Unsung role in Kandahar another Argo
Over the past year or so, I have met with many friends and family members wanting to know more about my deployment to Kandahar, Afghanistan. While the questions vary greatly (from “Just how hot was it?” to “Did you see camels?”), the conversation usually boils down to two issues: did we make a difference and was it worth it?
The first speaks to our selfless and humanitarian side; a desire to make the lives of Afghans better. But the second highlights the effects the blood spilled and the treasure spent have had on our collective mind. These two questions are simply veiled versions of the one overarching question on everyone’s mind: did we win?
With last weekend’s closure of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) — a relatively small base in the downtown of Kandahar City — this question is even more relevant. Although no longer home to any Canadians (Canada left the reconstruction team in summer 2011 as part of the end of our combat mission), it played a vital role in Canada’s overall mission in Afghanistan.
Housed at Camp Nathan Smith, named after the first Canadian soldier killed in Afghanistan, at its peak the KPRT was home to about 300 Canadian soldiers, and 80 or so development workers, civilian police, correctional service officers and diplomats.
Led by Canadians from 2005 to 2011, it eventually grew into a bi-national team, with the U.S. deploying soldiers and civilians to the KPRT during their surge. This bi-national team was tasked with security operations, supporting the Kandahar provincial government and undertaking reconstruction and development projects, all in the heartland of the former Taliban regime.
A focal point for military and civilian leaders, we were inundated with visits, ranging from Canada’s governor general to U.S. senators and congressmen to all-party parliamentary committees. At one point, the prominence of the KPRT became such that civilian and military personnel had to be permanently assigned to visits duties.
Despite this, Canada’s role in Kandahar and the KPRT are largely unknown. As Washington Post reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran said recently on Twitter, “Kandahar is another Argo. Most Americans have no idea about the crucial Canadian role.” Sadly, neither do most Canadians.
The KPRT is one for the win column. It was a place where Canada stood shoulder-toshoulder with the world’s superpower, and where we took a lead role. Canadian and American soldiers worked side-by-side with their civilian counterparts, bringing water to the desert and medicines to the sick and building schools for children.
In fact, the KPRT reflects Canada’s mission in Afghanistan as a whole. Did we get everything right? No. Were we often flying by the seat of our pants, hoping things would work out? Yes. But it was exemplary of the entrepreneurial spirit that defines Canada — that inherent willingness to step forward and take the lead, even if we don’t have all the answers.
But can we chalk up the Afghanistan mission as a win?
The reality is that the jury of history is still out, and will be for some time. The only true marker of victory will be when young Afghans believe in the future of their country enough to stay. They need to feel as though there is a future for them and their families. Unfortunately, for all the girls in school, for all the progress made, people still want to leave. Until this has reversed, we cannot claim victory.
No amount of foreign aid, security operations or diplomatic involvement can force this to happen. Instead, it will be up to them. Our job should be to help give them the space to do so.
One way to do this would be to address the chief issue preventing Afghan peace and security: Pakistan and its InterServices Intelligence, or ISI. We have known of Pakistan’s continuing support for the Quetta and Peshawar Shuras, for the Haqqani group and for other armed groups still operating in Afghanistan for years, yet the problem persists. This needs to be fixed.
Canadians can be proud of their countrymen and women, military and civilian, who have served in Afghanistan. Nation building, counter-insurgency, stabilization is an art, not a science. We can rest assured that Canada helped improve the lives of countless Afghans and set the conditions for them to choose their own future.
But can we say we won? Only Afghans themselves can, and will, determine that.