Reign of Terror: Mozambique is part of the problem

An elusive Islamist group going under the name of Ansar al- Sunna or “al Shabaab,” as the locals refer to this group, has since 2017, attacked villages, carried out summary executions, looted, destroyed civilian property and infrastructure, including schools and health centres, and seized the strategic port of Mocimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique.

Over time, the terror group has become significantly more dangerous and sophisticated since it first started up in 2017. In the early stages of the insurgency, attackers grouped in small packs of a few fighters to attack remote police outposts or villages, often brandishing blunt weapons.

But by early 2020, the insurgents had taken significant stockpiles of weapons from government security forces and were able to mount attacks on district capitals, including the port of Mocimboa da Praia.

Government forces fled the city in August and have yet to retake it. Violence against civilians also escalated over the past year, as the insurgency swept south towards the provincial capital Pemba, with numerous credible reports of atrocities committed by Ansar al- Sunna fighters.

Early on, the government of Mozambique was hesitant to acknowledge the threat that ultraconservative groups like Ansar al- Sunna posed. The central government overly relied on decentralised efforts by religious community leadership to counter and contain the spread of Islamist extremist ideology.

Despite repeated requests for intervention from both the Islamic Council and the Islamic Congress in the early 2010s, the government failed to mobilise any response. It was only in 2017, following initial reports of violent attacks, that police began arresting suspected group members in droves.

The complexity of the political and religious situation in northern Mozambique has made it difficult for government officials and stakeholders, both local and international to draw conclusions about the group, its objectives, and its tactics.

Ansar al- Sunna has remained silent, not offering reasons for its attacks, its high degree of brutality, or its overall objectives. At the tactical level, Ansar al- Sunna does not claim credit for the violence it inflicts on communities. This leads to a variety of questions about the group, its size, and its organisation, but also allows for the proliferation of disinformation within Mozambique and internationally.

Taking credit for acts of terror is common, especially in contemporary security environment where many groups are competing either to signal ideological purity or loyalty; public ownership of violence assumes importance. In the absence of credit claims or group narratives, disinformation surrounding the group and its motives has flourished. The lack of a unified official narrative contributes to information deficits that have stymied government efforts to address the crisis, as well as provided it with an excuse for inaction.

For example, government officials question the feasibility of negotiation when the group leaders are not fully known. The government’s lack of transparency surrounding the insurgency has compounded this effect. The government can ( and has) alternatively dismissed and described the group as “criminals” or “thugs,” diminishing the seriousness of the violence and justifying a slow and limited initial response.

In the same way that the absence of official credit claims or communiques has facilitated weak governmental responses to this crisis, Ansar al- Sunna’s silence has also allowed opportunistic external groups, such as ISIS, to claim connections to the group and assert partial responsibility for their attacks.

However tenuous this connection may be in reality, their insertion into a situation where rumours abound and confirmed facts are scarce has further complicated efforts to understand and address the threat posed by Ansar al- Sunna.

The Mozambiaquen government urgently needs help from the Southern African Development Community ( SADC) and the African Union ( AU). The rise in horrific attacks since October 2017 raises concerns that the attacks may spread to other provinces in Mozambique and neighbouring countries. This makes it imperative for the SADC and AU to take urgent measures to help Mozambique protect civilians. As the current SADC chairperson, Mozambique’s president, Filipe Nyusi, should tap into regional support to ensure civilian protection against attacks and to restore security in Cabo Delgado. But with Mozambique playing hide and seek with their security situation, there isn’t much that SADC can do.