The Hamilton Spectator

What’s behind nuclear threat

Kim Jong-un concerned about protecting his regime

- GWYNNE DYER Gwynne Dyer is an independen­t journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries.

“I’m not saying we wouldn’t get our hair mussed, Mr. President, but I do say not more than 10 or 20 million dead, depending on the breaks.” So said General Buck Turgidson, urging the U.S. president to carry out a nuclear first strike, in Stanley Kubrick’s 1963 film “Dr Strangelov­e: or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.”

But nobody in Kubrick’s movie talked like Kim Jong-un (“American bastards would be not very happy with this gift sent on the July 4 anniversar­y,” he crowed, celebratin­g North Korea’s first successful test of an ICBM). They didn’t talk like Donald Trump, either (“North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”)

Kubrick’s film came out the year after the Cuban missile crisis, when the world went to the brink of nuclear war after the Soviet Union put nuclear missiles into Cuba to deter an American invasion. It was a terrifying time, but neither U.S. President John F. Kennedy nor the Soviet leaders used violent language. They stayed calm, and carefully backed away from the brink.

So Kubrick’s fictional leaders had to stay sane, too; only his generals and civilian strategic ‘experts’ were crazy. Anything else would have been too implausibl­e even for a wild satire like Strangelov­e. Whereas now we live in different times.

Trump may not understand what his own words mean, but he is threatenin­g to attack North Korea if it makes any more threats to the United States. That’s certainly how it will be translated into Korean. And Pyongyang will assume that the U.S. attack will be nuclear, since it would be even crazier to attack a nuclear-armed country like North Korea using only convention­al weapons.

Is this where the world finds itself at the moment? ’Fraid so. And although a nuclear war with North Korea at this point wouldn’t even muss America’s hair — the few North Korean ICBMs would probably go astray or be shot down before they reached the U.S. — it could kill many millions of Koreans on both sides of the border.

A million or so Japanese might die as well (that would depend on the fallout), and a few tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers in western Pacific bases (from targeted strikes). Indeed, as the scale of the potential disaster comes home to North Korean strategist­s, you can see them start to play with the idea of a “limited nuclear war.”

North Korean planners have announced that they are “carefully examining” a plan for a missile attack on the big U.S. base on Guam. In that way they could “signal their resolve” in a crisis by only hitting one isolated American military target. Their hope would be that such a limited attack would not unleash an all-out U.S. nuclear counteratt­ack that would level North Korea.

“Limited” nuclear war typically becomes a favourite topic whenever strategist­s realize that using their cherished nuclear weapons any other way means unimaginab­le levels of death and destructio­n. It has never been credible, because it assumes that people will remain severely rational and unemotiona­l while under attack by nuclear weapons.

Thinking about limited nuclear war, while unrealisti­c, is evidence that the planners are starting to get really scared about an all-out nuclear war, which is just what you want them to be. Neverthele­ss, we are entering a particular­ly dangerous phase of the process, not least because the other two major nuclear powers in the world, China and Russia, both have land borders with North Korea. And neither of them loves or trusts the United States.

What “process” are we talking about here? The process of coming to an accommodat­ion that lets North Korea keep a nuclear deterrent, while reassuring it that it will never have to use those weapons. Because that’s what these North Korean missiles and nuclear warheads are about: deterring an American attack aimed at changing the regime.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson briefly said that the U.S. was not seeking to change the North Korean regime last week, although he was almost immediatel­y contradict­ed by President Trump. In the long run, however, that is the unpalatabl­e but acceptable way out of this crisis. In fact, there is no other way out.

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