Levelling the field for potential party leaders
Interim leaders of political parties play an important and unique role in the democratic process. They are typically highly respected members of their caucuses who fill a significant though temporary role during transition periods. In some cases, they also fill the role of premier or leader of the official opposition.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that interim leaders often have excellent leadership skills and might be desirable as permanent leaders (an observation made in recent years about both Bob Rae and Rona Ambrose in their respective federal parties), some parties in Canada disallow someone who holds the interim position to run in the subsequent leadership election, while other parties follow this standard as an unwritten rule. A formal rule of this nature would be appropriate in Newfoundland and Labrador.
There are common violations of this standard in cases where a rule is absent. In 2014, for example, Manitoba Premier Greg Selinger requested a leadership convention following a large exodus of ministers from his cabinet. He nevertheless maintained his position as premier and interim leader of his New Democratic Party. A Globe and Mail editorial called on Selinger to allow a neutral leader to replace him while he competed for the job, which Selinger did not do. He subsequently won the vote to remain leader in 2015.
There are important reasons why a rule of limiting interim leaders to the interim alone should be standardized and followed by political parties in Newfoundland and Labrador. This province has seen its two most recent elected premiers secure the leadership of their respective political parties in a similar manner to that of Selinger, though neither is an exact parallel.
In the first case (Progressive Conservative Kathy Dunderdale), the interim leadership was secured alongside a pledge to not seek the permanent leadership. The pledge was not maintained. In the latter case (Liberal Dwight Ball), the interim leadership was held for 18 months alongside a pledge to seek the permanent leadership, with the position being relinquished three months before the leadership vote.
Such cases present a problem because interim leaders are bestowed with all the formal powers of the party leader. In a case where the leader is also premier — an extremely powerful position — this means that policies and spending priorities can be fashioned after her/his preferences.
Further, the interim leader chooses other positions of leadership within the legislative caucus, such as ministers and parliamentary secretaries for government, or critics for opposition. The interim leader can determine which members will be given opportunities to ask questions during question period, who will have the opportunity to move a given motion in the House, and who will fill specific committee appointments. Any of these decisions can be used to buy support or reward supporters. They can also be used to punish
or diminish would-be challengers. Whether by using the power of the position, or simply by the ability to exercise it, interim leaders are given a significant advantage over potential competitors.
As some degree of loyalty is necessary for the caucus to function in the legislature and to present a united party, other caucus members are less likely to enter the race and potentially be seen to be undermining the party’s current leader. Indeed, those who have benefited under the leader will often prefer maintaining that leader and may provide support. The interim leader becomes the public face of the party, gaining additional media exposure and opportunities to present her/himself in capacities not afforded to any other competitors.
In a case where the interim leader is also the premier, a potential competitor from inside the caucus risks upsetting the status quo among the most powerful actors in the government, and perhaps giving up a cabinet position to do so. Ideally, political parties would see the potential danger that lurks in allowing interim leaders to use their office to benefit themselves for the longer term, and they would make the necessary changes to their constitutions to avoid this (the wording used in the Conservative Party of Canada’s constitution, section 10.9.1, is a good example). An alternative to be considered by the elected legislative members, and which would serve both their collective interests and those who elect them, would be to include language in Newfoundland and Labrador’s Elections Act, or House of Assembly Act, imposing the same measure. As these statutes refer to — but do not regulate — party leadership, an added section would need to stipulate that holding the position of interim leader disqualifies one from the subsequent leadership contest for that party.
If our democratic goal is to ensure that all qualified persons can compete for any office without any one person holding an undue advantage, then implementation of regulations forbidding interim leaders from seeking permanent leadership must be part of achieving that goal.
The interim leader becomes the public face of the party, gaining additional media exposure and opportunities to present her/himself in capacities not afforded to any other competitors.