Our Afghanistan exit comes after little gain

their internecine domestic disputes. Only Afghanistan itself remains a constant in centuries of foreign intervention in its affairs.

In 1897, after the siege of the British garrison at Malakand, young Lieutenant Winston Churchill participated in a relief force that cost the British Raj almost one-quarter of its force, 282 of 1200 deployed. Churchill wrote that every time the

Pashtun tribesmen would put up resistance the British would lose two to three officers and 15 to 20 Indian soldiers.

Pashtun casualties were estimated at 10,000.

Clearly not a proponent of what is now termed “hearts and minds”, Churchill was less than impressed with political officers, civil administrators in uniform. He singled out a Major Deane who drew the ire of his fellow officers.

“They parleyed all the time with the chiefs, the priests and other local notables,” he wrote.

“Just when we were looking forward to having a splendid fight and all the guns were loaded and everyone keyed up, this Major Deane – and why was he a major anyhow? — would come along and put a stop to it all by seeking some sort of diplomatic accommodation between a tribe and the British.”

Churchill, who was also commissioned to write dispatches for a British newspaper, reported the tribesmen in combat were shown no quarter. “Every tribesman caught was speared or cut down at once,” he noted.

The Malakand Field Force was disbanded in January

1898. Lives had been lost and reputations enhanced, particularly Churchill’s.

Old enmities were reignited and new created. Australia’s Afghan legacy, 41 killed, 261 wounded, will be felt for generations.

Reputations have been enhanced and it seems others may be lost. For what gain? No territory has been pacified and the pragmatic, fatalistic Afghans will pick their moment to resume their lives and disputes until the next foreign invader arrives.

The cycle will begin again.