The place where no warrior wins
AWISE man once observed that the only thing we learn from history is that we learn nothing from history.
Harold Macmillan, outgoing British Prime Minister in 1963, offered this advice to his successor: “My dear boy, as long as you don’t invade Afghanistan you’ll be absolutely fine.” This was based on three Anglo-Afghan wars, including one in 1839, arguably the greatest humiliation suffered by the West in the East.
So why do countries ignore this advice? Australia last year agreed to send another 30 troops there, taking its deployment to 300 defence personnel, making it our nation’s longest war, having first sent troops there in 2001 — 42 Aussies have died supporting there since George Bush’s decision to invade after 9/11. The US has lost 2300.
We must go back into history to understand why this advice was given and why it has been ignored. Many, including Alexander the Great, have invaded over the centuries, although no such country actually existed till the 18th century. This is because it is sandwiched between the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent on the ancient Silk Road.
Local war chieftain Mir Vais established independence for the Afghan state in 1711 although its borders were not delineated until later. The population is made up of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and other groups, all with their own languages. Most are Sunni Muslims, but the Hazara are Shi’a, which explains why they are persecuted and why most Afghan refugees coming to Australia are Hazara. Some Hazara asylum seekers are detained on Manus Island and Nauru despite persecution in their homeland and refugee camps in Pakistan.
The new state was soon involved in rival power plays, particularly between the British Empire and Tsarist Russia. These interventions ensured the weakening of feeble domestic structures, generating a vicious cyclic interplay between the factors of polygamy and foreign interventions, with each feeding off the other. In the first Anglo-Afghan War (183942), the British force of 20,000 troops and 38,000 camp followers marched into Afghanistan to depose the Shah. When the Afghans rose in revolt, the British force retreated and only a handful of them survived. When another force, the Army of Retribution, returned to avenge the massacre, they were ordered to retreat as the British felt they were too exposed.
The country’s western border with Persia was finalised in 1857 while the border with British India was fixed in 1893. This was the Durand Line that was seen as a temporary arrangement because it ran through the middle of Pashtun territory, a sore point to this day. The border with Russia was fixed in 1893 with a small strip, the Wakf, created to touch China so Russian territory did not touch British territory in India. In 1907, the Anglo-Russian Entente included recognition by Russia of Britain’s predominant position in Afghanistan and in 1919, Britain recognised the full independence of Afghanistan.
The new Amir signed a Treaty of Friendship with the USSR in 1921 and military aid was provided as part of this agreement. The Amir tried to modernise the country but faced with rebellion from conservative religious forces, he abdicated in 1929, to be succeeded by his cousin who was assassinated four years later. His son, Mohammed Zahir Shah, then ruled for 40 years. He tried to modernise his country, introducing a new constitution with a twochamber parliament, while remaining neutral in World War II. The Soviet Union provided loans while the US demonstrated irritation with the Afghan government’s nonaligned stance in the Cold War and refused to offer substantial aid for modernisation.
Zahir Shah was deposed by his cousin, Daoud, who proclaimed a republic and as opposition to Soviet influence grew, seven Islamist parties set up an alliance in neighbouring Pakistan though they were ineffective because of their own differences. When Daoud looked for more aid from Iran and Saudi Arabia, the USSR became alarmed, and backed Leftist forces who seized power in April 1978, when Daoud was killed. Opposition to their attempted reforms outside the cities was supported by the US, which saw an opportunity to get revenge on the USSR for their military defeat in Vietnam and started to provide weapons and training.
Fearing a loss of influence and worried about the spread of radical Islam in Central Asia, the Soviet Union intervened and their troops crossed the border late in December 1979. CIA aid to the Mujaheddin was stepped up as the US recruited young Muslim men from all over the world to support them, as they knew they could not risk more American lives after Vietnam.
It was a vicious war for all sides — 620,000 Soviet troops served in Afghanistan, with 14,453 killed. By 1992, nearly two million Afghans had been killed, over a million maimed, and six million had fled as refugees to Iran and Pakistan. Coming from 43 Muslim countries, 35,000 men fought for the mujahedeen. Aid was channelled through Pakistan, $700 million by 1989, and training camps were set up. Military aid came through the CIA despite warnings of the Soviet Foreign Minister who saw the outcome of combining military training and Saudi religious indoctrination of the mujahedeen. It was in this period Osama bin Laden arrived from Saudi Arabia and, based in Pakistan, created Al Qaeda. Opium production grew from about 100 tonnes annually to 2000 tonnes by 1991, and a network of laboratories opened along the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. By 1984, it supplied 60 per cent of the US market and 80 per cent of the European market.
After the Russians pulled out in 1989, Afghan forces in exile returned and warlords began to fight each other for control. Fed up with the chaos, the Taliban, which means “students”, emerged to capture the capital, Kabul, in 1996. The US government was happy to negotiate with the Taliban over oil and gas supply lines through Afghanistan but turned against them for offering sanctuary to bin Laden after he was exiled from Saudi Arabia and Sudan.
Thus began the current involvement in Afghanistan of a NATO force (officially it is called the International Security Assistance Force, and the initial attack in 2001 was code-named Operation Enduring Freedom), with Australia an honorary member. Despite many announcements about a withdrawal, this force is building up again while backing the Afghan government in its conflict against the Taliban. To reduce ground casualties, the US relies on air strikes and drones, creating civilian casualties, while the Taliban continued to control many rural areas.
The Afghan army is battling for control of the country’s opium profits, while the Taliban relies on poppy production to fund wages and weapons. Last year, the opium harvest nearly doubled again,
After 16 years of war, the US is trapped and, as spring approaches, poppy production will increase in the impoverished villages
the highest since 2007.
In the meantime, the war has become more complicated with the presence of al-Qaeda and ISIS even penetrating secure zones in Kabul for suicide attacks. After 16 years of war, the US is trapped and, as spring approaches, poppy production will increase in the impoverished villages that make up most of Afghanistan and a new generation of unemployed young men will continue to be recruited by various armed militias.
Much could be done to develop better economic options for agriculture instead of funding the military but despite promises to withdraw from this war, President Trump appears to have been drawn into the military option and Australia tags along.
In Australia there has been little parliamentary debate on Afghanistan because Labor and the Coalition agree on defence matters leaving only the Greens to raise the issue in Canberra. There has been little discussion in the media either.