Regional militant sanctuaries
THE dreaded militant outfit that once held sway over 3akistan’s former Fata may have been driven out from its stronghold and splintered, but its sanctuaries across the border in Afghanistan remain a security threat for the region. A recent spike in the attacks on 3akistani security forces in 1orth :a iristan district and reports of re activation of terrorist cells must be a cause of concern.
A recent 81 monitoring team report has revealed that most of the ,000 to , 00 3akistani militants in Afghanistan be long to the various factions of the banned Tehreek i Taliban 3akistan. They are now operat ing from their bases in eastern Afghanistan. :hile many re cent terrorist attacks in 3akistan have been traced to TT3 splinter groups, some of the fugitive mil itants have Moined the self styled Islamic State IS group and are not only fighting the Afghan and American forces but are also en gaged in a turf war with the Af ghan Taliban. The original lead ership of the .horasan chapter of the outfit came from the ranks of TT3 fugitives in Afghanistan. There has been a marked es calation in the terrorist attacks claimed by the group, whose ori gins lie in the 0iddle East, fol lowing the February peace deal between the 8S and the Afghan Taliban. It has recently carried out some spectacular terrorist at tacks in the Afghan capital .a bul, targeting civilians in an ef fort to disrupt the Afghan peace process. The 81 report esti mates the membership of the IS in Afghanistan at 2,200.
An estimated 6,000 to 6,500 Pakistani terrorists are operating from their bases in Afghanistan.
Although its numbers have de pleted in the last few years, IS has shown that it has the capacity to penetrate high security ones via suicide bombings. espite losing territorial control in parts of the eastern Afghan province of 1angarhar to the Afghan Tali ban, IS has proved its effective ness at carrying out attacks. The rise in activities of the mutated TT3 factions on both sides of the 3ak Afghan border raises some serious Tuestions. Such a large number of trained militants dis located from their home bases and with no resources could eas ily be turned into mercenaries and would be willing to work for vested interest groups and for eign intelligence agencies. The ongoing war in Afghanistan and regional conflicts make it easier for these mercenaries to be used as pro ies. The recent militant attacks in 1orth :a iristan dis trict and other parts of the county seemed well planned. Surely the splinter groups do not have the capacity and support base to re establish their control in their former strongholds. But they can create problems for the security agencies. The danger is more serious with the situation in the former tribal areas, par ticularly :a iristan, not yet fully settled. It could get worse with the conflict in Afghanistan. 0ost of the TT3 leaders were either killed or had fled to Af ghanistan after the military op erations in the former tribal re gions. Among them was 0ullah Fa lullah who became the leader of the TT3 after the killing of Hakeemullah 0ehsud in a &IA drone strike in 2013. After flee ing the Swat operation, he had taken refuge in the neighbouring Afghan province of .unar that had long been the centre of radi cal Islamic militancy.
The fleeing militants continued to engage in cross border attacks presumably with the support of their Afghan allies. It is unclear whether Fa lullah had received any support from elements of the Afghan Taliban. The killing of Fa lullah in 201 in an Ameri can drone strike led to the further disintegration of the group. In this period, many other TT3 commanders who had aligned with IS were also killed as the American forces intensified their offensive against the militant group. Their association with IS had also brought the elements of the TT3 into confrontation with the Afghan Taliban. There is, however, a Tuestion mark hang ing over the relationship between the other TT3 factions and the Afghan Taliban. It’s a comple situation indeed. :hatever remains of the TT3 in Afghanistan has suffered the most serious blow this year when three of its top commanders were found dead in mysterious circumstances outside .abul. Among them was also Sheikh .halid HaTTani, once deputy chief of the TT3 and a member of the group’s leadership coun cil. He was also believed to be one of the masterminds of the ecember 201 attack on 3esha war’s Army 3ublic School that killed almost 1 0 students and staff members. The others were 4ari Saif ounas and Saifullah 3eshawari. Both were top com manders. All three were report edly associated with IS.
A few weeks later, another TT3 factional leader, Shahryar 0ehsud, was also killed in a blast in eastern .unar province. 1o one has claimed responsibility for those killings but they could have been caused by factional infighting or have been the work of some intelligence agency. The presence of TT3 commanders in Afghanistan reinforces 3aki stan’s allegation that many of the terrorist attacks that occurred in northwest 3akistan were planned across the border. 3akistani se curity agencies believe that hos tile intelligence agencies abroad have been involved in terrorism. It sounds plausible given the on going regional conflicts. Across the border militant sanc tuaries are often used for pro y wars. The 81 report, which states that thousands of anti 3a kistan militants are operating in Afghanistan, only reinforces ear lier reports of the TT3’s cross border operations. It’s not only the TT3 but also groups like the Balochistan /iberation Army that have allegedly found safe haven in Afghanistan.
And it’s not Must about Afghani stan but also militant sanctuar ies inside 3akistan allegedly engaging in cross border terror ist activities. By not taking ac tion against militant safe havens, countries lose their sovereignty. 3akistan has paid hugely for its wrong policies of allowing mili tant sanctuaries on its soil in the past. But we can’t afford more such adventures at the risk of our own sovereignty and national se curity.
:ith the ongoing war in the country, the Afghan government may not have the kind of control needed to take action against militant sanctuaries, but the dan ger is that outside interests could e ploit this situation. 2ne of the most significant points of the 8S Taliban peace deal is not to allow Afghan soil to be used for action against other countries. It will also be a part of the political settlement in the war torn coun try. 0ore importantly, there is a need for an agreement on the is sue of regional security. Courtest