Command lacking in Moncton rampage
Independent review found several mistakes
• No one took command during a 2014 shooting rampage in Moncton, N.B., so officers were forced to make decisions amid the chaos, a retired assistant RCMP commissioner told the national police force’s Labour Code trial Wednesday.
Alphonse MacNeil, hired to conduct an independent review of the shootings, said few front-line supervisors were trained to take control of such situations. He said more than 20 officers initially responded to the call, and no direction was being provided.
“You have to have control. You can’t have all of those members moving on their own,” said MacNeil in Moncton provincial court. “Someone had to be in charge. It’s not a time to consult, and nobody took on that role.”
The RCMP is accused of violating the Labour Code for allegedly failing to provide members and supervisors with the appropriate information, instruction, equipment and training in an active-shooter event.
MacNeil noted the initial response to a camouflagewearing man wielding firearms was appropriate, with members setting up a perimeter.
SOMEONE HAD TO BE IN CHARGE. IT’S NOT A TIME TO CONSULT.
But operations then started to break down.
There was no “lethal force overwatch” during the first encounter with gunman Justin Bourque, meaning no one was in a position to take him down when he turned his weapon on police, he said.
Const. Fabrice Gevaudan — one of three Mounties who died June 4, 2014 — was then fatally shot, he said.
MacNeil said there was a lack of communication, noting no one went on the radio to clearly indicate what happened to Gevaudan.
MacNeil said officers set up a staging area at a fire station, but it was in a “hot zone.” There, no one took command. The street next to the staging area was also not immediately blocked off.
He said the lack of coordination continued after the 20-minute window of the shootings, with members from other detachments arriving June 5 unaware of where they should go.
Officers were at a tactical disadvantage because Bourque’s semi-automatic rifle and shotgun were more powerful than their pistols, MacNeil said. He also said none of the responders put on hard body armour.
MacNeil’s 2015 report made 64 recommendations and concluded carbines could have made a difference.