Mmegi

SADC and Rwanda shouldn’t go it alone in Mozambique

All troops in the country must agree on a joint vision to end the crisis in Cabo Delgado, writes

- LIESL LOUWVAUDRA­N* (Institute for Security Studies) *Liesl Louw-Vaudran, Senior Researcher, ISS Pretoria

Troops from Rwanda and the Southern African Developmen­t Community (SADC) have achieved some important results in northern Mozambique, where an insurgency has been ongoing since the end of 2017. Some roads have been reopened, and a semblance of calm has returned in key locations for liquefied natural gas projects, such as Palma and Mocímboa da Praia.

However, there are still attacks across the Cabo Delgado province, and the United Nations Refugee Agency has said it would be premature to encourage displaced people to return to their homes.

To resolve the crisis, a joint vision for long-term stability is needed that includes all the forces in Mozambique. Currently, around 2, 000 Rwandan troops are securing the Palma and Mocímboa districts, which are gas project sites (see map). SADC’s Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) is based in three other districts, with Mozambican forces responsibl­e for the rest of the province.

The SADC deployment is noted in official African Union (AU) documents as part of the AU’s African Standby Force. But so far there’s been little communicat­ion between SADC and the AU in this regard.

The southern African bloc has only recently approached the AU – six months after the Mozambican deployment and when funds started running out. In doing so, SADC set aside its historical mistrust of the AU and its insistence on the principle of subsidiari­ty – which means, in this case, that SADC leads on security issues.

SADC has also had no high-level discussion­s with Rwanda about its presence in Cabo Delgado. Rwanda believes that rooting out terrorism in the province is vital for its own security.

Tensions between SADC and Rwanda date back to difference­s over election results in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in early 2019. Despite overtures by President Paul Kagame to key SADC countries, concerns persist.

SADC only approached the AU six months after SAMIM’s deployment, and when funds were running out onApril 3, SADC ministers of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security met in Pretoria to discuss the mission with representa­tives of the main troop-contributi­ng countries and Mozambique. Heads of state are expected to ratify a decision to extend the mission for another three months, up to July 15, 2022.

As has been the case with all SADC meetings on northern Mozambique, Rwanda wasn’t invited. SAMIM head, Professor Mpho Molomo reassured member states that the mission’s troops and Rwandan forces are coordinati­ng on the ground. But there have been no high-level political talks amongst Heads of State of the countries concerned.

Institute for Security Studies research reveals deep divisions in Mozambique over the Rwandan and SADC deployment­s. Civil society organisati­ons in the country question the transparen­cy and financing of the Rwandan deployment.

The AU could help ensure that ‘African solutions’ for Mozambique are successful. It has experience in this regard, and most of its resolution­s highlight the need to deal with issues that drive violent extremism. But member states rarely adhere to these policies, and some see coordinati­on between regional economic communitie­s (such as SADC) and the AU as a stumbling block rather than a benefit. The first discussion of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on SAMIM only happened in January 2022, six months after its deployment. The PSC retroactiv­ely endorsed the mission and called for funding and material assistance for the force.

The AU considers SAMIM as one of the first deployment­s of the African Standby Force – a vital cog in its peace and security machinery.

African Standby Force protocols stipulate that coordinati­on, particular­ly from the AU Commission chairperso­n, is needed during its deployment­s. This hasn’t yet happened in the Mozambique case.

SADC only sought AU support when it needed funding to extend the mission’s mandate beyond the first six months. Earlier this month, it finally received an initial €2 million from the European Union through the AU Rapid Response Mechanism. SADC also hopes to access finance from the AU Peace Fund, which has over US$230 million from member states’ contributi­ons.

SADC is committed to seeking holistic, long-term solutions to the crisis. Last month a SADC assessment mission visited Cabo Delgado to discuss capacity building projects with local actors and internatio­nal organisati­ons. SADC also instructed SAMIM’s head to coordinate humanitari­an aid to internally displaced people, and member states have pledged food and humanitari­an assistance to the victims of violence.

African Standby Force protocols stipulate that coordinati­on is needed during its deployment­s.

Given its regional focus and attempts at a multi-pronged approach, the SAMIM deployment is salutary and a first for the region. To succeed though, it needs local buy-in and coordinati­on with Mozambique and Rwanda.

The concentrat­ion of vast natural resources in Cabo Delgado raises the stakes.

Threats posed by the insurgency to the liquefied natural gas investment­s worth around US$60 billion saw TotalEnerg­ies suspend its operations last year. The company wants a 30km radius of security around the projects before it will consider returning.

As the AU grapples with various options for dealing with terrorism across Africa, local contexts must inform decisions, and responses need to be flexible.

Coordinati­on among all parties is also vital. The troops in Mozambique are deployed in one relatively small area where violent extremist groups and locals move around constantly.

Joint strategies with security forces pulling in the same direction would lead to a much better outcome.

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