Jury in Snelgrove case seeks clarifications from judge
'You have to determine whether Mr. Snelgrove abused his position as a police officer,' Justice Vikas Khaladkar tells jurors
The jury in the sexual assault trial of Royal Newfoundland Constabulary officer Doug Snelgrove returned to the courtroom Friday afternoon, not with a verdict but with a list of questions for the judge.
The 12 jurors have been in deliberations since Thursday afternoon, after receiving instruction from Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court Justice Vikas Khaladkar on the required elements of a sexual assault conviction as laid out in the Criminal Code, as well as an explanation of the law when it comes to consent and the inducement of it by a person in a position of authority.
“You should take it as a given that Mr. Snelgrove stood in a position of authority (over the complainant),” Khaladkar explained.
The question in that regard, he told the jurors, is whether or not Snelgrove had abused that position to induce the woman to have sex with him.
Snelgrove, 43, is accused of sexually assaulting a woman he drove home from downtown St. John’s while he was on duty one night in December 2014. He has acknowledged having sex with the woman, now 27, after driving her home at 3 a.m. and helping her into her apartment through an unlocked window when she realized she had lost her keys.
The woman told the court she was intoxicated and had blacked out that night and can’t remember if she agreed to have sex with Snelgrove after she accepted a ride home from him, feeling it was safer than getting a cab.
A person cannot legally give consent if they are unconscious or severely intoxicated, and they can’t give consent to sexual activity with someone in a position of authority or trust who abuses that position to induce the consent. All sexual activity without consent is a crime.
On Friday, the jurors paused their deliberations to ask the judge to elaborate on “inducement” and how it might apply in Snelgrove’s case.
“You must find whether the whole of his actions were calculated to entice the woman to engage in sexual activity with him,” Khaladkar replied. “If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions were so calculated, you must find him guilty as charged.”
Khaladkar told the jurors to use their common sense to determine whether or not Snelgrove’s actions amounted to inducement.
“How does his being a uniformed police officer influence her ability to provide consent without the influence of force, threats, fear, fraud or abuse of authority?” the jury asked. “How does his being in her apartment without a valid reason influence her ability to provide consent?”
There are no allegations of force, threats, fear or fraud in this case, Khaladkar explained.
“You have to determine whether Mr. Snelgrove abused his position as a police officer,” he told the jury. “His being in uniform is only one factor you would consider in making that determination. The uniform established that he is in a position of authority, but it does not, in itself, have any bearing on her consent. You must determine whether she did or did not consent, and, if she did consent, whether that consent was negated because of what Mr. Snelgrove did or didn’t do.”
Khaladkar declined to answer the second question, saying it was the jury’s job to do so.
The jurors asked the judge how Snelgrove was able to present a defence that seemed contradictory: the defence had argued the complainant had not been too intoxicated to consent, but had also introduced evidence from a toxicologist saying the woman may have been drunk enough to black out but still appear sober.
Khaladkar explained the defence was entitled to argue a position — that the woman was not overly intoxicated — as well as an alternative one.
“Mr. Snelgrove says (that) to him she appeared to be sober and consenting, and this gave rise to his honest but mistaken belief that she consented,” the judge said.
The jury asked the judge to explain the principle of reasonable doubt and the definition of “reckless or wilfully blind” as it relates to Snelgrove’s obligation to ensure the woman’s consent.
Reasonable doubt is the standard of proof in a criminal trial; a judge or jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused is guilty of the elements of an offence in order to find them guilty. As Khaladkar had explained to the jurors, feeling Snelgrove is “likely” or “probably” guilty isn’t enough; they must be almost certain.
If Snelgrove had known the complainant was too intoxicated to consent when he had intercourse with her, that would meet the definition of reckless, the judge explained. If Snelgrove had intercourse with the woman without determining whether or not she was sober and consenting, that would make him wilfully blind.
Snelgrove’s “honest and mistaken belief” defence isn’t valid if the jury finds he was reckless or wilfully blind, the judge said.
The jurors also asked to listen to the audio recording of both Snelgrove and the complainant’s testimony, in order to clarify specific details. Khaladkar explained they would have to listen to the entire two-hour testimony and cross-examination of the complainant and the defendant. After a brief private discussion, the jurors decided they were satisfied with the judge’s responses to their queries and no longer needed to hear the audio.
Within a few hours, the jury returned with a new question for the judge, asking him for more clarification on the meaning of reasonable doubt.
“If you think Mr. Snelgrove is probably guilty or likely guilty, you have no option but to return a verdict of not guilty,” Khaladkar explained.
The onus is on the Crown to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, but not to the impossible standard of absolute certainty, he said.
Khaladkar told the jurors around 7:30 p.m. to go back to the hotel and continue their deliberations in the morning.