National Post

How ‘post-truth’ left-wingers created the very presidency they hate.

HOW ‘POST-TRUTH’ LEFT-WINGERS CREATED THE VERY PRESIDENCY THEY HATE

- Terry Glavin

It is a rare thing in the hyper-partisan cacophony of the current Trumpian moment that a comprehens­ible and honest American accounting presents itself that makes some clear sense of the cultural pathologie­s that have led directly to the dystopian abyss where the world’s liberal democracie­s are now perilously teetering.

That’s what’s on offer from Michiko Kakutani, after more than 30 years as The New York Times’ chief book critic, in her just-published book, The Death of Truth: Notes on Falsehood in the Age of Trump. Its value is in its lucidity, its persuasive­ness, and its courage to lay out a patient elucidatio­n of the slovenly habits of mind most closely associated with the American academic “left” that effectivel­y cleared the field for President Donald Trump’s lies in the first place.

It should be uncontrove­rsial by now that Trump — whose bloody-mindedness and cynicism would be catastroph­ic enough were he merely the vulgar and dangerous demagogue any sensible person will understand him to be — is also a pathologic­al liar of amazing profligacy.

Kakutani lays that case out sufficient­ly, but keeping track of Trump’s lies and his casual and constant uttering of falsehoods was already a sub-genre of serious journalism. The Washington Post counted 2,140 untruths in Trump’s claims during his first year in office. Going back over Trump’s 18-month record to his inaugurati­on speech of Jan. 20, 2017, The Toronto Star’s Washington correspond­ent Daniel Dale counts 1,929 falsehoods up to July 1.

But what Kakutani more usefully and carefully explains is exactly how this moment in history — the bizarre phenomenon of at least one-third of the American public not believing that Trump is a liar, or not caring — owes its origins to a nihilistic intellectu­al milieu arising from the 1960s and a section of the New Left. In the darkest of ironies, Trumpism emerged from “the gospel of postmodern­ism,” as Kakutani describes it: Cultural relativism and the radical-chic propositio­n that there are no universal truths, that “facts are fungible and socially constructe­d.”

By the time Trump came along, enlightenm­ent ideals had been cast aside as “vestiges of old patriarcha­l and imperialis­t thinking,” and a toxic nihilism that had spread throughout the culture, in literature, film, popular culture and politics eventually came to upend American conservati­sm, too. A new species of Republican activist took on the faddish habits of the bourgeois “left,” joining in to reject the evidence for anthropoge­nic climate change and the efficacy of vaccines, and to insist that creationis­m and “intelligen­t design” be taught alongside the science of evolution. Paranoia “increasing­ly migrated from the Left — which blamed the military-industrial complex for Vietnam — to the Right, with alt-right trolls and Republican members of Congress now blaming the so-called deep state for plotting against the president,” Kakutani writes.

It was this phenomenon — the rubbishing of Enlightenm­ent ideas about truth itself — that combined in a perfect “ecosystem” conducive to the rise of Trumpism: the fusion of news and entertainm­ent, the emergence of rabid, right-wing media, the breakdown of social cohesion, a rejection of expertise by both the right and the left, the collapse of a common understand­ing of American history, and the retreat of citizens into group-identity silos. Besides all that, “Hillary Clinton’s campaign basically wrote off the white working-class vote,” Kakutani points out. And with the good fortune of an Electoral College twist, Trump barged his way into the Oval Office.

Unmoored from a convention­al, common understand­ing of what constitute­s truth, Americans had become dangerousl­y susceptibl­e to demagoguer­y, hysteria, and even subversion by a foreign power.

The ease with which Americans on both the right and the left can be manipulate­d into forming groupident­ity camps to scream at one another is perfectly illustrate­d by a successful Russian “dezinforma­tsiya” (disinforma­tion) operation in May 2016. A fake Facebook account called Heart of Texas set up by the Internet Research Agency, a notorious troll factory in St. Petersburg, Russia, organized a “Stop the Islamizati­on of Texas” rally in Houston. Disclosure­s to Congress by Facebook executives revealed that a same-day counterpro­test across the street from the Houston rally turned out to have been organized by another fake Russian account, United Muslims of America.

Facebook’s review of 130 fake accounts set up by the Internet Research Agency found that 13 accounts managed to reach 126 million Americans and organized 130 protest rallies around issues related to race, migrants, guns and other divisive issues.

Last February, the U.S. Justice Department special counsel Robert Mueller filed indictment­s against several Russians who are alleged to have broken a variety of U.S. laws — including theft of the identities of American citizens — to pose as political activists in an effort to subvert the 2016 U.S. presidenti­al election campaign in Trump’s favour. Last week, a dozen Russian intelligen­ce officers were charged with hacking the Democratic party’s computers during the 2016 election campaign.

The indictment­s have fallen short of finding any deliberate collusion between the Russians and Trump’s campaign, but Mueller’s investigat­ions are ongoing. So far, his efforts have secured guilty pleas from Trump’s former foreign policy adviser, George Papadopoul­os, and from former national security adviser Michael Flynn, for lying to the FBI about their contacts with Russian officials.

While it has become exceedingl­y difficult to distinguis­h insinuatio­n and innuendo from genuine fact-based conjecture in the hyper-partisan American political discourse these days, there is no longer room for any doubt about the point of Russian dezinforma­tsiya in American politics.

The objective is the same as the purpose of the Kremlin’s propaganda monkey-wrenching in recent elections in Germany, France and the Netherland­s. It was the point of the dirty lie the Russian embassy in Ottawa circulated last year — that Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland had lied about her family’s Nazi past and was hiding an irrational animus towards Russia. The whole point of Moscow’s pro-Trump mischief is to enfeeble and destabiliz­e liberal democracie­s.

Vladimir Putin came close to admitting as much on Monday in Helsinki, while Trump was scandalous­ly dismissing the finding of several U.S. intelligen­ce agencies that the Kremlin wanted Trump to beat Hillary Clinton in the race to the White House, and that Russian interferen­ce in the presidenti­al election campaign was calibrated to that purpose. Standing beside Trump after their two-hour, translator­s-only meeting, Putin was asked if he wanted Trump to win. “Yes, I did,” he said, “because he talked about bringing the U.S.-Russia relationsh­ip back to normal.”

Just what constitute­s “normal” anymore is an open question, but as Kakutani’s The Death of Truth makes clear, the abnormalit­y that has disfigured the United States didn’t begin with Trump. It produced Trump. It is a deep dysfunctio­n at the core of American culture, and will likely persist long after Trump is gone.

 ?? ALYSSA POINTER/ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTI­ON VIA THE ASSOCIATED PRESS FILES ?? What constitute­s “normal” is up for debate these days, Terry Glavin writes, but as Michiko Kakutani makes clear in her book, the abnormalit­y that has disfigured the U.S. didn’t begin with Donald Trump — it produced him.
ALYSSA POINTER/ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTI­ON VIA THE ASSOCIATED PRESS FILES What constitute­s “normal” is up for debate these days, Terry Glavin writes, but as Michiko Kakutani makes clear in her book, the abnormalit­y that has disfigured the U.S. didn’t begin with Donald Trump — it produced him.
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