Churchill had recipe for success
AUSTRALIA’S military intervention in Afghanistan has become the nation’s longest war, one that still seems to have no clear end point.
As Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull ponders increasing our current commitment, there also seems no parallel commitment to an achievable military outcome.
Without a clearly defined aim, Australian military commanders in Afghanistan are soldiering at a disadvantage.
Afghanistan has always been a tough gig.
Many powers have tried to invade and subjugate Afghanistan and none have succeeded entirely.
Anyone seeking to understand the nature of war in Afghanistan need look no further than the book The Malakand Field Force.
It graphically describes the harsh climate and terrain, the rivalries and treachery of the various Afghan tribes, and the difficulties experienced by foreign troops fighting in this environment.
It tells of a vicious war against a cunning foe for whom mutilating fallen or captured soldiers is almost a savage obligation.
It details the heroic contributions of the foreign troops involved and the appalling death and injuries which befall many of them.
The author even describes his own close encounter with mortality in a vicious skirmish during a fighting retreat in a remote mountainous region of Afghanistan.
No matter the book was written in 1897, 50 years before the partition of British India when India, Pakistan and Afghanistan became separate nations, in Western eyes at least and continued the internecine warfare which is a way of life in the subcontinent.
The Malakand Field Force’s, author, one cavalry lieutenant Winston Spencer Churchill survived to become perhaps Britain’s greatest ever wartime leader.
He didn’t talk of surrender, withdrawal or retreat, or set timetables for troops to be withdrawn, giving the enemy both a moral and tactical victory. He also famously declared, in Britain’s darkest hour, “Give us the tools and we will do the job!”
Neither was Churchill risk averse, occasionally risking all for what others perceived as dubious outcomes. For all that, he maintained and more importantly articulated what the final outcome should be.
Unlike Vietnam, Australia’s Afghan mission has bipartisan support from the mainstream political parties.
Our servicemen and sponsored by women in Afghanistan are all volunteers, not conscripts, and they are well trained, led and equipped.
They do not have to deploy and they have the option of resigning from the ADF if they disagree with Australia’s involvement in the war.
That most want to go while accepting the risks speaks volumes about their professionalism and their belief in Australia’s participation.
That Australia’s casualties have been relatively light is a consequence of their professionalism though it also suggests both government and defence are risk averse.
Major General Jim Molan, perhaps Australia’s pre- eminent military thinker and tactician has argued what Australian forces in Afghanistan have lacked sufficient numbers and resources to take the battle to the Taliban and its allies.
He is absolutely right, for if the Australian Government, whatever its political persuasion wants our men and women to succeed in Afghanistan, it must give them the people and the tools for the job.