Why Catalan independence falls short

Secession unlawful, impractical, writes Jose Mauricio Gaona There is something intuitively inspiring when people use civil disobedience to fight overwhelming and unjustifiable forms of oppression. This perception of reality deepens when the oppressor, apparently acting under the authority of the law, employs violence over the non-violent actor.

Here lies the strength of civil disobedience: It makes the oppressor’s actions look — notwithstanding its constitutional authority — illegitimate, intolerant, gradually unpopular and, in some instances, amoral. But civil disobedience is not in itself an end. While it may foster sympathy for a cause, it requires consistency with reality and the actions it promotes to break the oppressor and make the reason behind the cause the sole and final source of authority.

In this context, one cannot help but sympathize with the protesters in the streets of Barcelona celebrating with tears and Catalan flags what they saw — at least for one hour — as the official proclamation of their independence. Yet, this image dissolves as several factors reveal that such independence did not and could not have existed.

First, legitimacy. The very act of the region’s independence is unlawful not only under Spain’s Constitution of 1978, but especially under Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy of 2006. Although secessionists often question the law and by doing so the authority of the government from which they intend to secede, they cannot successfully question the law from which their secession results.

Hence, Catalan nationalists cannot validly argue that their region is now a country by virtue of an act of the Catalan Parliament when that act is illegal under the law that regulates how such a parliament may act.

In fact, Article 60, Section 3 of Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy states that to be valid, acts of the parliament must be preceded by a qualified deliberative quorum represented by the absolute majority of all its members, who must thereafter be present and vote by simple majority.

The Catalan Parliament, however, did never reach such quorum, particularly when members of three major political parties walked out precisely to break the quorum and only 70 out of 135 members of the parliament voted for the region’s independence.

Second, the economy. In the few months that preceded this crisis, Catalonia, which nowadays represents nearly 20 per cent of Spain’s economy, has lost at least 15 per cent of its major revenue source: tourism.

What is more, afraid of radical decisions that could lead to a financial collapse (i.e. the Catalan nationalist government increasing taxes, or its sympathizers massively withdrawing money), several major companies, capital funds and banks have recently relocated their headquarters outside Catalonia, triggering yet another critical destabilizing factor.

Further, the heads of the EU institutions have unanimously rejected Catalonia’s alleged independence, which dilutes the idea of an independent country, especially when Catalonia’s currency is the euro, its finances have been already seized by Spain’s Minister of Economy Cristóbal Montoro, and the Catalan Government or Generalitat is now under the delegated authority of Spanish Vice-President Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría.

Finally, a practical factor. Just like in a divorce, secession must end in peaceful terms to avoid greater trauma. And even then, the weakest side ends up often losing most: money, friends and, in some cases, a privileged position. Catalonia is already losing money and, in the process, the position that has made it one of the wealthiest regions in Spain.

Catalonia is also losing friends, going from a growing list of countries to regional organizations that have already rejected its independence, which could further prevent Catalonia from even being recognized as a country.

In the end, what otherwise could have been a legitimate claim (i.e., a fairer tax share and fiscal distribution of Catalonia’s revenue) has become the biggest political crisis Spain has seen since the end of Franco’s regime in 1975.

While both sides — the Spanish and the Catalan governments — may have some blame to share, there is little doubt that the promise of a full independence was not merely popular among Catalans but inherently unrealistic.