Terrorism suspect not victim of delay

Right to speedy trial has not been violated, judge rules

Calgary terrorism suspect Jamal Borhot has not been the victim of an unreasonable delay in his prosecution, a judge ruled Monday in determining his trial will proceed.

Justice Corina Dario said that after a review of Crown and defence submissions, she determined Borhot's Charter right to be tried within a reasonable amount of time was not violated.

Defence counsel Pawel Milczarek had argued Borhot was entitled to have his charges thrown out based on the more than 44 months that will have elapsed from the time he was charged until the scheduled conclusion of his trial at the end of next month.

But prosecutors argued much of that time period was attributed to defence delays, including the fact Borhot is now on his third lawyer.

Crown lawyer Dominic Puglia also argued the case was complex, which would mean delays over the ceiling established by the Supreme Court would not violate the accused's constitutional right.

“Upon a review of submissions by counsel ... I am satisfied that Mr. Borhot's 11(b) rights have not been violated,” Dario said, citing the Charter section that guarantees an individual the right to be tried in a timely fashion.

The Court of King's Bench judge said she will issue a more thorough decision, likely later this week.

Borhot, 34, faces three charges of participating in the activities of a terrorist group. He is accused of travelling to Syria in 2013 and 2014 to assist ISIS.

He was arrested in September 2020 after a lengthy RCMP investigation.

His cousin, Hussein Borhot, was arrested several months earlier and was handed a 12year sentence in May 2022, after admitting becoming an ISIS fighter while in the Middle East.

Milczarek, in both written and oral submissions, had argued Dario should enter a judicial stay of his client's charges based on the length of time it took to get the case to trial.

Under the Jordan ruling, the Supreme Court found delays in excess of 30 months from the date of arrest to the end of trial are presumptively a violation of an accused's Charter right short of exceptional circumstances.

Those include delays attributable to the defence.

Milczarek had argued nothing the defence had done caused his client's case to be before the courts for so long, suggesting conduct by the Crown over issues such as disclosure was to blame.

In their written brief, Puglia and co-prosecutor Kyra Kondro said the nature of the case alone justified a lengthier period.

“This is a complex case,” they wrote.

“Terrorism prosecutions and the terrorism provisions of ... the Criminal Code have consistently been referred to as complicated.”