A world in crisis

This August marks the 25 th anniversary of the f ailed coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev, which accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union. A a quarter- century on from that high drama, there are many indicators that geopolitical risks are at their highest level since the fall of Soviet communism.

In the past few weeks alone, there has been: a failed military coup in Turkey; U. S. missile strikes against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya; a spate of significant terrorist attacks in Europe; and t he nuclear stand- off in the Korean Peninsula has i ntensified after Pyongyang’s decision to test fire a missile into Japanese- controlled waters for the first time. It’s little wonder that a recent Citi report asserts that the world is facing the “most fluid global political environment in decades,” while John Drzik, president of Marsh Global Risk and Specialities, says “events such as Europe’s refugee crisis and terrorist attacks have raised global political instability to its highest level since the Cold War.”

The challenges confronting the international order include more than just the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the threat from international terrori sm. They also i nclude: the continuing instability in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan; Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the fact that Washington’s relations with Moscow are perhaps more strained than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union; and the fact that the Israeli- Palestinian peace process appears moribund, despite recent Egyptian efforts to rejuvenate it.

This l andscape underlines the fact that many of the most optimistic hopes and expectations of how the post- Cold War world might look have also been dashed. For instance, the vision of a universal order of l i beral, capitalist, democratic states living in peace and contentment — as espoused by Francis Fukuyama and others — has been replaced by a reality in which authoritarian states such as Russia appear to to be in the ascendancy, Islamic terrorism remains a significant international concern a decade- and- a- half after 9/ 11 and several unstable countries, including North Korea, have acquired nuclear weaponry.

S o me critics of the Obama administration, including Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump, see this international picture as being the result of weak leadership in Washington over the last 7½ years. However, the expectat i ons sometimes placed on U. S. President Barack Obama by his most ardent critics are often unrealistically high.

To be sure, just as at the end of the Cold War, the United States remains the most powerful country in the world — at least in a military sense. It can still project and deploy overwhelmi ng force relative to any probable enemy. However, Washington is not an allpowerful hegemonic power. And this core fact has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout the post- Cold War period, from Somalia in 1993, Iraq and Afghanistan since 9/11 and most recently in Ukraine and Syria.

Donald Trump and other unalloyed critics of t he Obama administration also often fail to acknowledge that, while 2016 may be a year of high political uncertainty, the international l andscape also contains multiple areas of opportunity for greater stability.

One example is last year’s nuclear deal with Iran and six world powers — the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France and Germany. The deal opens up the possibility of a wider warming of ties between Tehran and the West, and also enhancing global nuclear security.

A lasting nuclear settlement with Iran will constitute an important win for long- standing efforts at nuclear non-proliferation. And this at a crucial time when, according to t he International Atomic Energy Agency, more than 40 countries have expressed interest in joining the “club” of 30 states with nuclear energy.

Meanwhile, the rise of China, which has now surpassed the United States as the world’s largest economy on purchasing- parity terms, is one of the biggest gamechangers in global affairs since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This development could become a growing source of tension with Washington, or develop into a fruitful partnership.

Growing bilateral cooperation is possible if the two powers can i ncreasingly cooperate on soft issues like climate change, and find effective ways of resolving larger disagreements, including over territorial claims in the South China Sea. By contrast, bilateral rivalry is possible if Beijing’s military power continues to grow rapidly and the country embraces a more assertive foreign policy stance toward its neighbours in Asia.

Taken overall, while 2016 has so far been a year of heightened political strains, there are also opportunities for greater stability. America’s success at helping manage the complexity of global affairs will increasingly depend upon cooperation of others, both competitors and allies. A key uncertainty here is the direction of bilateral relations with China, which could be a force for greater global tension, or deeper strategic partnership.

THE MOST OPTIMISTIC HOPES OF HOW THE POSTCOLD WAR WORLD MIGHT LOOK HAVE BEEN DASHED.