National Post (National Edition)
Jack M. Mintz: The separatist impulse,
ONE OUGHT NOT TO BE SURPRISED THAT A RECENT PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY REVEALS `A PERSISTENT MALAISE IN ATLANTIC CANADA' AND `WESTERN ALIENATION HAS GOTTEN WORSE.'
— DONALD J. SAVOIE
Separatist feelings are historical in Canada. Quebec separatism reflected the province's desire to shape its own future and identity, which I call “conflict of tastes.” Western separatism comes from the powerlessness of a small, rich region to withstand Central Canada's encroachment on its economic well-being, which I call “conflict of claim”. Federal conflicts are not just Canadian in nature — they have occurred elsewhere, including in Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Malaya, Sweden/Norway, Spain and Yugoslavia, sometimes leading to countries breaking up.
For much of its history, Canada has been vexed with the issue of accommodating Quebec, which has its own language, culture and values. Even though Quebec has had two referendums, in 1980 and 1995, that rejected separation (by a slim majority the second time), Canada adopted several policies to accommodate Quebec's aspirations since 1867, including opting out of fiscal arrangements and provincial autonomy over policing, education, health, labour markets and taxation. Most important, Quebec has received substantial financial support in that federal spending in the province far outstrips federal taxes paid. From 2009 to 2018, the best-known source of this federal contribution to Quebec has been via equalization (32 per cent), although it is second to redistribution through the progressive personal income tax (53 per cent).
In the case of Alberta's conflict of claim, its ownership of natural resources has been a major point of contention for over a century. When
Alberta and Saskatchewan were created as provinces in 1905 (as well as Manitoba in 1870), the federal government did not grant them ownership of public lands until 1930. After the oil price shocks of the 1970s, the Pierre Trudeau government established the National Energy Program in 1980 to subsidize a domestic oil price for consumers below the international price with an oil export tax largely collected from oil-producing provinces, only to be undone in 1986. The collapse of the commodity boom and the election of the Liberal government in 2015 led to a new round of regional tensions. Alberta and Saskatchewan were particularly upset with the Liberal government's climate-inspired regulatory and tax policies that stalled oil and gas development.
Alberta has only 11 per cent of Canada's population, but 16 per cent of Canada's GDP and the highest per capita income of all the provinces. It has contributed fiscal transfers through the federal budget equal to $631 billion (in 2018 dollars) to the rest of Canada during the years 1961-2018, resulting in a 10 per cent effective tax on Albertan personal incomes. In 2020, every province is now paying fewer taxes than they are receiving in federal spending due to overwhelming federal deficit spending. However, the federal deficit is simply deferred taxes. Alberta will be picking up its outsized share in the future, if policies remain the same.
The use of asymmetric federalism has enabled Canada to accommodate Quebec's “conflict of taste” but, much less so, Alberta's “conflict of claim” in Confederation. Ontario has played a critical role as the largest province in Canada supporting Quebec's accommodation. This financial cost to Ontario would have been much greater had it not been for Alberta's largesse. In other words, it was much easier for Ontario to support federal policies with Alberta voters picking up a majority of the tab in the past decade.
Canada's encounters with Alberta or Western separatism reflect several truisms that can be learned from elsewhere.
First, small regions have less ability to influence central government decision-making since they do not have sufficient representation in the national government to modify or block harmful policy decisions. The asymmetry between size and wealth has led to movements in favour of the devolution of spending, tax and regulatory powers in Australia, Belgium, Italy and Spain. In Norway, Singapore and Slovenia, this conflict led to separation.
Second, large fiscal transfers from rich to poor regions can be a major source of regional tension if the rich region feels exploited. It may feel that the transfers lead to dependency if the poorer region does not try to improve itself (as in the cases of Catalonia, Flanders, Singapore and Slovenia). Or they may be unhappy with transfers that are not sensitive to sudden economic shifts (such as Western Australia's complaints over equalization after the commodity price collapse).
Third, weak central government institutions make devolution or outright separation more tenable. If regional interests are insufficiently represented in federal institutions or the central government is weak, regions will push for more devolution of powers in a federation or separate. The weak central government in Belgium, under proportional representation, has been unable to accommodate Flemish and Walloon interests. Many of the spending and regulatory powers already belonged to the republics in Czechoslovakia before dissolution. The union between Norway and Sweden left little power in the hands of the king, except for foreign policy, thereby enabling Norway to rely on well-developed public institutions when it separated. In Australia, regional interests represented in the federal Senate and an independent fiscal grants commission have given more voice to regional interests in national decision-making.
Fourth, a lack of strong economic linkages can lead to separation. Federations with relatively free mobility of labour and internal trade are more likely to stick together than fall apart. Despite similar culture, Norway's trade was western, with Britain and western Europe, while Sweden's trade was southern and eastern, with Germany and Russia. Further, migration was limited between Norway and Sweden, even though many Norwegians moved to North America in the mid-19th century. Western Australia was distant from the more heavily populated parts of Australia (Perth is closer to Singapore than Sydney), but a strong internal union encouraged migration and trade. In the case of Yugoslavia, its breakup reflected deep religious, cultural and economic divisions that limited any desire for a unified country.
Fifth, separation can be peaceful. The breakup of Czechoslovakia, Malaysia and Norway/Sweden was accommodated on friendly terms. Parliaments in the two Czechoslovakian republics each voted for separation, even though neither had a referendum seeking public approval. The Malaysian Parliament formally agreed to Singapore's secession without conflict after being unable to work out fiscal terms. Norway and Sweden peacefully separated once the king agreed in 1905. On the other hand, Yugoslavia's breakup resulted in wars and a lack of protection of minority groups, and Catalonia's unresolved push for independence has been blocked by Spain's constitution.
If the West and the rest of Canada wish to avoid separation — as they should — more accommodation of Alberta and the West's conflict of claim is needed. It could mean a reform of federal political institutions like free trade, federal transfers and a truly elected Senate. It might mean more provincial autonomy, like an independent police force, pension plan and tax policy. Right now, the status quo is not acceptable.
Jack M. Mintz is the president's fellow at the University of Calgary's School of Public Policy. This article is adapted from Moment of Truth: How to Think about Alberta's Future, now available from
Sutherland House Books.