Trump and Clinton have no idea how to deal with Putin
THE degree to which Russia has taken centre stage in the US presidential election hasn’t been seen since the height of the Cold War. Whether it’s the strange and disturbing details of an apparent Kremlin-sponsored Democratic National Committee email hack or the Donald Trump campaign’s curious and convoluted links to the former Soviet region, Russia and its strongman president, Vladimir Putin, have emerged as a top US security concern. But so far, polarising campaign rhetoric and media sensationalism have largely overshadowed all this attention on Russia.
We may not know the full extent to which Moscow is directly meddling in American campaign affairs, but the US political elite is in an uproar over the possibility. Furthering the speculation is the news that two of Trump’s foreign policy advisers – retired Army General Michael Flynn and investment banker Carter Page – have had financial dealings with state-owned Russian companies, though neither has disclosed the full extent of those arrangements.
But this political feeding frenzy unleashed by Russian jabs at the US presidential election underscores a deeper problem for America’s national interests. Despite ample rhetoric bashing Russia’s muscle f lexing foreign policy or impugning the White House for failing to explore avenues of cooperation, neither presidential candidate seems to have given much thought to what a coherent US policy towards Russia would look like.
Moscow is one of a small handful of powerful governments that has both the capability and the ambition to challenge US interests not only by def ying Washington’s preferences for human rights within Russia, but by intervening in neighbouring states and even projecting power far beyond its borders.
It should be obvious, then, that Washington needs a better Russia policy. And it will be incumbent on the next president to develop an approach that advances vital US national interests while taking into account Russia’s objectives and capabilities on its periphery. What we have heard from the candidates so far falls short of that mark.
As secretar y of state, Clinton presided over considerable accomplishments during the “reset” period of 2009 to 2011, and famously presented a literal “reset” button (mislabelled with the Russian word for “overcharge”) to her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in 2009. During this brief period, President Barack Obama and then-President Dmitry Medvedev agreed to practical cooperation on nuclear arms control, trade promotion, and supplying NATO forces in Afghanistan. But by 2012, nearing the end of Clinton’s tenure at Foggy Bottom, this short productive stretch soon gave way to escalating confrontation.
As the Democratic nominee, Clinton seems content to continue the muddled approach of seeking to both isolate Russia and engage with it, depending on the issue.
For his part, Trump has suggested he would pursue better relations with Putin, whom he has called a “better leader than Obama”, and who in turn has called Trump “colourful” (mistranslated in the Western press as “brilliant”).
Both candidates’ disorganised approaches to the Kremlin stand in contrast to Washington’s historical relations with Moscow. During the Cold War, American presidents from Harry S Truman to Ronald Reagan defined the challenge from the Soviet Union in terms of defeating the ideology of communism, but they also identified concrete US interests around the world jeopardised by Soviet policies and defined the resources necessary to defend them.
In their own time, each previous US administration was faced with quickly evolving technological, political, and economic developments on the home front, as well as unpredictable global security crises that demanded scarce US resources and attention. In each case, clearly defining the challenge posed by the Soviet Union to American interests, and the steps necessary to secure those interests, helped set a standard against which competing priorities could be weighed and difficult choices made.
The simple fact is that Russia is a major player in regions of great strategic importance to the United States and its closest European allies, from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Middle East and the Arctic. It is nowhere near the superpower and rival to the United States that it was during the Cold War, but Russia is still a major force, with 145 million people, one of the world’s largest economies, increasingly potent conventional militar y capabilities, and a vast strategic nuclear arsenal. These facts may fuel campaign broadsides about the threat from Putin and Russia over the coming months, but paranoia and demonization should not obscure the fundamental challenge Russia poses for US foreign policy.
Thinking through a comprehensive, interests-based approach to managing US-Russia competition and confrontation in 2017 and beyond is not an academic exercise. The next US administration is certain to face recurring trade-offs between confronting the Kremlin over its bullying of neighbouring states or its abuse of its own citizens, versus securing Russian cooperation on global challenges like maintaining the nuclear nonproliferation regime and countering the terrorist threat.
Consider just a few of the Russia-related problems the next administration will face: The conf licts in Syria and Ukraine cannot be resolved without Russian cooperation, yet Russia’s interventions so far have clearly been designed to weaken US proxies. Russian participation was critical to achieving the breakthrough agreement to halt Iran’s nuclear program, but as relations with Washington deteriorate further, Moscow could easily back Tehran if it is found cheating. And, although low oil and gas prices have dealt a blow to Russia’s export-dependent economy, Moscow can still turn off the tap during Europe’s cold winter months to punish neighbors for cozying up to the West.
In dealing with smaller, weaker states more inclined to defer to US preferences, it may be smart for a candidate to talk tough on the campaign trail – but once elected, shift to experienced career officials and talented diplomats to actually manage productive relations with the Kremlin. Russia, however, will require presidential attention from day one – and coordinating efforts across the vast US bureaucracy will demand a strateg y. It’s not too early for the candidates to stop bashing each other with caricatures of Putin and Russia and start developing a clear vision of the challenge Moscow poses to US’s interests and the steps needed to defend them.