Roadmap for solving lobster fishery dispute

Perhaps DFO will do the right thing, after exhausting all the other possibilities.

In a previous letter to The Chronicle Herald, I noted that DFO should set the rules for the aboriginal and existing commercial fishery and negotiate later. Not doing so would lead to disagreements within each group and between groups. This was born out in the recent article, “Sipekne'katik First Nation drops talks with Jordan,” Dec. 11 by Aaron Beswick, as well other reports in the Herald.

Lobster fishery science is not rocket science. When done well, it includes knowledge of social and economic considerations as well as lobster biology. It also requires humility in accepting that we don't know everything about lobster stocks, and never will. However, we do know enough to manage this fishery well.

We have good information on lobster migration, growth rate, size of sexual maturity, lobster habitat, lifetime egg production by an average female in different locations, yield in weight to the fishery for the average male and female in different locations, and how changes to regulations will affect egg production and weight yields. Tagging studies, catch rates, size of lobsters in the catch and total landings all give indices of abundance.

We don't need to know why lobster stocks are now booming. Current guesses are benefits from a warming ocean, a decrease in predators and wind. DFO would be unable to alter these causes. We do know that nature can be generous or stingy with yields of all harvested species. We need to regulate a fishery for when nature is stingy.

We don't know the minimum number of eggs a stock should produce to maintain commercial yields at a high level. Therefore, based on previous records of high and low yields, we should manage lobster stocks for what appears to be excess egg production. That should not be difficult. Lobsters are good at producing lots of eggs at little or no cost to the fishery.

The following are suggestions for allocating lobster catches between existing commercial licenses and “moderate livelihood” aboriginal licensees.

DO:

1) Divide access based on fishing time, fishing location, or both. Compared to alternatives, this is easy to enforce and understand. Catching or landing lobsters outside these limits would be a violation, period.

2) Allow fishing only with standard lobster traps. This has been one of the best regulations for more than a century. It results in fishermen handling each lobster and returning the illegal lobsters to fishing ground unharmed.

3) Acknowledge that both commercial and aboriginal groups have a strong sense of entitlement to any creatures worth taking from the ocean. Therefore, a firm hand will be required to sort out a division of catch. Consensus will not occur.

4) Charge both commercial and aboriginal license holders annual license fees balanced by the value of the harvest. Commercial lobster fishermen have a very sweet deal. To fish a resource owned by all Canadians, they pay an annual fee from $100 to $2,000, averaging about $350 (excepting a few northern areas with low fees and catches), for a license which they can sell for $100,000 to $800,000.

They receive free search and rescue, free aids to navigation, free resource management, free policing by a force dedicated to fisheries, generous EI and subsidized port maintenance. Also, the Canadian lobster fishery is the only regulated lobster fishery in the world, including many species and countries, that does not allow a sport fishery. A reasonable license fee would also reduce the resale value of licenses, making it easier for young people to enter the fishery.

MAYBE:

Limit trap numbers to control catches. However, this would be expensive to enforce and fishermen would find ways to increase catch per trap. Enforcement would be especially problematic in an aboriginal fishery with three types of licenses: food and ceremonial, moderate livelihood, and regular commercial licenses. Boats in the existing commercial lobster fishery now have expensive fines to enforce trap limits. These are high enough that though they do little to control catch, they benefit fishermen by reducing the cost of unproductive fishing effort.

DON’T:

1) Assign catch quotas to enterprises. Enforcing catch limits on a high-value, low-volume, easily marketed catch that can be landed anywhere is very difficult. Quotas transferable between enterprises, as present in some other shellfish fisheries, are worse. They can lead to the quotas being bought up or leased by a few owners and drain revenues from coastal communities heavily dependent on the lobster fishery.

2) Regulate for resource waste. This includes a season within a few months following molting when lobsters have a high water content, a short shelf life, and fetch a low price.

3) Allow a season in months when lobster landings are high in the U.S. and prices are depressed.

In summary, Ottawa should set time and/or area limits on fishing for all fleets, and negotiate later. Challenges in court are inevitable. Hopefully, the courts will be more thoughtful this time in view of the problems created by their previous attempts. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, perhaps DFO will do the right thing, after exhausting all the other possibilities.

Robert Miller is a retired DFO shellfish scientist. He lives in Halifax.