The dangers of wishful thinking
On Iran, well-meaning policy isn’t enough
U. S. president- elect Joe Biden’s stated intent of returning to the Iran nuclear deal is fraught with complexity and unlikely to happen. For one thing, Biden has stressed that his priorities starting Jan. 20 will be domestic, focused on the economy and getting the pandemic under control. If the Republicans sustain their Senate majority, that would pose a significant obstacle to any reinstatement of the Iran deal. Former president Barack Obama chose not to bring the initial agreement to the Senate for approval because he knew it would be voted down.
If anything, Iran’s behaviour since the deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was concluded has undermined any appetite for renewal. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran’s uranium stockpiles have grown eight fold since the U. S. left the deal and have significantly surpassed the agreed enrichment percentage. Iran received US$1.7 billion ($ 2.2 billion) in cash plus an additional US$ 100 billion in unfrozen assets as the reward for the deal. It was used primarily to support proxy wars in the region and bolster Iranian missile production, actions that are hardly inclined to change attitudes in Washington. Iran’s stipulation that the United States would have to return to the accord “without condition” and pay compensation for the damage caused by sanctions imposed by the Trump administration only makes the prospect of renewal more unlikely. When Iran rejected any notion of filling gaps in the agreement, the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA and moved to exert maximum pressure as a means to stop its nuclear arms development.
With presidential elections slated for next June in Iran, the hardliners are more skeptical than ever of dealing with the West and unwilling to give their so-called reformist rivals any room for pre-electoral success.
On Nov. 12, former Trump national security adviser H. R. Mcmaster cautioned the Biden team that moves to resurrect what he regarded as a deeply flawed deal would be “political disaster masquerading as diplomatic triumph.”
In his memoir, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World, Mcmaster castigated the initial deal as a singular example of “strategic narcissism” that has bedevilled U. S. administrations over several decades, leading to failures in dealing with Russia, China and Iran, among others. He described strategic narcissism as a mindset that leads presidents and their advisers to craft policies based on wishful thinking and to define problems as one may like them to be rather than to understand them on their own terms — in short, naivety. The Iran deal “led to self-delusion and, ultimately, the deception of the American people.” The Obama administration had contended flimsily that it was a choice between the agreement or war.
At best, the JCPOA represented a temporary stall, not a blocking action on Iran’s march to become a nuclear weapons state. It did not stop such moves nor missile development nor aid to Iranian proxies in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. The negotiating team vis-à-vis Iran consisted of foreign ministers from China, Russia, France, Germany, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, shepherded by former U. S. secretary of state John Kerry. It was an unwieldy and somewhat untrustworthy group whose individual motives were often self- serving. With visions of a Nobel Peace Prize dancing in their heads, Kerry and his colleagues acceded to the negotiator’s dilemma that any deal is better than no deal. In reality, a bad deal is worse than no deal and the JCPOA was a bad deal. If you persist in pumping air into a tire full of holes, you are unlikely to generate traction. That is the real dilemma posed by Iran’s agreement to a temporary pause.
If the new U. S. administration accedes to strategic narcissism once again on Iran, it will not contain the existential threat that lies in the nexus between terrorists and the most destructive weapons on earth. It may jeopardize the recent breakthroughs for peace in the Middle East. It could also inspire a deeply skeptical Israeli government to take matters into its own hands and act directly to suppress Iran’s nuclear weapons ambition, just as it did in Syria in 2007. (Syria had been induced on a nuclear path by none other than North Korea.)
Mcmaster was unable to convince Donald Trump that his overtures to North Korea’s Kim Jong Un exemplified a similar strategic narcissism — well- meaning but futile. It’s a position that may in part have led to his dismissal from the White House. In his view, the counterproductive Iran policy that led to the JCPOA was “the result of self- delusion, a lack of Iranian expertise and the associated misunderstanding of history and underappreciation for the emotions and ideology of Iranian leaders.”
Mcmaster claims that, along with the effect of sanctions, the credible threat of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear programs is what moved Iran to enter multiple rounds of negotiation between 2006 and 2015. That is why he favours a maximum pressure approach. In the dying days of the Trump administration and before the Biden team takes office, the U. S. is tightening sanctions on Iran and concluding major arms deals with the
United Arab Emirates and other Gulf states.
The Iranian regime just may be vulnerable to a concerted multinational effort to force them to choose between sustaining murderous proxy wars or behaving like a responsible global player. The objective should be to force Iranian leaders to make that choice; not coddle them with conciliatory gestures intended to prompt moderation or good behaviour.
We were mistaken to believe that economic growth in China would lead to political moderation. In fact, the reverse is true. Economic power has reinforced aggressive military and territorial ambitions, reduced key elements of democracy in Hong Kong and escalated tensions with Taiwan.
Obama administration officials have a reputational interest in salvaging the Iran nuclear deal. They also have a track record for articulate, well- meaning statements on foreign policy that were rarely matched by action. Russia’s invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine happened on Obama’s watch, flying in the face of the administration’s hope to “reset” relations with Russia. Apart from applying some sanctions, the administration sent blankets, not weapons, to Ukraine to assist in the defence of its sovereignty. The Russians still occupy Crimea and part of eastern Ukraine while Germany, a key Western ally, welcomes a Russian gas pipeline.
And then there was the infamous red line in Syria, stated but never upheld by the Obama administration, causing Syria, abetted by Russia, to descend into appalling internal strife with a massive and disruptive exodus of refugees.
The new Biden administration faces more than enough domestic and foreign policy challenges. It should not waste time trying to put the JCPOA toothpaste back in the tube.
is it ... bad ... for a movie to be more personal than political? — Jamil Jivani
recall the famous red line in syria, stated but never enforced by obama.