HARD TRUTHS ABOUT N. KOREA
While misguided, regime coldly rational
During my time as a diplomat on the Korean Peninsula, I lived through recurring cycles of missile and nuclear tests, rhetoric, international condemnation, sanctions and demonstrations of military power.
Alarm about recurring tensions has generally been in inverse relation to distance from the region, with South Koreans having been relatively unperturbed. South Korea has existed in a standoff with the North since the Korean War; South Koreans are accustomed to the North’s rhetoric and to the danger of thousands of conventional North Korean artillery pieces and rockets aimed at Seoul from 60 kilometres away. That continues to be the case, whether or not North Korea has an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capacity.
Diplomats, military officers and other experts are more concerned with miscalculation and inadvertent escalation than about a deliberate act of war by North Korea.
Here are some keys to understanding the situation:
First, contrary to a popular misconception, Kim Jong-un and the North Korean leadership are neither mad nor irrational. Rather, they are coldly rational leaders, however misguided, committed to regime survival by making North Korea a nuclear weapons state.
Second, they are on the brink of achieving their aim after a systematic series of nuclear and missile tests over a number of years. The tests can be expected to continue, both for technological reasons and because they help Kim strengthen his hand for any future negotiations.
Third, despite Kim’s rhetorical brinkmanship, North Korea views a nuclear-weapons capacity as a deterrent, not a means to launch a suicidal strike resulting in its own destruction. James Clapper, former U.S. director of National Intelligence, has remarked on North Korea’s fear of being attacked. I found the same apprehension during my visits to North Korea in 2015 and 2016.
Fourth, for Kim, nuclear weapons are not a bargaining chip to be negotiated away. At most, he may consider a freeze. While China has long advocated this (together with a halt to the massive biannual joint military exercises in South Korea), many American experts also consider a freeze the most that North Korea would consider.
Fifth, North Korea may soon be capable of delivering nuclear armed missiles to the continental United States, according to published reports. However, achieving that should not presume a first-strike intention.
Sixth, there is no good military option for the U.S. A major pre-emptive strike would result in a retaliatory attack on South Korea, and possibly beyond, with the death of hundreds of thousands or more, and risk a fullerscale war. Despite the president’s rhetoric, Donald Trump’s administration has the same limited options as its predecessors.
Seventh, China will only pressure North Korea to the extent that this does not result in regime collapse. In any case, sanctions alone will not change North Korean policy.
Eighth, there will be an impasse as long as there are preconditions to negotiations. That North Korea has always wanted direct talks with the U.S. provides a small window of opportunity. In the meantime, it will come ever closer to achieving a deliverable nuclear weapon.
North Korean agreement to terminate its nuclear program is a non-starter.
A freeze is the best that can be hoped for but time is short. While this is far from ideal, the alternative is that in the near future the international community will be dealing with a ICBMarmed North Korea.
This should be a matter of serious concern rather than alarm. Many of the same concerns were raised 50 years ago when China acquired nuclear weapons.
What will be required is a combination of negotiations, incentives, sanctions and strengthened missile defence to limit the number of nuclear weapons North Korea produces, lessen the risk that those weapons will ever be used, contain North Korea’s rogue tendencies, reassure the international community, and dissuade South Korea and Japan from acquiring their own nuclear weapons.