Will Biden revert to Obama's Mideast playbook?

TRUMP'S ABRAHAM ACCORDS STILL SHOW GREAT PROMISE.

— VIVIAN BERCOVICI

During his Senate confirmation hearing on Tuesday, President Joe Biden's nominee for Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, was, as expected of such a seasoned D.C. hand, poised, unruffled, and confident. Widely known and respected in foreign policy circles for his measured, thoughtful demeanour, this was Tony Blinken's mainstage debut in a starring role; no longer the “man behind,” but — The Man.

A longtime Biden confidant and adviser, Blinken served as deputy secretary to John Kerry in the final two years of Obama's tenure. He is expected to be a secretary of state who will lead on foreign policy; someone upon whom the president will be extremely reliant.

In the Middle East there is tremendous regional support for what is perhaps the key foreign policy legacy of president Donald Trump: the negotiation of the Abraham Accords. This fourth-year accomplishment is in its infancy but showing great promise. It has heralded a seismic shift in the regional geopolitics that will foster greater economic and security cohesion, particularly when dealing with a hegemonic Iran.

The negotiation of the accords brought a wave of normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab countries: the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. It also put the lie to a canard promoted for so long by so many in the foreign policy community — and the Obama administration — that there would never be Mideast peace until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved, with finality. Furthermore, Obama officials believed firmly that bilateral agreements between Israel and Arab nations were simply not possible in the absence of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

And, as more than a few Biden cabinet picks were key players in the Obama presidency, the Mideast is paying extremely careful attention to what may transpire with Blinken at the helm. The key question: will he be motivated to expunge key Trump achievements and revert, holus-bolus, to Obama's Middle East playbook?

Obama's approach was based on the view that America had historically been excessively heavy-handed in its exercise of power in the region. The “Obama Doctrine,” as some of his acolytes have labelled his views, held that U.S. foreign policy had offended the dignity of many in the Muslim world, in particular, the brief Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt and the decades-old extremist theocracy in Iran. He believed that if shown deference by the United States, Iran and others would moderate their policies and enthusiastically rejoin the “family of nations.”

It was this profound belief that led Obama officials to agree to terms in the Iran nuclear deal which did pretty much nothing to prevent Iran from achieving a near-term nuclear weapons breakout capability. And it did less than nothing to address the development of Iran's offensive arsenal, able to launch and deliver nuclear warheads. The agreement was a capitulation and shameless pander to Iran by an administration determined to have such a “deal” bequeathed as its paramount legacy.

And it enraged Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which regard Iran as the most significant military and terrorist threat in the region. So, when president Trump announced that the U.S. was withdrawing from the nuclear deal as of May 8, 2018, there was huge relief in the Middle East. To this day the region remains steadfast in opposing any return to the previous Obama-led framework.

What the Trump administration understood, and Obama officials ignored, was that the cohesion of interests among Israel and many Gulf states and Saudi Arabia was reinforced by the Obama doctrine. The Iran nuclear deal was the main catalyst to fostering the recognition among Israel and various Arab countries of their common interests; which is also the foundation of the Abraham Accords.

The overriding concern of the Saudis and so many Gulf states was aligned with Israel: they feared a powerful Iran, the foremost sponsor and advocate of terrorism in the region. Obama and his secretary of state, John Kerry, managed their Mideast relationships with astonishing arrogance, treating local leaders as they would swat a fly. And they were supremely confident in their take on things. At a 2016 conference, Kerry famously dismissed any notion of peace between Israel and its neighbours, without a “final resolution” of the Palestinian conflict, as a pipe-dream.

Today, that viral clip makes him look like the kid at the back of the class with a funny hat on his head, which is pretty much how he is regarded in the Middle East and likely why he's been shunted off to the climate file.

Then again, the kid at the back of the class will be at the table for National Security Council meetings, the nucleus of foreign policy at the White House. The room will, in fact, look a lot like it did in the Obama years, with key Iran deal negotiators and supporters present, chairs slightly reshuffled.

Blinken has been paying close attention, clearly, and understands the gravitas that his words now carry. His comments to the Senate Committee were calibrated to address regional co-operation and signal that the Biden administration will move forward on this issue prudently.

He confirmed a continued American commitment to supporting a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which surprised no one. What did, however, surprise more than a few was his unequivocal statement that the U.S. Embassy would remain in Jerusalem, which he agreed is the capital of Israel.

What is far less clear is how this reconstituted Obama foreign policy squad will manage the rather intense regional resistance to returning to negotiate with Iran. There have been numerous comments in the past few months by Biden and his team that they intend to make a resumption of talks with Iran and renewed American support for the nuclear deal a very early priority of the administration.

It is, after all, a defence of their collective legacy to remake American foreign policy in the Middle East.

Early days will be telling.