The Spring Rice Document
One would be hard pressed to find any published historical record in the 100 years since WWI ended that refers to the existence of the Spring Rice Document, let alone what it was and where it originated.
Yet from the moment it ended up in the hands of Newfoundland’s governor in 1915, the country’s wartime policy immediately changed, and the result was felt in every nook and cranny of the colony.
Yet without knowledge of this document, one cannot know the truth about the First World War in Newfoundland.
This true espionage cloakand-dagger episode began with the finding of a briefcase, left on a New York subway, on July 15, 1915, and ended up in the hands of American intelligence. Inside the briefcase were secret German documents revealing an extensive network of espionage and subversion across the United States.
On August 15, 1915, the New York World began publishing details of the espionage story which were provided by the US Secretary of the Treasury, William G. Mcadoo. The document contained ominous details relating to Germany’s plans for Newfoundland.
The British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, sent a message to the chief intelligence officer in St. John’s, Captain G. Abraham, which contained information relating to Newfoundland discovered in the captured spy files.
Following an almost sixmonth investigation by the Americans, it was concluded that German military and naval attaches were involved in the elaborate spying and espionage program. On December 1, 1915, the United States demanded that Germany withdraw its military and naval attaches from the Washington embassy.
The Spring Rice Document, despite its widespread consequences, was never made public in Newfoundland and has remained a secret for the past one hundred years. However, its revelation in 1915 prompted the Newfoundland government, in addition to its more widespread actions, to immediately intensify its approach to censorship and the treatment of enemy aliens.
The Labrador area of the colony was of special importance to British intelligence. Captain Abraham felt that German forces could establish a Labrador base and commandeer a telegraph station for their own purposes.
After presenting his view on what German strategy would be, Abraham advised Governor Davidson that Newfoundland’s first move should be to seek Canada’s cooperation in closing the Straight of Belle Isle to ships from Europe for the summer of 1915. He suggested this could easily be done in conjunction with the guarding of the route through the Cabot Straits. When this suggestion was discussed with Canada, the Canadians disagreed with closing the straits but agreed to accept the responsibility to patrol them.
Captain Abraham, just days before, had discussed other steps the enemy would have to take to follow through on its intention to send submarines to the northwest Atlantic.
Abraham suggested that bases of supply would be needed to service the enemy fleet and these would likely be set up “in out of the way bays of Newfoundland, Labrador or off St. Pierre.”
The intelligence officer pointed out that part of Newfoundland’s response effort needed to include a countrywide monitoring of supplies, particularly those needed to support submarines (i.e., oils, hardware supplies, unusually high orders of food, water, medicines, etc.).
Upon the advice of Captain Abraham, Newfoundland customs officers were ordered to gather information from all British and neutral ships coming into Newfoundland regarding any sightings and locations of vessels acting suspiciously.