NINE KEY ISSUES RAISED AT THE DREAMWORLD INQUEST

None of the ride operators to take the stand said they had been given the training since the disaster.

A Dreamworld spokeswoman told the inquest drill training was taking place at the park.

Prior warning

DREAMWORLD ignored a series of warnings for 17 years leading up to the fatal incident on the Thunder River Rapids Ride.

A raft flipped in January 2001 after being caught in almost the same spot on the conveyor belt in a dry run before the park opened, leading engineers to voice their concerns in an internal email. There was a second collision of rafts in 2004 where one guest ended up in the water. No one was injured.

A 1999 safety audit recommended an emergency stop button be installed which stopped all mechanisms of the ride at once. It was never done.

In November 2014 two rafts collided on the conveyor belt. The operator manning the ride was sacked for not following the shut down and start up procedure.

No internal investigation

IN the eighteen months since the diaster numerous employees told the inquest they had never been asked to be a part of an internal investigation. This means there could be staff who made vital mistakes on October 25, 2016 and their management do not know.

Too many tasks

RIDE operators at the Thunder River Rapids Ride had more than 20 tasks to complete in less than a minute between rafts being launched. They also had to monitor 16 potential hazards during the ride. The list included helping children on to the raft, checking CCTV cameras to ensure rafts were not stuck or passengers had fallen in the water, loading the ride and monitoring the queue.