Nuclear deterrence a fraying tightrope?
Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un have created unique challenges for nuclear deterrence. Two bombastic and undisciplined leaders — one with an overwhelming nuclear arsenal and one wannabe — are putting a lot of strain on the idea that the United States is willing and able to use its nuclear arsenal to deter an attack on its allies. And that this umbrella can prevent aggression and will keep allies from acquiring their own nukes. Kim has frayed the tightrope of nuclear stability with a relentless effort to test long-range missiles that could deliver warheads to the U.S. west coast. For reckless bad measure, he has boasted about doing exactly that.
This prospect has America’s allies in Asia concerned about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If North Korea could threaten the U.S. with nuclear retaliation, they worry, would Washington be as resolute in defending them from attack or nuclear blackmail?
These currents of insecurity washed through a wide-ranging panel discussion of nukes and North Korea at the weekend Halifax International Security Forum, which a number of senior American military figures attended.
And they prompted two attention-grabbing statements from Gen. John E. Hyten, commander of America’s nuclear arsenal and the senior officer with whom Donald Trump would discuss any order to deploy nuclear forces.
Responding to discussion of whether South Korea could continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Gen. Hyten said, “We are ready every minute of every day to respond to any event that comes out of North Korea.”
He said “an extended deterrence” provided by the U.S. is both real and the “best option.” But he also added that “my goal is to create the room for diplomacy and sanctions to work” to convince North Korea to change direction.
On whether there are checks to drive rational White House decisions on nukes, Gen. Hyten said the law of armed conflict — with established principles of necessity, proportionality and unnecessary suffering — will guide the military’s advice and response to the president.
This applies as much to nuclear weapons as to any military decision, he said. And the outcome of executing an unlawful order is clear: “You will go to jail.”
How would this work in practice if the president were considering a nuclear response?
“I provide advice to the president,” Gen. Hyten told the security forum, “and he will tell me what to do. And if it’s illegal, guess what’s going to happen? I’m going to say, ‘Mr. President, that’s illegal’.” “And guess what he’s going to do? He’s going to say, ‘What would be legal?’ and we’ll come up with some options of a mix of capabilities to respond to whatever the situation is. That’s the way it works.” Gen. Hyten’s words are significant for two reasons. First they provide clear statements that the U.S. deterrent strategy is engaged, has not wavered and is subject, at the top rung of decision-making, to strong legal and institutional judgments, no matter who is president.
The second is that it was necessary for a senior military official to give these assurances. Mr. Trump would serve deterrence better if he showed more gravitas and constancy himself. There is a school of thought (fathered by Richard Nixon) that presidents must show a hint of unreasonableness to be convincing on deterrence. But playing “Punch and Judy” with Kim Jong-un is not the way to do it.