Highlights of safety board report on deadly capsizing off B.C. coast

Key findings of the Transportation Safety Board on causes and contributing factors in the capsizing of the Leviathan II, along with some recommendations made by the board:

Conditions were favourable for the formation of breaking waves and moments before the wave that capsized the boat struck, the master became aware of it and attempted to realign the vessel to minimize its impact, but there was not enough time for his actions to be effective.

The vessel maintained position on the weather side of a reef that was exposed to the incoming swell to allow passengers to view wildlife. As the vessel was leaving the area, a large wave approached from the starboard quarter.

It took about 45 minutes before search-and-rescue authorities became aware of the capsizing because the crew did not have time to transmit a distress call, nor did the vessel have a means to automatically send one.

Crew members were able to discharge a parachute rocket, which alerted a nearby Ahousaht First Nation fishing vessel that was instrumental in saving the lives of a number of survivors.

If companies that operate passenger vessels do not implement risk management processes for environmental hazards, there is a risk of a similar capsizing and loss of life.

The life raft deployed after the capsizing was fitted with an emergency pack that did not contain devices effective for signalling distress, such as a parachute rocket or buoyant smoke float.

Transport Canada should consider whether requirements for the use of digital emergency beacons should be applied to additional classes of boats and airplanes.

Operators of commercial passenger vessels on the west coast of Vancouver Island should be required to identify areas and conditions conducive to the formation of hazardous waves and adopt strategies to reduce the chances of passenger vessels encountering those conditions.