In Venezuela, A Game Of Survival
Even as Venezuela sinks into chaos, why have its powerful political and military elites stuck by President Nicolás Maduro?
The country would seem to be a prime candidate for something scholars call an “elite fracture,” in which enough powerful officials break away to force a change in leadership.
Rage against Mr. Maduro’s government is mounting, and demonstrators have been undeterred by a police crackdown in which hundreds have been arrested and more than 30 killed. The crisis has been marked by food shortages, economic collapse and Mr. Maduro’s fumbling attempts to consolidate authority.
“The fact that it hasn’t happened in the last two years is the biggest puzzle of all,” said Steven Levitsky, a Harvard University political scientist.
But recent actions by both elites and the government suggest they take the possibility of fracture seriously.
Members of the elite, in this game, try to test one another over where they stand, as well as the government’s strength, to decide whether to remain loyal. If enough believe they have achieved critical mass to force a leadership change, they will all push at once.
Luisa Ortega, the attorney general, conducted such a test in late March. When the pro-Maduro Supreme Court moved to seize many of the legislature’s powers, Ms. Ortega condemned the ruling as a “rupture of the constitutional order.”
The government faced a dilemma. Tolerating Ms. Ortega’s dissent would signal that elites could more freely break with Mr. Maduro. But punishing her would risk a backlash.
Ms. Ortega went unpunished, and the ruling was reversed.
“It’s a sign of enormous weakness inside the ruling clique that Luisa Ortega took the position that she did and kept her job,” said Francisco Toro, a Venezuelan political scientist who edits the Caracas Chronicles website. “That’s never happened before.” deadlock among elites and, often, the popular legitimacy to lead a transition.
In Venezuela, some are already calling on the military to step in. Luis Ugalde, a prominent Jesuit leader, has called for a transitional government modeled after the 1958 military coup that then installed democracy.
Still, Hugo Chávez, Mr. Maduro’s predecessor, packed the military with allies. The military also gained vast patronage streams, which some local officials say include control over gold mining.
But even a loyal military, when forced to resolve a political crisis, might decide against the leader who called it in, as happened to Mr. Chávez in 2002.
Last year, Cliver Alcalá, a retired major general, called for a referendum to unseat Mr. Maduro. Though Mr. Maduro ordered his arrest, Mr. Alcalá remains free and a vocal critic.
Mr. Maduro can also play this game. He has let loyalists profit from corruption and patronage, giving them a financial stake in the government’s survival. But as the economy worsens, elites compete over a smaller pie.
“When elites begin to compete among themselves, usually somebody defects,” Mr. Levitsky said.
As threats mount, Mr. Levitsky said, “even actors who were bought off with patronage tend to worry.”
And coups are often led by colonels or civilians of equivalent rank, who enjoy fewer fruits of patronage.
But movement from elites comes only when they are sure they have the numbers to win. And any contest over ideological loyalty will tilt toward the status quo. The rules of the game still favor Mr. Maduro, even if the state of play does not.