Brexit: Britain’s dilemma on Zimbabwe
What is critical now is that when the EU diplomats meet to deliberate, the element of personal attachment and settling of scores will not be on the table. What will be clear for the diplomats is that the sanctions have failed to engineer the envisaged reg
BRITISH Prime Minister Theresa May last week publicly outlined her Government’s plan on leaving the European Union, dwelling on the sort of relationship her country will seek with the bloc once it leaves.
The speech was Mrs May’s most prominent speech on Britain’s post Brexit relations with the EU nearly seven months after the United Kingdom voted to quit the bloc.
Reading from the speech, Britain will seek to sever all relations with the EU after four decades of membership.
The country will trigger Article 50 of the EU treaty - the formal mechanism to begin the process of departure - by the end of March.
But what does this imminent divorce mean for relations between the bloc and Zimbabwe, given how Britain’s influence within the corridors of power in Brussels triggered a decade and half long diplomatic and economic standoff between the two?
Before Brexit, Britain held immense political sway within the EU to the extent of escalating what was bilateral dispute between her and Zimbabwe towards the imposition of illegal economic sanctions against the African sovereign nation.
So influential was Britain that it cajoled the EU into punishing Zimbabwe without taking regard to international multilateral treaties - principally the Cotonou Agreement - in order to settle a “personal” score.
In just under a month, the EU will again pronounce its decision on the annual review of its economic sanctions against Zimbabwe, in what has become a yearly preoccupation of the 28 member bloc of nations in relation to the Southern African country.
Zimbabwe has been under an economic embargo since February 2002 - a state of affairs that has characterised the relations between two ever since.
The sanctions were a direct result Zimbabwe’s pursuance of the Land Reform Programme that addressed the issue of agricultural land that was held by a handful of whites.
The resource was placed under the ownership of hundreds of thousands of indigenous Zimbabweans.
But under the sanctions regime, Zimbabwe has suffered the worst in terms of economic collateral damage.
The EU’s sanctions along with a similar set of restrictions imposed on the country by other Western powers - including the United States - have cost Zimbabwe US$42 billion between 2001 and 2013.
Politically, however, the sanctions have failed to achieve their intended goal of instigating regime change in Zimbabwe.
The embargo was meant to prompt Zimbabwe’s isolation from the global diplomatic and trade arena and set off a collapse of President Mugabe’s Government, thereby fulfilling their political function.
The sanctions have been dismal in this particular respect.
In fact, Zimbabwe has only grown as a reputable power broker in global affairs, particularly in shaping Africa’s position in the League of Nations.
While the terms of the EU’s embargo have progressively changed in their outlook over the last few years, Head of State, President Mugabe and the First Lady Dr Grace Mugabe remain under the punitive measures, which are publicly clad as travel restrictions and targeted asset freeze.
The Zimbabwe Defence Industries also remains under an arms embargo.
While in public the European Union maintains that only President Mugabe, the First Lady Dr Grace and the ZDI remain under the EU sanctions, in reality the position if false.
In fact, the country’s top five security services bosses remain on the “suspended list” of restrictive measures - a condition that can trigger their relisting on the restrictive measures list instantly.
In announcing the decision to extend the sanction by a further 12 months last year, the EU Council noted that, “The restrictive measures will continue to apply to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, his wife Grace Mugabe, and Zimbabwe Defense Industries, while measures against five high ranking members of the security apparatus will remain suspended.
“Furthermore, 78 persons and eight entities, against whom measures had been suspended, will be removed from the list.
“An arms embargo will remain in place.
“The restrictive measures were initially introduced in February 2002, when the Council expressed grave concern at the situation in Zimbabwe, in particular at serious human rights violations by the country’s government.”
Now that Britain has elected to leave the EU, how the bloc deliberates on sanctions against Zimbabwe is likely to change.
Reports from the British Parliament show that Britain remains among the few EU nations that are openly opposed to a complete removal of Zimbabwe from the embargo.
Ex-Minister of State at the Foreign Office Mr David Lidington who is now Leader of the House of Commons under the new dispensation has previously admitted that Britain was fighting a lone battle in its quest to keep Zimbabwe under sanctions in the face of resistance from other EU member states.
Mr Lidington admitted two years ago that, “The UK has long been fighting a rearguard action against other, more accommodating Member States,” in reference to keeping Zimbabwe under sanctions.
It is evident that Britain’s exit will definitely change the game, as many commentators have observed.
How much it will change remains subject of conjecture and speculation.
However, given the apparent evidence of how some major players remaining in the EU, including Belgium, Italy and Portugal, have traditionally been averse to maintaining the embargo things will change.
As intense lobbying and political horse trading plays out within European capitals ahead of the EU Councils meetings to deliberate on the Zimbabwe question, the general outlook for those looking from outside is that Britain’s influence will not be as prominent as in previous years.
What is critical now is that when the EU diplomats meet to deliberate, the element of personal attachment and settling of scores will not be on the table.
What will be clear for the diplomats is that the sanctions have failed to engineer the envisaged regime change.
What remains obvious is that during those discussions there will be some who will invoke the obvious mantra of alleged state-sponsored political violence, the rule of law and human rights abuses.
But without Britain’s interference, there is scope for a sober approach to these concerns, whether they are real or imaginary.
Come February it would be 15 years since Zimbabwe was placed under sanctions by the EU and they are yet to deliver changing of the guard at Munhumutapa Offices.
If this is not a sign of how the embargo has not worked then what is?
Outgoing United States Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew recently warned against the overuse of sanctions saying Washington runs the risk of lessening their impact.
Clearly, the EU’s sanctions on Zimbabwe have failed and indeed their overuse will only serve to diminish their impact going forward as Zimbabwe continues to find more accommodating friends in China, Russia, India and Brazil, to name a few.