Canada and possible hostilities with N. Korea

Four questions to be answered before joining any war, Irvin Studin says.

There is a very real prospect of major international war in the coming months.

The immediate theatre of pressure is the Korean Peninsula, where North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and apparent progress are fast colliding with Washington’s apprehensions about Pyongyang’s medium-term military capabilities.

The prospect of armed conflict is heightened by the growing confidence of the new American president, following the unexpected U.S. bombardment of Syrian assets earlier this month, the use of the so-called “mother of all bombs” in Afghanistan last week and, to be sure, the active search by the new administration for “wins” or “consolidation actions” to offset limited policy achievement and depressed popularity on the home front.

The North Koreans have not relented. They recently celebrated the 105th anniversary of the birth of their founding president, Kim Il Sung, with a massive military parade showcasing what may or may not be new weaponry, but supported by rhetoric threatening nuclear war in the event of (or pre-emptively to) any attack by the United States, and the promise of frequent missile tests for the foreseeable future.

Beijing and Moscow alike have flagged their alarm, calling for de-escalation, but simultaneously mobilizing assets and emergency planning. Every major-power capital knows full well that any outbreak of war would be catastrophic, and quite possibly nuclear in nature within the earliest pangs of conflict.

What should the Canadian position be in the event of war? And how ought we to think about this crisis in anticipation of possible war (alongside, naturally, the hope for some species of peace)?

Until any war has begun, Canada has one overriding obligation: to mobilize all diplomatic energy to advance a peaceful outcome. Period. The prime minister and foreign affairs minister must move now, with purpose, playing whatever bridging role Canada can offer.

Canada’s diplomatic campaign must be coupled with serious reflection in Ottawa on whether Canada should be party to such a possible war. To this end, four questions must be answered.

Q First, do we share the same interests as the Americans with respect to North Korea in particular, and northeast Asia in general?

A For the most part, yes. We fancy a strategically predictable and stable North Korea. That said, we may have less of an interest than the Americans in the destabilization or weakening of China that could result from such a war, or from the collapse of the North Korean state. By socalled “linkage,” Canada also has major interests in the context of the renegotiation of NAFTA, and Canada-U.S. economic relations more broadly.

Q Second, do we trust the intelligence and analytics of the Americans with respect to North Korea (or connected theatres of pressure)?

A Perhaps, but not without due skepticism. The intelligence and analytical resources and capabilities of the Americans in Asia are by far superior to ours (and that of all Western countries), but their quality and reach should not be overstated — particularly in the context of the present tensions between the president and that country’s intelligence agencies, not to mention the dearth of Western embassies in Pyongyang.

Q Third, do we trust the strategic judgment of the Americans?

A No. The new American president has negligible geopolitical experience, and no appreciable understanding of the complexities of a large Asian war involving great powers. He may or may not receive competent advice from his generals, but the final call (affirmative, independent, veto or override) would be his alone.

Q Finally, do we trust the American to have our backs in a pinch?

A On balance, yes, but not without qualification — especially in an America First framework.

Canada’s conclusion: Keep our powder dry. Press for peace. If pushed to war, win.