention to lift them from increasing penury and hardship.