Spy document warns of China threat

Look out for colleagues rummaging through others’ desks.

Beware spies who could exploit your divided national loyalties, greed or ego.

And monitor foreign visitors at all times, especially last-minute additions to tour groups.

These are among the tips outlined in an extraordinary manual drafted by the FBI for universities and other research facilities in the U.S., warning about the threat of economic and scientific espionage by China — and advising how to combat it.

As Canada grapples with how to counter Beijing’s meddling here, the American document — called China: The Risk to Academia — recommends a level of alertness that seems almost a throwback to Cold War days.

And it is aimed at a milieu — university and college campuses — where academic freedom and openness are sacrosanct, and government interference usually spurned. Those institutions have also, though, been welcoming tens of thousands of students and scholars from China in recent years.

“It is every university and institution’s responsibility to safeguard its information,” states the document, a copy of which was obtained by the National Post. “The Chinese government (poses) a particular threat to U.S. academia for a variety of reasons.”

In Canada, where 143,000 Chinese students are enrolled at colleges and universities, there’s little evidence of the same level of vigilance, or willingness to name China as a prime villain. The RCMP says it has produced no such document and has no country-specific enforcement programs, while universities report little in the way of warnings from security agencies.

The country’s spy agency does acknowledge an economic espionage problem, without mentioning any one country.

Unidentified foreign powers are using “a range of traditional and non-traditional intelligence collection tradecraft” to try to acquire Canadian technology and expertise, which could result in lost jobs and competitiveness, said Tahera Mufti, a spokeswoman for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

“CSIS routinely engages with a variety of stakeholders, including in the private sector and universities, to advise them of potential threats,” she added.

Mufti pointed to a five-paragraph section on economic espionage in the service’s recent annual report, and a speech by director David Vigneault last year, warning business leaders about the threat in generic terms.

U.S. authorities, on the other hand, have made clear they consider improper siphoning of secrets and other advanced knowledge from research facilities by China specifically to be a major problem. FBI director Christopher Wray controversially pointed the finger last year at students and professors of Chinese background, suggesting a “whole of society” response to the threat is needed.

Several people have been charged in connection with such activity, though critics have accused the government of racial profiling and paranoia in the area.

The Risk to Academia document takes some pains to acknowledge that immigrants and visiting students and scholars are integral to the U.S. research system, saying the “vast majority” of those from China are in the States for legitimate academic reasons.

But it lays out in detail the Chinese government’s tactics to vacuum up intellectual property — such as using some students and professors as “non-traditional collectors” — and suggests colleges and other research organizations should play a part in countering those tactics.

The document warns that “foreign adversaries” — its title singling out adversaries from China — could elicit information by “using flattery, assuming knowledge, asking leading questions … or feigning ignorance.”

Intelligence agents will look to exploit vulnerabilities, keying in on ideology or loyalty to a country other than the U.S.; greed or financial stress; ego or self-image and “anger, revenge or disaffection,” the FBI advises.

“They can spend years targeting an individual and developing a relationship that leads the student, professor or researcher — either wittingly or unwittingly — to provide information to the foreign adversary.”

The briefing suggests ways to detect “insider threats” — employees who as early as the job-application stage may have been directed by a foreign government to gain access to universities with sought-after research programs.

Warning signs could include someone who insists on working in private, volunteers herself for classified projects, “rummages through offices or desks of others,” has mysterious absences or displays “unexplained affluence,” the briefing says.

The FBI notes that campus visits by foreign researchers can be risky.

“Foreign adversaries sometimes add individuals at the last minute in an attempt to steal your information.”