There is no global recession without the U.S.

And the U.S. is nowhere near one

I keep getting asked about this global recession — what? Even with the slowdown, emerging-market economies in aggregate are expanding at an annual rate of four per cent. And there is no global recession without the U.S.

I have so many people calling me a hypocrite because in 2007 and 2008 I said over and over again that “decoupling” was only found in fairy tales. Dude, that is because the rest of the world cannot break loose from the grips of U.S. domestic demand, but the U.S. economy can survive a turndown elsewhere (I didn’t say thrive … survive).

For example, the Mexican crisis in 1995 did not bring the U.S. economy down for the count (in fact, it was Brady Bonds that saved Mexico in the end).

The near decade-long pain that Germany felt in the 1990s’ post-reunification period hardly stopped the U.S. from experiencing positive economic growth.

Even the Asian crisis of 1997/98, which makes what we endured this year look like a poolside summertime martini by comparison, did not prevent U.S. growth from topping four per cent, for crying out loud.

Japan, for years the second-largest economy in the world (replaced by China in 2010), has been in recession nearly 40 per cent of the time over the past quarter-century and I don’t see that as having exerted a lasting negative impact on the good ol’ U.S. of A. — indeed, the effect was imperceptible.

Canada is the U.S.’s largest trading partner and suffered a mini-recession in the first half of the year. I didn’t see the U.S. following suit, did you?

Please, correct me if I’m wrong, but I don’t think I am rewriting history here. It’s just about the mathematics.

The U.S. runs a trade deficit equivalent to three per cent of GDP. What other country of this scale does this? That is how America shares its growth with the rest of the world.

If only Germany adopted this role as the consumer of first and last resort for the rest of the euro area.

What the U.S. buys from the rest of the world is double what China contributes: the U.S. imports 50 per cent more than it exports; China exports 20 per cent more than it imports and what it buys from the rest of the world is mostly stuff in the ground, assembled at home. The U.S. imports final products across the gamut in the consumer and capital goods space.

Beneath the veneer of the transitory factors dampening GDP growth right now is a slate of positive domestic news that seems to be dismissed.

I doubt that Southwest Airlines Co. could report a year-over-year 11.4-per-cent increase in air traffic or that Boeing Co. would book 182 new commercial plane orders in Q3 (shares jumped 1.5 per cent on the

The Mexican crisis in 1995 did not bring the U.S. economy down

news) if the U.S. economy was about to tip over.

Finally, as everyone navel gazes after the dismal payroll data on Oct. 2, take note that employment is not part of The Conference Board’s index of leading economic indicators, but initial jobless claims are included.

As a result, it is likely highly significant that filings for unemployment insurance in the first week of October fell 13,000 to 263,000, flirting with 42-year lows. The four-week moving average fell 3,000 to 267,500 and is 10,000 lower than it was a month ago.

Why talk about this? Because recessions do not typically start until claims hit the 400,000 mark. And does anyone have a clue how long it would take to get there from where we are today, even assuming claims have hit a trough?

More than two years, if history can be used as a guide; and no, sorry, it’s not different this time — as Mark Twain would attest.