Saddam’s former loyalists have helped build ISIL
On May 23, 2003, the U.S. stood down the Iraqi army. Twelve years later, they are still fighting its remnants. National Post reporter Davide Mastracci examines how former Saddam loyalists have aided the rise of ISIL.
Everything seemed to be going right for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003.
Baghdad had fallen. Saddam Hussein was on the run. The Iraqi army had surrendered. Former U.S. President George W. Bush went on live television, declaring the Iraq war a victory while standing in front of a banner that read Mission Accomplished.
On May 11, Paul Bremer was named head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the body created to serve as a transitional government for Iraq. His first order of business called for the de-Baathification of the new government: anyone associated with Saddam’s political party was to be removed from their post and banned from ever serving again. The second order, issued on May 23, dissolved the Iraqi military and intelligence services.
An American senior coalition official at the time told CNN the order to stand down the army was “part of a robust campaign to show the Iraqi people that the Saddam regime is gone and will never return.”
The reality turned out to be far more complicated. The order, which many blamed for the violent insurgency that followed, quickly became one of the most disputed decisions of the U.S. postwar occupation. Now, 12 years later, there are signs the decision continues to haunt U.S. efforts in Iraq, with in- creasing evidence former members of Saddam’s military have helped fuel the rise of ISIL.
Although a majority of ISIL’s foot soldiers has been recruited from around the world, reports and personal accounts suggest its leaders are predominantly Iraqis, many of whom were affected by the 2003 dissolution of the Iraqi Armed Forces.
“ISIL, as an organization, would not exist without former Baathists,” says Iraq analyst Sajad Jiyad, a senior researcher at the al-Bayan Center for Studies & Planning in Baghdad.
He estimates more than 25 of ISIL’s most prominent 40 leaders in the last two years were previously Baathists.
Brig. Gen. Hassan Dulaimi, a former intelligence officer who lost his job after the 2003 dissolution, made a similar claim in an interview with
The Washington Post this year.
“The people in charge of military operations in (ISIL) were the best officers in the former Iraqi army, and that is why (ISIL) beats us in intelligence and on the battlefield,” he said.
In April, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, who was featured as the “King of Clubs” on a deck of cards listing the most-wanted members of Saddam’s regime, was reportedly killed in battle north of Baghdad. Formerly Saddam’s right-hand man, he led a militia that is believed to have co-operated with ISIL from 2014 onward, during its greatest gains.
Last year, Adnan al-Asani, Iraq’s deputy interior minister, told Al Arabiya three of ISIL’s top six military commanders at the time, Haji Bakr, Abu Ayman al-Iraqi and Abu Ahmad al-Alwani, were all former high-ranking Baathist party members.
Shashank Joshi at the Royal United Services Institute, says the Baathists’ significance to ISIL goes beyond numbers. “It’s less important in terms of the contribution to manpower, or sheer heft or size, and more important in terms of the specific skills, connections, linkages and technical expertise that the Baathists bring to the table,” he says.
He cites skills former Baathists have used to propel ISIL’s rise, including knowledge of smuggling networks, familiarity with military technology and significant experience in terrorizing civilians.
ISIL has used intelligence expertise to “systematically profile, manipulate and then dominate population centres by assessing the weak points of the population, and assessing potential collaborators,” Joshi says. “That’s the kind of thing professional intelligence officers in authoritarian states, specifically in psychopathic authoritarian states like Saddam Hussein’s, are well trained to do.”
J.M. Berger, co-author of ISIS: The State of Terror, says “Former Baathists have played a very significant role in the leadership of ISIS, and their contributions can be seen especially in the local organization and strategy of the group.”
Just how they became tied to ISIL, and how committed the secular Baathists are to its religious goals, is uncertain.
Immediately after the order to disband Saddam Hussein’s army, more than 250,000 soldiers and officers were put out of work overnight. Jiyad calls the decision a “catastrophic” mistake that “gave every reason to a vanquished enemy — battled-hardened Baathist officers — to fight the U.S. and further destroy Iraq.”
Thousands of the soldiers, unemployed and bitter, went on to drive a violent insurgency that saw guerrilla attacks, suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) kill thousands of U.S. and Iraqi troops, officials and civilians.
The post-invasion insurgency involved a tactical alliance between terrorist groups, such as al- Qaida in Iraq, former Baathists and Sunni tribes. Despite substantial ideological differences, the partnership was driven by a shared interest in reclaiming control of Iraq from U.S. forces.
Connections between the former Baathists and ISIL in its current form seem to have increased since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the group’s leader in 2010.
Kind of thing professional intelligence officers in ... psychopathic authoritarian states like Saddam Hussein’s, are well trained to do.