The main lesson from Afghanistan is that the ‘war on terror’ does not work
Iopposed the initial invasion of Afghanistan on the grounds that terrorism is a heinous crime but not a war, and that we needed to use the techniques of policing and intelligence, while tackling the underlying causes of terrorism, rather than military methods to deal with the problem.
Many of us said at the time that the attacks of 9/11 should have been viewed as a crime against humanity, not as an attack by a foreign state. The terrorists should have been designated as criminals not enemies. As the distinguished war historian Michael Howard said, the phrase “war on terror” accorded the “terrorists a status they seek and do not deserve”.
After the invasion, I favoured a strategy of human security, stabilising Afghanistan, and protecting individual Afghans and their families. President Biden called this “nation building” and said it should never have been undertaken. This was the approach of the UN in Afghanistan and, while it is possible to argue that nation-building efforts are often too top down and technical, and need to include civil society and local initiatives, these are not the reasons that nation building was so inadequate in Afghanistan.
Indeed there were considerable gains in women’s rights and education as well as democratic consciousness, as exemplified by the recent protests in Jalalabad. The fundamental reason was that the security of Afghans was continually undermined by the way that the US prioritised counter-terror operations, by which it meant military targeting of the Taliban and al-Qaida, and more recently, Islamic State.
Actually, there was no insurgency until five years after the invasion. The insurgency began for two main reasons. First, night raids, drone attacks and bombing produced a counterreaction. Second, the US allies in the counterterror endeavour were the so-called warlords, many of the same people or their children that the CIA recruited to fight the Soviets in the 1980s. It was the continued presence of these criminalised and predatory warlords within the Afghan government that explains its systemic corruption and lack of legitimacy. Civil society groups were vocal and persistent in their demands for justice and an end to corruption. But their demands were ignored.
Antony Blinken, the US secretary of state, had the temerity to blame the Afghan security forces for not defending their country despite all the money the US has provided. In fact, many of them have died in defence of their country. But much of the trillions of dollars spent on equipping and training the security forces went into the pockets of the US allies in the “war on terror” – the Afghan warlords and corrupt officials.
Moreover, private security contractors used by the US government suddenly withdrew, taking with them the logistical infrastructure needed by the security forces. Above all, the decision to withdraw, taken by the Trump administration and upheld by the Biden administration without conditions, had led to peace talks with the Taliban that excluded the government and civil society and greatly empowered the former. For many in the security forces, the hasty withdrawal appeared to signal that the US had changed sides and was now supporting the Taliban, and this was what undermined the will to fight.
Any illusion that the Taliban are somehow “different” – despite the assassinations of intellectuals and the horrendous treatment of women – should be disabused. The Taliban government must not be recognised. If sanctions are applied, they should be targeted so as not to cause yet more suffering to ordinary Afghans. What is likely to happen is yet more violence as factions emerge within the Taliban coalition and compete for dwindling state resources and control of criminal activities. Al-Qaida, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Haqqani network, not to mention different ethnic militias, are all part of the Taliban coalition.
If we want to help ordinary Afghans, we should neither do a deal with the Taliban nor start a war against them – continued counter-terror air operations, as suggested by Biden, will merely shore up support for the Taliban. Rather, we should undertake a humanitarian intervention in order to establish safe havens and humanitarian corridors to help those who need to flee and to deliver aid. This is not the same as war even though military personnel could be used – the aim would be to protect people rather than kill enemies.
The airport should come under international control (the UN or the International Red Cross) and safe corridors should be established to reach it; it is incredible that the chaos at the airport continues after several days. The UN could also establish protected sites for civilians and safe land corridors to other countries could be established, for example from Mazar-i-Sharif to Uzbekistan, or Herat to Iran. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a safe haven in the Panshir valley, the only part of Afghanistan not yet overrun by the Taliban. At the same time, visas should be given to all Afghan refugees, just as the UK is doing for Hong Kong residents fleeing authoritarianism.
The main lesson from the Afghan experience is that the “war on terror” does not work. Twenty years after the invasion, extremist Islamists are celebrating their victory. It is true, as Biden said, that the US conducts counter-terror operations in multiple places; the consequence has been the spread of extremist Islamism not just in Afghanistan and the Middle East but in large parts of Africa. If we take the danger seriously, then we need a different human security approach. One that combines policing and intelligence with tackling injustice, establishing legitimate political authority, and that aims to marginalise and arrest terrorists rather than turn them into martyrs.
Mary Kaldor is a professor of global governance and director of the conflict and civil society research unit at London School of Economics