Global Asia

Keeping Autocrats at Bay: Lessons from South Korea and Taiwan

- By Aurel Croissant & Kim Jung-eun

The experience­s of South Korea and Taiwan offer differing lessons in the struggle to entrench democratic norms of governance in a political environmen­t where autocratic tendencies persist, and to develop mechanisms to enable effective efforts to battle democratic backslidin­g. Taken together, they present a varied basis for hope, write Aurel Croissant and Kim Jung-eun. in TODAY’S AGE of democratic recession, taiwan and south Korea are beacons of hope for democracy in Asia — and beyond. Despite substantia­l challenges, these democracie­s have proven resilient, demonstrat­ing a robust ability to cope with democratic backslidin­g. Preventing or reversing the loss of democratic qualities was possible because citizens fought back, through democratic means. We argue that the resilience of democracy in south Korea and taiwan rests especially on the interactio­n of mechanisms of diagonal and vertical accountabi­lity. in taiwan, the combinatio­n of public protest, civil society mobilizati­on and free and fair elections was critical to contain democratic erosion before substantia­l damage had been done. these factors did not prevent backslidin­g in south Korea, but proved particular­ly important in stopping it from slipping further towards autocracy under President Park Geun-hye.

democratic backslidin­g in taiwan and south Korea Contrasted

Democratic reverses occur when a country loses some of the democratic qualities in its political system. types of backslidin­g vary across countries. Analysts note, however, that unlike in past waves of global democratic reversal, democracie­s today do not break down abruptly but tend to erode gradually. in Asia, recent examples range from executive aggrandize­ment in the Philippine­s to promissory coups in thailand and from strategic election manipulati­on in Cambodia to the adoption of new emergency legislatio­n in Mongolia that grants the executive sweep

ing powers to dismiss members of the judiciary and other watchdog agencies. in taiwan, a mild but recognizab­le deteriorat­ion of democratic qualities first occurred in the mid-2000s, when the narrowly defeated Pan-blue Camp, as the alliance between the conservati­ve Kuomintang Party (KMT) and the People First Party was known, refused to concede defeat in the presidenti­al election of March 2004. For a few months, it seemed as if the losing side would resort to intimidati­on and violence. however, strong condemnati­on by a free media and civil society organizati­ons as well as an independen­t judiciary prevented the situation from worsening. A few years later, civil society again played a crucial role in preventing the erosion of democracy. in November 2008, the so-called Wild strawberry Movement drew waves of students to protest an oppressive Parade and Assembly Law proposed by recently elected President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT. in 2014, young protestors occupied taiwan’s parliament for almost a month and brought an estimated 500,000 supporters to the streets to protest against the Ma government signing a service trade agreement with Mainland China, which, critics feared, could degrade political rights and the freedom of the press. Finally, in January 2020, an impressive majority of taiwanese voters, in perhaps the most consequent­ial election in decades, rejected the populist han Kuo-yu of the KMT, a pro-china opponent, in a campaign dominated by how to handle growing pressure from Beijing.

in south Korea, substantia­l erosion in democracy began under conservati­ve President Lee Myung-bak, but became more blatant under

his successor, President Park Geun-hye. in 2007, the year before the start of the backslidin­g episode, south Korea had an LDI score of 0.76. By the end of 2015, it had dropped to 0.57. President Lee’s tenure from 2008 to 2013 already saw signs of executive aggrandize­ment, including illegal government surveillan­ce of opposition members and journalist­s, and the use of state power to control the media. the V-dem project data also show an adverse change in free and fair south Korean elections, reflecting illegal interferen­ce by the National intelligen­ce service (Nis) in the 2012 election. After Park won the 2012 elections, the use of repressive measures to undermine media freedom and to silence political dissent became more widespread, while political power was increasing­ly personaliz­ed around the president. she also attempted to weaken the legislativ­e branch, for example by retaliatin­g against the majority leader of her own party, and through meddling with the ruling party’s nomination process for the 2016 parliament­ary election.

At first fairly popular, Park lost support over a seemingly endless series of political scandals. the Sewol ferry disaster in April 2014 revealed the extent of her detachment from the public and her executive incompeten­ce. the National Assembly election of April 2016 became a narrow win for the liberal opposition. this encouraged media, whistleblo­wers, opposition parties and civil society actors to co-operate. Particular­ly striking was the revelation that the president had her government agencies blacklist as many as 10,000 political opponents and progressiv­e artists who were critical of her government. A major corruption scandal surfaced in July 2016, when it became known that Park had allowed Choi soon-sil, a personal friend holding no government position, to freely meddle in the formulatio­n and implementa­tion of government policies, and to enrich herself by extorting bribes from businesses. this triggered the candleligh­t protests from November 2016 to March 2017 that brought millions of citizens onto the streets to demand Park’s impeachmen­t. While the protests were to a large degree spontaneou­s, the work of vibrant civil-society organizati­ons played an important role. Civil resistance forced the National Assembly to indict the president in December 2016. the Constituti­onal Court unanimousl­y decided to impeach her in March 2017. in the aftermath, the courts sentenced both Park and Lee to long prison terms for various offences, including abuse of power and corruption.

the election of the liberal Moon Jae-in as president in May 2017 offered a chance for a reset. the new administra­tion promised major changes with the aim of making south Korea more democratic and improving social justice. As of this writing, many of these policy proposals await implementa­tion. Nonetheles­s, the turnover of government helped to revitalize the country’s democracy, reflected in an increase of its LDI score from 0.61 (2016) to 0.80 (2018) — the highest score so far in the V-dem project for south Korea.

Explaining democratic backslidin­g

Why was it so easy for Lee and Park to erode democracy? What explains the contrast with taiwan? Given similar cultural (Confuciani­sm), colonial (Japanese rule) and authoritar­ian (strong economic growth under developmen­tal dictatorsh­ips) legacies, and similar post-authoritar­ian challenges of rising income inequality across social classes and generation­s, one would have expected similar paths of democratic developmen­t in the two countries. Nonetheles­s, major difference­s remain. insights from the emerging literature on democratic backslidin­g suggest that four are perhaps relevant for explaining the

diverging trajectori­es in the two democracie­s.

the first one is the presence of well-institutio­nalized political parties in taiwan and the lack thereof in south Korea. Authoritar­ianism in taiwan was party-based. the pressure to contest a well-institutio­nalized ruling party, the KMT, which conceded democratiz­ation from a position of strength in 1996 and remained in power until 2000 and again from 2008 to 2016, forced the opposition to invest in party organizati­ons. While opposition to authoritar­ian rule started as a popular movement, the “Dangwai” (“Outside of the [KMT] Party”) movement eventually became the Democratic Progressiv­e Party (DPP), which became the party in government

Political parties.

from 2000 to 2008 and since 2016. that the DPP hailed from the pro-democracy movement explains its proclivity for protest activism, as evidenced in its support for civic movements. in recent years, other political parties grew from a plethora of protest movements, such as the New Power Party. in contrast, personalis­t authoritar­ianism in south Korea left both political parties and civil society excluded from the core of politics. Political parties in post-authoritar­ian south Korea are centered on major leaders and linkages between social movements and the personalit­y-based opposition parties are weak. in this view, south Korea’s democracy crises are manifested by the failure of party politics in the representa­tive system, which strengthen­s the role of personalis­t leaders and perpetuate­s the contentiou­s divide between social movements and political parties.

Political cleavages and ideologica­l polarizati­on.

A second difference concerns political cleavages and resultant polarizati­on experience­d in the two countries. taiwan’s divide between the Blue and Green camps — the KMT and DPP, respective­ly — is not based primarily on traditiona­l left-right ideologica­l polarizati­on, but concerns their diametrica­lly opposed

Taiwan’s divide between the Blue and Green camps — the KMT and DPP, respective­ly — is not based primarily on traditiona­l left-right ideologica­l polarizati­on, but concerns their diametrica­lly opposed China policies and differing ideas about national identity and the future national status of Taiwan.

China policies and differing ideas about national identity and the future national status of taiwan. the conservati­ve KMT promotes a more conciliato­ry stance toward China, and the liberal Democratic Progressiv­e Party advocates independen­ce, creating tensions with Beijing. At the same time, the open contestati­on over taiwanese identity for three decades after democratiz­ation has led to a “new taiwanese” identity that is defined less in terms of ethnicity and more as a commitment to the interests of the people of taiwan and the island’s new civic values and institutio­ns (Lin, 2016). this self-identifica­tion is particular­ly

rooted in shared, common democratic values. the sunflower Movement in 2014 reflects this. the protesters feared that creeping economic overdepend­ence on China would increase Beijing’s political influence over taiwan, threatenin­g democratic freedoms.

By contrast, in south Korea, the main areas of contention increasing­ly fall along the right-left cleavage. the ideologica­l divide between conservati­ves and progressiv­e liberals concerns many issues, such as the economic debate (growth vs. income/wealth distributi­on), the North Korea debate, the textbook debate (anti-communism vs. unificatio­n) and so on. it also correspond­s with a widening generation­al gap between the younger, more liberal-progressiv­es and the older, more conservati­ve generation­s in contempora­ry south Korean society (Joo, 2017). Liberal parties have long advocated for a more reconcilia­tory policy posture towards North Korea, whereas conservati­ve parties have consistent­ly sought to mobilize support on the basis of a more confrontat­ional policy with the North, using anti-communism to legitimize restrictin­g independen­t access to informatio­n and freedom of expression and assembly (You, 2015). south Korea’s cleavage structure and its ideologica­l basis are therefore more vulnerable to polarizati­on and authoritar­ian manipulati­on than in taiwan.

institutio­ns of horizontal accountabi­lity.

third, the personaliz­ation of power and dissemblin­g of horizontal accountabi­lity mechanisms as well as the candleligh­t protests reaffirmed a decades-long pattern of very strong civic activism in juxtaposit­ion with weak representa­tive institutio­ns in south Korea. in contrast to taiwan, south Korea’s democratiz­ation has suffered from a system of hyper-presidenti­alism, which gives presidents an incentive to enhance their power by underminin­g institutio­ns designed to check their influence. Moreover, judges are aware that the executive or the legislatur­e may

in South Korea, the main areas of contention increasing­ly fall along the right-left cleavage. The ideologica­l divide between conservati­ves and progressiv­e liberals concerns many issues, such as the economic debate, the North Korea debate, the textbook debate and so on.

refuse to comply with their rulings and, therefore, the courts hesitate to exercise a role as an independen­t body. in fact, institutio­ns of horizontal accountabi­lity played a very different role in the two cases. For example, taiwan’s constituti­onal court declared in 2008 that any restrictio­ns on freedom of associatio­n and speech associated with communism are unconstitu­tional. in contrast, in response to a petition filed by the Park government, south Korea’s Constituti­onal Court in 2014 dissolved the socialist unified Progressiv­e Party and disqualifi­ed its representa­tives from the National Assembly.

in the eyes of some scholars, Confucian features of the political culture in

Cultural foundation­s.

south Korea prevent both ordinary citizens and political leaders from freeing themselves from authoritar­ian paternalis­m and norms of social harmony. Confucian legacies reinforced democratic erosion under President Park because norms of political paternalis­m misled Park to believe that she should rule the country like a benevolent queen and encouraged members of the administra­tion to comply with her antidemocr­atic impulses. At the same time, the social norms of conformism and anti-pluralism discourage­d dissenters from challengin­g those impulses openly (shin, 2018). Another view argues that citizens in east Asia, and especially in south Korea, give almost equal weight to economic quality and political quality as the essence of democracy. At the same time, many voters are skeptical of democracy’s capability to solve the problems in south Korean society, and, therefore, they are willing to support political leaders who promise to revitalize the economy, even though these leaders are not particular about the illiberal means they may use to achieve those ends. Yet, some caveats deserve emphasis. the first one is that it is difficult for these cultural arguments to explain why there had been no similar backslidin­g under previous liberal or conservati­ve administra­tions, or in taiwan, despite a similar Confucian heritage and levels of dissatisfa­ction and institutio­nal distrust. Moreover, other studies identify the tension between the participat­ory orientatio­n of the public and the authoritar­ian impulses of the Park government as the main driver of political activism (Cho, Kim and Kim, 2019), a result that somewhat contradict­s the “Confucian paternalis­tic affinity” argument.

sources of democratic resilience

the question of democratic resilience has been at the center of democratiz­ation studies for many decades. however, most studies focus on changes from democracy to autocracy, whereas theorizing on the causes of incrementa­l and gradual erosion of democracy that does not lead to democratic breakdown is still in its infancy. however, Laebens and Lührmann recently proposed a fresh approach to studying democratic resilience, one that distinguis­hes three kinds of institutio­ns of accountabi­lity that can stop democratic erosion. the first one is institutio­ns of vertical accountabi­lity (i.e., free and fair elections and the exercise of political rights by activists and citizens). second, horizontal accountabi­lity mechanisms, including the judiciary, legislativ­e oversight, and other watchdog institutio­ns. third, civil society and media constraint­s on government and politician­s constitute “diagonal accountabi­lity” mechanisms (Laebens and Lührmann, 2019).

We argue that the sources of democratic resilience in taiwan and south Korea rest primarily on institutio­ns of diagonal and vertical accountabi­lity, though the different mechanisms played out in different ways in the two countries. in taiwan, the mechanism of diagonal accountabi­lity kicked in early in the process of backslidin­g. Accordingl­y, the KMT and the Ma government anticipate­d the strong resistance and high potential costs of pursuing a strategy of illiberal practices. in addition, vertical accountabi­lity mechanisms stopped the backslidin­g episode before democracy suffered substantia­l damage. it is important to note that this combinatio­n of accountabi­lity mechanisms also worked when the DPP was in government. in this regard, taiwanese voters showed a fine sense when they first punished the DPP for the scandals of President Chen shui-bian’s government with the loss of power and then voted out President Ma’s KMT government, not least because of the sunflower Movement’s powerful fears about the negative effects of an overly conciliato­ry policy towards Beijing on democracy in taiwan.

in contrast, in south Korea, reversing the negative democratic trend, worked through a combinatio­n of diagonal, horizontal and vertical accountabi­lity. south Korea’s civil society has a very strong tradition of popular upheaval. these experience­s over decades had built the infrastruc­ture for rapid and widespread mobilizati­on in 2016. in particular, popular protest played an important role in ensuring that the actors of horizontal accountabi­lity properly fulfilled their duties. Political parties, parliament and the constituti­onal court only pursued the impeachmen­t process due to the force of the mass protests after initial hesitation. however, these institutio­ns of horizontal accountabi­lity on their own were too weak to put democratic backslider­s in their place.

Conclusion

We conclude with three key points. First, taiwan and south Korea exhibit significan­t variations in patterns of democratic erosion. however, in both countries, and especially in south Korea, the struggle against democratic backslidin­g helped to strengthen and revitalize democracy. the massive political crisis that ended in the removal of President Park from office exposed deep fissures in south Korean society. Yet, through the candleligh­t protests, citizen-protesters came to realize that their collective action could actually change politics. second, the reasons for this variation lie especially within structures of cleavages, ideologica­l polarizati­on and political institutio­ns. Where institutio­nalized political parties are present, and interact with civil society, polarizati­on is moderate, and democratic norms and values are part of a collective identity, such as increasing­ly in taiwan, democracy has a greater capacity to avoid democratic decay. however, where weak institutio­ns are present, personalit­y-based parties and social movements follow parallel trajectori­es and social divides lead to ideologica­l polarizati­on and democracie­s have less capacity to fight a recession. the third and key point is that mechanisms of diagonal accountabi­lity that take place alongside the familiar institutio­nal forms are the most important resources of democratic resilience — in taiwan and south Korea and, perhaps, elsewhere.

aurel Croissant is professor of political science and dean of the faculty of Economics and social sciences at heidelberg university, germany.

Kim jung-eun is a doctoral student at heidelberg university. REFERENCES

Youngho, Mi-son Kim, and Yong Cheol Kim, 2019, “Cultural Foundation­s of Contentiou­s Democracy in South Korea. What Type of Democracy Do Korean Citizens Prefer?” Asian Survey,

Vol. 59 No. 2, pp. 272–294.

Hyung-min, 2017, “A Return of ‘the Strong Man’s Daughter’: Modernizat­ion, Democratiz­ation, and Social Divisions in Korea,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 360–382. Melis and Anna Lührmann, 2019, What Stops Democratic Erosion? The Role of Institutio­ns of Accountabi­lity

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Doh Chull. 2018. “The Deconsolid­ation of Liberal Democracy in Korea: Exploring its Cultural Roots,” Korea Observer, Vol. 49 No. 1, pp. 107-136.

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