Why we are wary of Russian émigrés in Georgia – so soon after Russian invaders
When Russia’s modern tsar escalated his war by announcing the partial mobilisation of reservists on 21 September, another wave of anxiety swept over Georgia. With due acknowledgment that every word written from this region at the moment should be about, or in support of, the Ukrainian people and their struggle, this anxiety is why I’m diverting to focus briefly on how we see this brutal war from Georgia, which, thanks to historical and geopolitical misfortune, happens to be a southern neighbour of Russia.
The invasion of Ukraine has revived painful collective and personal memories of Russia’s 2008 war on Georgia. The trauma from this not-so-distant past rose to the surface again in February and has remained there. The current government of Georgia has tried to ignore it altogether, as if it had never happened.
Thousands of us have taken to the streets in huge public demonstrations in Tbilisi and other cities in support of Ukraine. But the government has steered clear, sticking to embarrassingly careful statements and not even bothering with any diplomatic courtesies towards Kyiv. Instead it deploys a “What do you want, war?” response to its own people’s appalled reaction and opposition demands, implying that joining the sanctions against Russia or acting against Russian economic interests would automatically drag Georgia into the war as well.
This is how the logic of Georgia’s government works – but it is not particularly hard to read between the lines. The ruling party (Georgian Dream) was founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire former prime minister who made his fortune in Russia in the 1990s and remains so influential that he is often referred to as our “informal leader”. Nobody, least of all civil society campaigners, consider it sur