Eighteen months of SoE:
The advent of COVID-19 at the start of the year 2020 gave rise to the President declaring a State of Emergency (SoE) to take the necessary measures to address the risks posed by COVID-19.
This was on account of a presentation that the COVID-19 Task Force had made to Parliament. It was their strongest opinion and recommendation that a State of Emergency was necessary to fight the invisible and rising tide of COVID-19.
According to the government, the Public Health Act was inadequate to fully equip the government to fight the pandemic. The Presidential Task Force was mandated to be the tip of the spear in the fight against COVID-19, effectively abdicating that responsibility from the Ministry of Health and Wellness, who by popular opinion should have been leading the fight but due to political interference were denied of their aim.
Yet now, from October 1, 2021, and after the longest State of Emergency has come to an end, the government has since reverted to equip the Public Health Act to combat COVID-19. All the COVID-19 protocols that were employed during the SoE have since been included in the Public Health Act.
This new development comes against the backdrop of a deteriorated health system that has been battered and overwhelmed by the growing numbers of new COVID-19 cases.
This article seeks to juxtapose a few of the critical issues that stood out during the 18 months of SoE and the outlook of the economy post-SoE. Was the SoE necessary? Did it have to last this long? Did it achieve its intended objective? What were the effects of the measures that were employed using this instrument of the law?
We review the first lockdown and the impact it had on the economy. To understand the State of Emergency, we have to start from the beginning. The Presidential Task Force takes responsibility for the State of Emergency seeing the light of day and having lasted for 18 months.
The narrative pushed by government by the time the first case was confirmed last year, was that we are prepared. The government sought to move from prevention to containment of the flu-like virus. In order to effectively prepare and contain the COVID-19 pandemic, the Task Force led by Dr Kereng Masupu and deputised by Professor Mosepele Mosepele was set up.
Dr Kereng Masupu’s background includes a degree in veterinary medicine from the University of Tuskegee, USA and a Master of Science Epidemiology from the University of California, USA. Most of his experience relates to providing technical and strategic expertise in the fight against HIV/AIDS and the closest experience he has to being a Coordinator was when he was appointed Coordinator of the Task Force that contained the Cattle Lung Disease outbreak in Ngamiland.
The Deputy Coordinator was plucked from the University of Botswana where he was acting deputy Dean, Research and Graduate Education in the Faculty of Medicine. Professor Mosepele is also an Associate Professor of Internal Medicine and Infectious Disease and Head Medicine in the Faculty.
He also served as a senior lecturer in internal medicine, Infectious Disease and Clinical Epidemiology for four years.
While epidemiologists study and investigate the causes and sources of diseases in the same way as medical doctors, they are not considered actual physicians.
These two men along with a group of advisors had the President’s ear during the entirety of the SoE in the fight against COVID-19.
Though their accolades are to be admired, the truth is that their experience was inadequate in the fight against the flulike virus called COVID-19.
They were indirectly responsible for the heavy-handed decisions that would be made by the President who is chair of the Task Force using the legal tool enshrined in the constitution known as SoE.